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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis explores the role of learning communities in the evolution of the 
EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). It engages the academic 
debate on institutional learning and the “practice turn” in IR to shed light on the 
factors leading the EU to learn by policy failure, as well as by ten years of 
practice in crisis management. Specifically, the work investigates the role of the 
knowledge and practice-based communities that shaped the consensus 
towards the comprehensive approach, with a strong emphasis on civilian 
means.  
Ideational factors, as opposed to material ones, are critical in understanding 
why the EU has developed a “soft” provider of security, in spite of the St Malo 
commitment to develop hard security capabilities. In the absence of a direct 
threat, EU member states’ preferences towards CSDP were driven by a set of 
new ideas, which in turn resulted from an emerging international agenda 
advocating the development of non-military crisis management approaches and 
tools. Through a critical appraisal of the “practice turn” and its application to the 
study of EU security and defence, the thesis sheds additional light on the 
overlap between knowledge and practice, which bears relevance for the 
research agenda on learning communities and norm diffusion.  
The empirical analysis makes an evidence-based reconstruction of the rise and 
evolution of civilian crisis management (CCM) and security sector reform (SSR). 
The comparison between the two case studies assesses the extent to which, at 
critical junctures, ideational factors influenced security policies. CCM and SSR, 
in fact, shared a similar learning process, yet the former had a much deeper 
impact on the shape and activities of the CSDP than the latter. To account for 
such variation in outcomes, it is argued that the emergence of “learning by 
doing” shaped CCM evolution. On the contrary, the introduction of SSR by 
knowledge-based communities failed to produce a common practice. Therefore, 
when policy innovation is supported by the re-elaboration of practices, the ideas 
diffused by learning communities are more persuasive and impactful on policy-
making.
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Introduction  
 
 
The study of the European Union (EU), and namely of its Common Security 
and Defence Policy (CSDP), has until now failed to spot the processes through 
which new ideas affect policy evolution. It is well known that ideas change the 
world. In more academic words, they produce new patterns of cooperation 
among states, impinging on the formal and informal institutions that were 
created to foster such cooperation. What is most problematic is to determine 
how ideational factors bear impact on actors’ decisions, particularly those 
leading to the adoption of common policy frameworks. What is also unclear is 
how these frameworks then result in observable policy outcomes.  
Drawing from the academic debate on institutional learning (Etheredge, 1985; 
Nye, 1987; Haas E.B., 1990; Haas P.M., 1990; Breslauer and Tetlock, 1991; 
Hall, 1993; Levy, 1994; Zito, 2009; Radaelli, 2009), policy evolution (Adler 
and Haas, 1992) and the recent “practice turn” in IR (Adler and Pouliot, 2011a, 
2011b), this research specifies the conditions under which international 
organisations learn, and how security policies evolve as a consequence of these 
lessons learned. It is argued that specific ideas had impact on EU security 
policies because new knowledge was bound up in the execution of the security 
practices. Conversely, the thesis shows that a purely epistemic enterprise not 
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associated with performance did not generate policy transformation, as 
intersubjective, consensual knowledge struggled to expand. Therefore, the 
objective of this work is to test the avenues of learning affecting CSDP and its 
“learning by doing” evolution. Under what conditions does learning matter and 
what is the relationship between knowledge, practice and power? Can the 
comprehensive approach to CSDP, and in particular the development of non-
military crisis management tools be explained from a practice perspective, or 
does evolution stem from the role of expertise or knowledge-based networks, 
as other authors have suggested (Cross, 2011)?  
The empirical findings demonstrate that institutional learning has policy impact 
when the consensus on the lessons learned from the past is underpinned by a 
common set of normative and principled beliefs - which fits the definition of 
episteme in accordance with Haas’ theory of institutional change; at the same 
time, it shows that policy impact turns into observable policy evolution and 
shapes broader socio-political processes (e.g. the design of CSDP as a 
“civilian” or “soft” provider of security) when the knowledge is embedded in 
communities of practice that structure experience and define the way actors 
socialise and learn.  
In the case of the CSDP, common practices defined the way EU actors learned.  
The nexus between new knowledge and practice is what made CSDP learning 
by doing possible. My contribution demonstrates the academic advantage of 
analysing the CSDP as an environment in which transnational learning, 
promoted by knowledge and practice-based communities, drives policy-
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making. Investigating the role of “learning communities” in CSDP also help 
detecting which one of the several communities discussed by the IR literature 
(Adler, 2008: 199; Cohendet et al., 2011: 306) is more suitable, in analytical 
terms, to account for security cooperation within the EU framework. In fact, 
there is a strong need in IR theory “to clarify the main characteristics of diverse 
communities” (Créplet et al., 2003: 44), how they contribute to knowledge 
creation and what are the implications in policy terms.   
In this regard, it is important to observe that the CSDP environment includes 
sectors where practice – and learning by doing – struggled to emerge, despite 
the evidence of knowledge-based policy innovation. Reappraising the concept 
of epistemic communities helps us assessing the exact extent to which 
impactful learning depends on the overlap between knowledge and practice, 
something that the academic literature has not clarified. As long as EU security 
and defence is a new policy field in which outside-in diffusion processes have 
repeatedly occurred, it can be argued that there can be new knowledge without 
a common practice, but a fully-fledged process of institutional learning cannot 
be achieved without common practice.  
This approach is also applied in an empirical field – security – traditionally 
considered as a hard case for the role of ideas and identities in shaping 
decisions. In this regard, this work suggests that interests are present across the 
whole trajectory of norm diffusion. The conceptual bases of learning 
communities point out the notions of “joint enterprise”, shared beliefs (Haas 
P.M., 1990) and repertoire (Wenger, 1998). These communities are linked to 
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the emergence of a dominant view of a social reality across different 
backgrounds, as in the case of epistemic communities (Haas P.M., 1992); or 
the existence of like-mindedness as the condition for the development, sharing 
and maintenance of common practices leading to collective learning (Adler and 
Pouliot, 2011; Bicchi, 2011).  
Dominance is power-based. The presence of interest-based constituencies (e.g., 
support from one or more member states) backing the formation of consensual 
views determines the ability of the communities to gain access to and influence 
politics. Accordingly, I seek to demonstrate through my empirical analysis that 
the creation of a policy consensus (McNamara, 1998) on new forms of security 
cooperation leads to policy change when ideas are supported by interests and 
can rely on pre-existing practices.  
These factors can largely account for the variation in impact of new norms or 
security prescriptions. Not all ideas, in fact, are equally successful in 
influencing policy-making. Some of them lead to the creation of new 
institutions, bureaucracies, or entail profound changes in actors’ behaviour. 
Other may be diffused, but are discarded or do not manage to persist (Risse-
Kappen, 1994). Some norms shaped the activities, perceptions and the 
institutional design of the CSDP in the first ten years of existence (1999-2009). 
Others had a much more limited impact. Accounting for such variation is a 
main theoretical goal of this thesis.  
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1.1 The argument  
 
Learning has obviously to do with change. What is less obvious is the 
definition of what type of change occurs as an international organisation learns, 
whether it is simple adaptation or more complex belief change (Zito, 2009). 
This thesis defines learning as “the process by which consensual knowledge is 
used to specify causal relationships in new ways so that the results affect the 
content of public policy” (Haas P.M., 1990: 23). This approach proves 
particularly useful for the institutionalisation of security and defence 
cooperation within the EU over the past fifteen years.  
In fact, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU has been 
marked by unprecedented developments in the field of security and defence. 
Prompted by the December 1998 Franco-British St Malo Declaration, the 
CSDP was officially launched at the Cologne European Council on June 1999. 
In the wake of the Yugoslav Wars, the initiative was to provide the European 
Union with the military force the frappe to support the critical mass of the until 
then inconclusive CFSP. It was also a response to major changes in the 
structure of the post-Cold War international system, which urged European 
states to enhance their power projection capability and decrease their reliance 
vis-à-vis the United States (Jones, 2007; Howorth, 2007).  
The evolution “by doing” (Grevi et al., 2009) of the CSDP in the past decade 
affected activities, institutional structures and procedures. It can be understood 
as a wide process involving three fundamental dimensions. First, the building 
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up of institutions and the consequent process of institutional reform, leading to 
the implementation of existing structures, and the creation of new pivotal ones. 
Second, the emergence of a European strategic debate, resulting in the adoption 
of the 2003 European Security Strategy (updated in 2008). Third, the 
operational experience gained by CSDP missions from 2003 onward (Grevi et 
al., 2009). In March 2003, in fact, the EU launched its first military operation 
(EUFOR Concordia, in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) using 
NATO assets under the “Berlin Plus agreement”, while the first autonomous 
CSDP military deployment came about only a few months later, in May 2003, 
with the launch of Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(RDC). Since then, the EU engaged in more than 27 operations, thus becoming 
a significant actor in crisis management in many regions of the world (Western 
Balkans, Africa, Middle East, Caucasus, Asia).  
Such evolution of the CSDP by practice has led some analysts to qualify the 
evolutionary process as learning “by doing” (Juncos, 2006: Grevi et al., 2009). 
The research interest of this thesis, as well as the empirical contribution to the 
debate, does not lie in the rise and development of the CSDP per se, nor in its 
impressive institutional growth alone. My puzzle centres on the specific design 
the CSDP has evolved into, through the acquisition of new knowledge and its 
application it “by doing”.   
Seen from an institutionalist perspective, the shaping of the CSDP appears as a 
history of endogenous institutional change producing unintended consequences 
(Menon and Sedelmeier, 2010; Pierson, 1996). As a matter of fact, whereas the 
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nature of past errors (e.g. policy failure in the Balkans) and the lessons learned 
concerned the absence of military means, the solution has rather gone in the 
opposite direction. In empirical, operational terms the CSDP has developed 
mostly on the civilian side of the crisis management spectrum (Drent, 2011). 
The comprehensive approach (CA) and civil-military coordination have 
dominated the political, strategic and institutional dynamics. Concerned with 
clearing up why the EU had started engaging in crisis management, where and 
with what implications on the Brussels-based bureaucratic machinery, the 
academic literature has failed to explain why something that was supposed to 
have a military outlook and outreach, ended up being overwhelmingly civilian 
or civil-military. Alternative explanations of the EU security architecture, as 
the next chapter will show, are indefinite as to why actors learned and 
socialised in a specific manner, and how their common understanding of the 
CSDP as non-military was constructed.  
By engaging the debate, the theoretical starting point of this work lies in the 
institutionalist approach quoted above. CSDP institutions evolved as a result of 
endogenous change impacting on states’ cooperative attitude. At the same time, 
my research challenges institutionalism on two grounds: the processes and the 
outcomes of institutional change. Concerning processes, my work reframes the 
study of socialisation within CSDP (Meyer, 2006; Juncos and Pomorska, 2006; 
Juncos and Reynolds, 2007; Cross, 2010) so as to focus on the conditions for 
persuasiveness defining how socialising forces matter. By doing so, it identifies 
learning communities as the “carriers of change”, mediating between structure 
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and agency, as well as between interests and ideas, and ultimately leading to 
learning. The EU has become a comprehensive security provider because 
transnational expertise and practice-based communities pushed forward a new 
security thinking changing the traditional – military – understanding of crisis 
management. Curiously enough, the academic literature has overlooked the 
nexus between the profound re-conceptualisation of security resulting from the 
changing nature of post-Cold War crises, on the one hand, and the new 
activities developed by international organisations, including the EU, on the 
other. The impact of the paradigmatic shift in security on new norms 
influencing the security agenda, and hence on the content of cooperation trough 
CSDP, has hardly been inquired into. Nonetheless, a link exists between the 
generation of new security norms at the international level and the 
development of the EU comprehensive approach, including all the sub-policies 
that fall under this label. CSDP’s adaptation to systemic pressures was then 
characterised by an emerging consensus on the importance of non-military 
crisis management and on the value of civilian and integrated capabilities. 
These ideas diffused and trickled down the EU decision-making by means of 
social interaction. They ultimately affected the way states preferences are 
shaped and gained salience in the CSDP setting because practice helped 
constructing and consolidating social interaction.   
This thesis shows how the practice of security enabled the EU to learn and 
evolve. In that respect, it fills a lacuna in the institutionalist literature, which 
tends to focus on the creation or reshaping of institutions rather than their 
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effect (Menon, 2011; Barnett and Finnemore, 1999). A convergence on a 
comprehensive vision of the CSDP, in fact, does not automatically translate 
into the CSDP implementing comprehensive policies. My work follows the 
causal chain of events to reconstruct how specific concepts within the EU 
comprehensive approach framework turned into policies, and why specific 
ideas produced policy evolution by means of experiential learning while others 
did not. The framework develops four pathways of influence, which describe 
the conditions under which ideas turn into policies. These include the presence 
of a power constituency supporting the diffusion and institutionalisation of the 
new ideas; the formation of cohesiveness and a “sense of belonging” among 
practitioners, facilitated by a common identity; a shared epistemic enterprise 
aimed at producing policy innovation; and the emulation of a successful model 
of cooperation or policy implementation.  
 
1.2 The research design 
 
The hypotheses are tested on two case studies: security sector reform (SSR) 
and civilian crisis management (CCM). The choice of these two case studies 
was based on the following criteria.  
Cases should, first of all, represent new or emerging policy fields in CSDP. 
They should also be relevant for the EU comprehensive approach, in terms of 
civilian or holistic contribution to crisis management concepts/procedures. 
Concerning the institutionalisation within the CSDP, each case should have a 
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clearly defined policy framework with at least one CSDP operation carried out 
between 2003 and 2009 (SSR and CCM missions). Finally, selection was 
influenced by the degree of comparability between the processes of norm 
diffusion, variation in policy outcomes/evolution and availability of sources. 
Both SSR and CCM provide sound empirical evidence of the presence of the 
communities of practice and/or experts promoting the diffusion of new norms 
that originate in the post-Cold War security environment. These communities 
act within a dense networked governance system (Mérand et al., 2010) 
composed of a variety of units: bureaucratic actors, national desks officers, 
NGOs, diplomats, military staff etc. In each one of the two case studies, a 
questionnaire inspired from social network analysis was used to structure 
interview questions. Namely, it helped locating the relevant communities and 
their membership, so as to facilitate the task of detecting the inner working 
processes, practices and knowledge flows. Despite the relatively poor academic 
attention to the EU SSR and CCM developments, these two policy areas 
occupy a central position in the EU’s comprehensive provision of crisis 
management. Both are key examples of policy innovation, hence useful cases 
to explain how policy consensus emerges, diffuses, gets institutionalised and 
evolves. At the same time, differences in policy outcomes – especially 
institutional developments and operational outreach – make a comparative 
analysis between SSR and CCM suitable for testing the conditions under which 
some norms lead to policy evolution, while others do not.  
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Besides exploring the genesis of the comprehensive approach as a process of 
learning, my work seeks to answer the following questions: why did CCM 
have more impact in shaping the CSDP in terms of policy outcomes? Was a 
policy consensus on SSR more difficult to muster, or to turn into 
implementation, and if so, why? Starting from similar conditions of policy 
failure, followed by policy innovation, the relative success of CCM and poor 
evolution of SSR tell us that even if they are “grabbed” by policy-makers and 
enter the institutional arena, norms may still fail or struggle to survive in 
practice. Even the presence of national constituencies (e.g. backing from the 
United Kingdom, in the case of SSR) are alone not sufficient to cope with the 
intricacies of multilateral cooperation. The connection between ideas and 
interests needs to be complemented by the one between knowledge and 
practice.  
Finally, the choice of SSR and CCM was functional to the feasibility of this 
research. Whereas the notion of comprehensiveness would have been too broad 
to analyse, SSR and CCM fit the empirical targets of this study, as they allow a 
narrow focus and an in-depth inquiry into specific policy areas at the heart of 
the paradigmatic shift in security.  
The comparison between SSR and CCM builds on Mill’s method of difference 
and a qualitative, semi-structured interviews-based research design in order to 
test the hypotheses that cohesiveness and overlapping practices/epistemes are 
key determinants of variation. Therefore, the same research methods have been 
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used to gather empirical evidence, although structured questions have been 
slightly adjusted to the different contexts.  
To facilitate comparison between empirical findings (cf. chapter 8), the case 
study chapters have symmetrical structures. In both cases, research findings are 
presented according to three dimensions: (1) the types of learning 
communities, namely their composition and cohesiveness, which define the 
cognitive architecture of the policy area under study; (2) the diffusion process 
of ideas, according to an assessment of the pathways of influence and 
intervening factors; (3) the analysis of policy outcomes, and whether evolution 
as learning by doing has occurred or not.    
 
1.3 Significance  
 
Kenneth Waltz wrote “elegance in social science theories means that 
explanation and prediction will be general” (Waltz, 1979). Although this study 
aims at achieving as much elegance as my academic experience allow, the 
undertaking may prove to be vain as studies on the European Union are in 
general difficult to generalise. This is mostly due to the sui generis nature of 
the EU integration process, including in the “less than supranational but more 
than intergovernmental” security and defence policy (Howorth, 2011).   
The theoretical scope of this work might therefore be somewhat narrower, but 
nonetheless worth the effort to address the CSDP’s continuous process of 
institutional adaptation. My theoretical framework seeks to overcome the 
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realist emphasis on exogenous processes of change, but also engages the 
current “inward looking” analyses of institutional dynamics and social rules 
within the Brussels-based bureaucratic machinery (aka Brusselsisation) that 
has been gaining ground since the mid-2000s. The thesis merges elements of 
sociological institutionalism (March and Olsen, 1989; Christiansen et al., 1999; 
Checkel, 2005), networked governance (Mérand et al., 2011) and 
epistemic/communitarian approaches to International Relations (Ruggie, 1975; 
Haas E.B., 1990; Haas P.M., 1990; Verdun, 1999; Cross, 2011; Adler, 2005), 
including the most recent “practice turn” (Adler, 2008; Adler and Pouliot, 
2011; Lachmann, 2010). The sociological source of inspiration resides in the 
works of Foucault (1970) and Bourdieu (1990) and their conceptualisation of 
epistemes and background knowledge. The concept of learning communities 
(Adler, 2008), seeks to bring ideas back into the debate on European security 
cooperation, while at the same time making clear that ideational forces and 
socialisation matter but do not operate independently from power.  
The empirical scope on the CSDP has three focal points: the structure of 
learning communities interacting in the CSDP environment; the ensuing 
dynamics of norm diffusion; and the impact in terms of policy outcomes.  
Concerning structural aspects and the problem of “cohesiveness”, the original 
contribution of this research is to visualise learning communities beyond 
formal institutional structures or committees, and to picture them as “islands of 
knowledge and practice”, transcending states and international organisations’ 
boundaries. Therefore, the argument (Cross, 2011: 26) that epistemic 
Chapter 1 – Introduction  
                   27 
communities’ internal cohesiveness explains external persuasiveness is 
reformulated so as to include a more nuanced definition of the content (what is 
agreed or not agreed upon), the domestic setting (culture, institutional barriers 
to the formation of consensus) and, most importantly, the linkage with 
professionalism and practice.  
Another innovative feature of this analysis is that it explores the extent to 
which previous experiences in a given policy field (e.g. civilian police) and the 
existence of networks of practitioners support the formation of new knowledge, 
and hence boost learning. In terms of norm diffusion, the empirical case studies 
test the applicability of the policy evolution model (Adler and Haas, 1992; 
McNamara, 1998) to security policies. By going through the steps of failure, 
innovation and norm diffusion, important indications can be derived in order to 
understand how international organisations dealing with security and crisis 
management adapt their policy objectives and institutional setting to face 
changing circumstances.  
Concerning the outcomes, the value added for studies on the CSDP is to put 
learning by doing (Juncos, 2006), previously looked at as an isolated concept, 
into the broader context of institutional learning. According to my model, in 
fact, policy evolution should produce learning by doing, understood as the 
refinement of new policy tools out of the first waves of operational experiences 
leading to feedback loops. The absence of lessons learned is, in this regard, a 
symptom that a convergence on the policy consensus has struggled to turn into 
convergence in outcomes and implementation.  
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All in all, while being careful on the “elegance”, the nub of my argument is to 
follow the norm, rather than the money or the institutional structures, and 
connect it with the relevant pre-existing or emerging practices.  
 
1.4 The structure of the thesis  
 
The remaining chapters of this thesis identify the emerging consensus on non-
military and civil-military approaches to crisis management as the foremost 
achievement of the CSDP since its creation in the late-1990s. The consensus 
came out as an adaptive response to changing international conditions leading 
states to no longer view purely military interventions as viable means to solve 
conflicts and to design security cooperation within the EU accordingly. This 
consensus, supported by key constituencies of member states, allowed the 
CSDP to find its “niche” in the European security landscape by investing in the 
comprehensive dimension of crisis management and hence differentiating itself 
from other international organisations dealing with security (e.g. NATO). The 
learning process, however, resulted in some norms being more influential than 
other and, as a consequence, in different patterns of policy evolutions across 
areas of cooperation. The limit of learning is that the policy consensus does not 
necessarily turn into a good practice, or effective cooperative outcomes.  
The CSDP empirical record demonstrates that ideational factors can drive 
cooperation, but also that such cooperation does not automatically turn into 
successful and impactful provision of security. This narrow experience of the 
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comprehensive approach, by SSR and CCM means, can therefore illuminate 
integrative efforts in other sectors. Namely, it can shed light on the interaction 
between material and ideational factors, as well as on the link between rhetoric 
and practice of cooperation.  
In chapter 2, the argument of the thesis is developed. I start from a review the 
literature on the rise of European security cooperation. I argue that the 
academic debate has acknowledged the importance of transnational 
communities as driver of learning and institutionalisation (Cross, 2011) but 
failed to account for the permanence of some practices and the fading of others. 
Furthermore, the formative interactions leading to the formation of knowledge 
have not been sufficiently studied. Therefore, the chapter discusses the way my 
analytical framework fills this gap in the literature, and how the concepts of 
epistemic communities and communities of practice are operationalised to 
explain the current shape of the CSDP. I hypothesize that policy evolution 
occurs if practice and knowledge overlap, and elaborate on the pathways of 
influence and intervening factors through which new ideas turn into policies. 
The methodology section discusses how the learning process is assessed and 
expounds the qualitative methods used to trace learning communities. In 
particular, it specifies how the triangulation between semi-structured 
interviews, process-tracing and document analysis made it possible to detect 
the attributes and types of communities, the process of knowledge formation, 
its subsequent integration into the CSDP framework and the emergence of 
learning by doing.    
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Chapter 3 and 4 pave the way for the empirical analysis. They introduce the 
paradigmatic shift in security that occurred since the end of the Cold War, as 
well as the structures, actors and networks that construct the CSDP, with an 
emphasis on their “comprehensive” nature. Overall, these are two 
complementary chapters, whose principal aim is to introduce the 
“comprehensive approach” the EU’s crisis management tools are embedded 
into.  
Chapter 3 does that by focusing on the origins of comprehensiveness. It 
connects the re-conceptualisation of the definition of security resulting from 
the new nature of crisis management to international responses – namely 
human security and peacebuilding. By doing so, it explains how the idea of 
comprehensiveness and its implementation through the EU comprehensive 
approach are rooted in a broader paradigmatic shift affecting the global 
security agenda. Therefore, the chapter seeks to link global norm generation to 
the rise of the EU’s specificity in comprehensive crisis management.  
Chapter 4 examines how the comprehensive approach shaped the CSDP 
institutional design. Special emphasis is placed on the “culture of coordination” 
and the institutional interface connecting military and non-military, civilian 
structures.  It is argued that the governance process is made of three 
dimensions: structures, actors and networks. Accordingly, the chapter seeks to 
provide an exhaustive explanation of the CSDP system by examining the 
interplay between the three dimensions. Conclusions show that the CSDP 
system is characterised by the presence of different type of networks and 
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communities that structure relationships between actors and structures. 
Moreover, they show that those networks are manifold and multi-level, thus 
extending beyond the formal institutional setting where intergovernmental 
negotiations occur: network’s configurations vary depending on the sector 
analysed. 
Moving on to the analysis of the case studies, chapters 5, 6 and 7 constitute the 
empirical bulk of the thesis. The framework for learning and policy evolution 
is applied to the emergence of SSR and CCM within the EU security 
architecture.  
Chapter 5 introduces the two policy frameworks and makes clear how they fit 
into the CSDP, particularly as regards their contribution to shaping an 
integrated or comprehensive vision of security cooperation. The purpose of this 
introductory chapter is to help the reader understanding the levels of the 
analysis and gathering background information on the case studies before 
embarking upon the empirical investigation. Accordingly, it contains both an 
overview of the relevant academic literature as well as a state-of-the-art 
description of the scope, structures, procedures and practices related to the 
implementation of SSR and CCM.  
Chapter 6 investigates the case of SSR. It addresses the questions of why and 
how SSR principles were institutionalised by EU member states, what 
influenced EU policy-makers’ choices and, finally, what have been the 
outcomes of the policy consensus on the EU approach to SSR. Through a 
thorough investigation of the role of learning communities and by tracing back 
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the dynamics of norm diffusion, this first case study concludes that 
convergence was driven by a confluence of ideational factors and state 
interests. Empirical evidence shows the role of national constituencies (the 
United Kingdom in particular) in supporting the diffusion of SSR’s knowledge.  
At the same time, conclusions highlight the failure of SSR framework to turn 
into a real convergence in policy outcomes and evolution. As a result, SSR’s 
overall impact on the shape and activities of CSDP has been limited.  
Chapter 7 analyses the development of CCM in the EU through the lenses of 
conceptual evolution, and the resulting diffusion of ideas and practices across 
EU member states. By asking similar questions to the ones raised in the case of 
SSR, and with similar starting conditions (experience of policy failure and 
policy innovation), the chapter illustrates a different picture of learning. 
Knowledge is, in the CCM case, rooted in shared practices, born out of EU 
member states’ previous experiences in civilian missions (e.g. police) with 
other international organisations. The genesis of a CCM policy framework and 
the so-called “EU way to civilian crisis management” (Nowak, 2006) are hence 
practice-driven, and strongly supported by the constituency of Nordic EU 
member states - Sweden and Finland in particular. Conclusions to this chapter 
emphasise, in stark contrast with the previous case study, the much stronger 
impact of CCM in defining the CSDP, and the greater amount of policy 
evolution through learning by doing.  
Chapter 8 explains such variation and uncovers the causal link between 
learning communities and policy evolution, in light of the evidence emerged 
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from the case studies. It summarises and compares the empirical, then 
discusses the theoretical implications. By linking the case studies findings to 
the broader thesis’ argument, this chapter answers the question of why some 
ideas turn into policy evolution while others do not.  
The thesis concludes with chapter 9, where the theoretical and policy relevance 
of this work, as well as some recommendations for future research are mused 
on.  
 
 Chapter 2 
 
The theoretical framework  
 
Introduction: explanans and explanandum 
 
 
This thesis challenges the conventional wisdom that the soft or civilian focus of 
the CSDP results from the lack of a consensus among member states on the 
degree of military integration in the EU (Santopinto and Price, 2013). Quite the 
contrary, the development of an overwhelmingly civilian CSDP is the end 
product of a growing transnational consensus on non-military approaches to 
crisis management. This explanation shows the limits of IR theories 
emphasising inter-state bargains and balancing/bandwagoing behaviour, and 
stresses the importance of ideational factors in shaping security policy-making. 
New ideas can affect security policies, but different channels for diffusion may 
lead to different outcomes in policy terms. The channels under study are 
transnational communities of experts and practitioners, who act as carriers of 
knowledge into policy-making structures. Understanding how ideas turn into 
policies through these channels may help explaining the reason why some 
ideas produce change while others do not; and, as a result, what type of 
cooperation stems from what ideational factors and under what conditions. 
Questions about how actors learn, what lessons they draw, how knowledge 
produces change in international organisations, have been salient in political 
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science and IR debates over the past thirty years. These questions have also 
been relevant for the study of the European Union (Zito, 2001, 2009; Zito and 
Schout, 2009; Radaelli, 1995, 2009). As the other policy areas studied in the 
literature, learning also took place in EU security and defence, an area of 
cooperation that was created in the late-1990s and has grown substantially ever 
since. Therefore, the theoretical question worth asking is whether the 
transnational communities performing the learning process matter in EU 
security policy-making, which ones do, and how?  
By way of introduction, let us briefly consider the historical and international 
context first. Since the end of the Cold War, security has become a complex 
and multidimensional concept, owing to the decline of traditional inter-state 
wars and the rise of new challenges such as intra-state conflicts, asymmetric 
and unconventional warfare, terrorism, civil wars, or threats related to failing 
or failed states. The international provision of security and multilateral defence 
cooperation, have evolved accordingly. Multilateral institutions have become 
increasingly absorbed in the management of security crises. Despite 
operational distress and budgetary constraints, crisis management has become 
a term of art in the post-1989 security discourse, and translated into a diffused 
international practice. Collective security organisations started to engage in 
complex peacekeeping, crisis management or nation-building tasks whose 
nature was not essentially military. Responding to momentous changes in 
polarity as well as in the nature of armed conflicts, comprehensive forms of 
intervention have therefore emerged, entailing profound changes in the way 
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actors decide upon and implement their responses to crises. These “new 
trajectories” for crisis management involved the conceptualisation of different 
and longer phases of action, joining short-term combat responses with broad 
conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction long-term programmes.   
The most immediate implication of these transformations for security and 
defence cooperation has been the increased value of civilians and civilian 
capabilities in what was previously considered a domaine réservé for the 
military. New scenarios opened up in the field of international security, with 
experts and practitioners gradually moving towards a consensus on the critical 
importance of civilian, and “civilian-military” work to the success of crisis 
management operations (Chivvis, 2010: 1).  
Both states and international organisations refined their crisis management 
goals, means, and instruments according to new systemic priorities. However, 
the way these actors responded to structural stimuli varies from case to case. 
There is no universal doctrine or model for civil-military crisis management, 
since each actor develops different instruments, sets out different goals, or uses 
different terms according to contextual or historical considerations (Wendling, 
2010: 10). As a result, understanding “how” single actors respond to structural 
pressures is crucial in explaining "why" change takes place in the international 
security environment.  
The “how” question is a theoretical one, and implies the presence of some 
intervening factors between agency and structure, which alter the way these 
two interact. These factors are social and ideational. Actors do not just adapt to 
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structural constraints, such as changes in the distribution of natural resources or 
an alteration of the balance of power, in order to guarantee their self-
preservation in an anarchic international system. States, and international 
organisations alike, learn by diffusing and assimilating new knowledge: 
endogenous factors, such as ideas, identity, expertise or the social interaction 
with other actors, affect the way preferences are shaped. From a theoretical 
standpoint, asserting that international organisations learn entails embracing a 
pragmatic approach merging some elements of social constructivism and 
institutionalism. To what extent does this pragmatic approach apply to the 
evolutionary dynamics of the EU's CSDP? The new approaches to global 
security and crisis management that originated in the post-Cold War 
international system have affected the EU and other security institutions (UN, 
NATO, OSCE) in a similar way, but with different outcomes.  
What generated change in CSDP is the overarching question of this research. 
From a theoretical standpoint, the evolution of the CSDP into the 
comprehensive approach, with a critical focus on civilian means, constitutes 
the explanandum. The outcomes that this thesis seeks to explain are the 
institutional structures sustaining CSDP; the operational outreach; the means at 
its disposal; the holistic procedures for crisis response. The analysis of the 
determinant – that is, the explanans – is framed as the combination between the 
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practice, knowledge and power, which generally define the process of learning 
and, in the case of the CSDP, was operationalised as learning by doing.1  
The claim that the EU has learned to be a security actor “by doing” suggests 
the importance of an international practices approach to understand the 
determinants of the learning process (Adler and Pouliot, 2011a: 16). This thesis 
tests such claim by assessing the extent to which evolution in CSDP could not 
be, instead, explained through the lenses of other learning approaches. The 
theoretical framework considers different pathways by which ideas turn into 
policy. While elaborating on the pathways, I deemed it necessary not to limit 
my ontological choice to the concept of communities of practice, but to 
include, as useful competing explanations, knowledge-based, epistemic 
communities (Haas E.B., 1990) as well. Hence the question arises as to 
whether practice-based communities, as opposed to other communities, played 
a determinant role in producing evolution.  
The hypotheses presented in this chapter suggest that, in European security, 
learning by doing has occurred in those sector areas in which practitioners have 
endowed their joint enterprise with political validity, epistemic ground for 
action, and intersubjective meaning. In other words, practices helped 
constructing, or reconstructing from past experiences, the common knowledge 
as well as a common understanding of a political reality. By contrast, in other 
sector areas, common practices have struggled to emerge, although new 
                                                
1 In the words of the EU Institute for Security Studies’ former Director Alvaro de Vasconcelos, 
who quoted the Spanish poet Antonio Machado, “walking is how you learn to walk” (Grevi et 
al., 2009: 12).  
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epistemes (ideas and cognitive content) have nonetheless had an effect on 
policies and decision-making events.  
Acknowledging the importance of international practices and their contribution 
to the understanding of world politics, this research tests the applicability of a 
learning framework to the understanding of CSDP evolution. The research 
design looks at two sectors of EU security cooperation that display variation in 
the outcomes of policy evolution. One is CCM, which has expanded and 
significantly impacted on the CSDP activities. The other is SSR, which, on the 
contrary, has failed to become a fully-fledged practice and occupies a marginal 
role in the EU security framework. The presence of a community of practice in 
the case of CCM, and its absence in the epistemic-driven emergence of SSR, 
explain the failure of the latter, the successful evolution of the former and its 
impact on the overall strategic posture of the CSDP.  
 
2.1 The rise and evolution of European security cooperation  
 
The academic debate on European security cooperation has largely ignored 
these factors. Namely, it has failed to account for the EU response to the 
changing nature of international security. Scholarship on European security has 
not produced a comprehensive framework that could explain – theoretically – 
the rearrangement of EU security policies, structures and capabilities 
(institutional reform) or the creation of new institutions from scratch, as well as 
the resulting process of policy change.  
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This section briefly reviews the alternative explanations for the emergence of 
CSDP, in order to show the original contribution of this thesis. It is divided in 
two parts: genesis and evolution. The first part focuses on the explanations for 
the “rise” of the CSDP, while the second addresses its advancement through 
institutional and operational development.  
 
2.1.1 CSDP genesis: exogenous and endogenous drivers 
 
The academic debate on CSDP has its origins in the causes and remedies to the 
EU’s diplomatic échec in the Balkans (Pond, 1999; Forster and Wallace, 
2000).2 It pertained to the redefinition of the European security architecture 
according to the transformations in the post-1989 international system, namely 
vis-à-vis the US and NATO (Kupchan, 2003). In this regard, the EU’s inaction 
in the Yugoslav tragedy not only reflected a fundamental split in the interests 
of the three larger member states (France, Germany and the UK), but was also 
the logical consequence of the lack of a military underpinning characterising a 
European diplomacy “without teeth” (Jopp and Diedrichs, 2009: 100). In his 
formulation of the “capabilities-expectations gap”, Hill (1993) pioneered the 
conceptualisation of European foreign and security policy, based on the notions 
of actorness and presence (Hill, 1993: 308), which showed the gap between 
what the EU was talked up to and what was able to deliver (Hill, 1993: 306).  
                                                
2 As Fraser Cameron put it, “the lessons of the Yugoslav conflict were never far from the 
minds of the negotiators at the 1996 IGC preparing improvements in the CFSP” (Cameron, 
1999: 32).  
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The first attempts to account for the launch of the CSDP at the December 1998 
St Malo Summit, and its official establishment six months later at the Cologne 
Summit, described the initiative mainly as a reaction to exogenous stimuli 
affecting European security (Pond, 2002; Duke, 1999; Cornish and Edwards, 
2005).  
Accordingly, structural realist perspectives have explained the evolution of 
CSDP as a European attempt to balance against the United States (Posen, 
2009). The main problem with this approach is that the “hard balancing” thesis 
– a robust military build up to rebalance the transatlantic relationship – has 
failed to materialise. Instead, the EU’s crisis management machinery has been 
soft-security intensive. Variants of realism have sought to address this point. 
The idea of “soft balancing”, developed by Pape (2005), contends that 
Europeans are instead more likely to balance the United States through 
“international institutions, economic statecraft, and strict interpretations of 
neutrality” (Pape, 2005: 17).  
Engaging realist scholars, Howorth (2007) contends that structural change is 
not the only factor that spurred European security cooperation. Two sets of 
combined explanatory variables (exogenous and endogenous factors) account 
for the EU’s move towards a global security commitment. He identifies four 
underlying drivers behind CSDP: a) exogenous forces deriving from the end of 
the Cold War, most notably the lessening strategic importance of Europe for 
the United States; b) new tasks and concept entered the IR lexicon in the post-
Westphalian “new world order”, such as crisis management, that meshed easily 
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with the multilateral internationalism of most of the EU’s activities; c) the 
reappearance of military conflict in the European continent (Western Balkans); 
d) the development of a European defence industry (Howorth, 2007: 52). 
Andrew Moravcsik (1998) also stresses the importance of endogenous sources 
such as the convergence of member states interests and interstate bargains or 
the pressure from domestic groups having an interest in areas such as the 
production of weapons, economic sanctions and the creation of joint military 
forces. Without denying the primary role of power and interest in shaping 
interstate relations, Moravcsik’s neoliberal theory of European cooperation 
maintains that the preferences of domestic actors and political processes in the 
domestic policy shape an institutional setting whose inner functioning abides 
by the rules of intergovernmentalism.  
More recently, Gross and Juncos (2011) have studied the relationship between 
changes in the international security environment and EU operational 
approaches. They focused on the impact of EU crisis management capabilities 
on the EU’s role and self-perception as a security actor.  
None of these accounts of the genesis of the CSDP, however, answer the 
underlying question of this thesis as to why some security concepts (and not 
others) become embedded in discourse and practice (Koenig, 2012: 131), and 
what has driven a specific shape of the CSDP in its formative process.  
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2.1.2 CSDP evolution  
 
Works on CSDP implementation have been manifold and largely dominated 
the “second wave of CSDP theorising” (Kurowska and Breuer, 2012: 2). As a 
result of the first of operational experiences (2003-2009), studies on the 
evaluation of EU missions (Merlingen and Otrauskaite, 2008; Emerson and 
Gross, 2007; Grevi et al., 2009; Pirozzi and Sandawi, 2009) and related 
institutional learning (Juncos and Pomorska, 2006; Ioannides, 2006; Adebahr, 
2009) emerged in the literature. Academic writings have been particularly 
concerned with the functioning of Brussels-based institutions and the process 
of Brusselsisation (Duke, 2005). Scholars belonging to this strand see CSDP as 
an institutional context within which “actors’ identities and interests develop 
and change through interaction” (Checkel, 1999: 550). Theories on 
socialisation and organisational learning have provided some additional insight 
on the process of identity construction and rearticulating of interests as 
significant change-inducing factors in an institutionalised and socialisation-
prone setting (Juncos and Pomorska, 2006; Adebahr, 2009). However, a 
question remains open as to what extent CSDP has created dynamics of path-
dependency (Kay, 2005), constraining member states behaviour (Pierson, 
1996) and letting security cooperation enter a path of unintended consequences 
(Hall and Taylor, 1996).  
CSDP’s influence on states behaviour has been looked at through the lenses of 
Europeanisation. Through a comparative analysis, Giegerich (2006) discovered 
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patterns of adaptation of national cultures to the emerging EU strategic culture. 
Meyer (2006) compared the evolution of public and élite opinion in selected 
countries to find areas of shared consensus and norm compatibility fostering 
the convergence of national interests. Gross (2009) analysed British, French 
and German policies with respect to CFSP/CSDP in two specific crises 
(FYROM and Afghanistan) in order to determine whether Europeanisation of 
national foreign security policies occurred or whether other considerations 
(such as the influence of the transatlantic alliance) were more pertinent to 
explain national preferences.  
Several authors have also emphasised fierce tensions among member states as 
determinants of CSDP (Menon, 1994, 2006; Howorth, 2007, 2011). According 
to Menon (2011) cleavages that have emerged across several dimensions 
(civilian vs military instruments; Atlanticists vs Europeanists; territorial 
defence vs force projection)3 exerted pressure on institutional structures, 
producing incremental institutional change.  
More recently, academic research has moved to a collegial outlook over the 
social networks (Mérand et al., 2011) and the role of expertise as “epistemic” 
shaper of policy change (Cross, 2011). Mérand has looked at processes of 
socialisation within institutional settings. The CSDP is a “social field”, 
comprised of policy-makers seeking to make sense of the world which in turn 
leaves them “open to new ways (rules, power structures, and symbolic 
representations) of structuring” the CSDP (Mérand, 2010: 372). All in all, the 
                                                
3 See also Giegerich (2006).  
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analysis of networks and epistemic communities marked a rapprochement of 
sociological institutionalism to power, as it became clear that socialisation and 
ideational forces matter but could not float or operate freely (Risse-Kappen, 
1994). It is at this specific juncture, at this critical moment of research on the 
dynamics of EU security cooperation, that my thesis engages the academic 
debate.  
 
2.2 Learning and CSDP: conceptual and ontological choices 
 
 
According to Jopp and Diedrichs, the EU is an organisation involved in a kind 
of “lifelong institutional learning”, trying to incrementally improve its own set 
of procedures and instruments for better coping with external crises and 
problems (Jopp and Diedrichs, 2009: 106). Ginsberg, too, acknowledges the 
importance of institutional learning in EU foreign and security policy 
developments in the early twenty-first century (Ginsberg, 2007: 43).  
This thesis re-frames the role of learning as a driving force behind the 
evolution of CSDP. Namely, it looks at the CSDP as a social field, 
characterised by the presence of a multitude learning communities. These 
communities produce change by mediating between structure and agency, and 
between exogenous and endogenous factors. Communities do not simply 
exchange knowledge, as networks do. They construct and diffuse cognitive 
content to achieve a specific policy enterprise.   
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On that account, the present thesis seeks to fill a theoretical gap in the 
literature. What drove the specific orientation of CSDP towards the soft 
provision of security (Drent, 2011), with an institutional and operational 
emphasis on the comprehensive approach, which largely rests on civilian 
means?  
It is argued that new norms, ideas and shared beliefs, arising from policy 
failure and gradually turning into “consensual knowledge”, have shaped the 
rise and evolution of non-military CSDP by activating processes of policy and 
institutional evolution as learning. Accordingly, my work investigates the 
policy consensus that produced EU cooperation in crisis management, thus 
shedding light on the causal force of ideas in driving CSDP. It aims to go down 
the causal chain to reconstruct how specific concepts turned into policies, why 
other were discarded and what crucial factors influenced the emergence and 
diffusion of consensual knowledge. Finally, it accounts for the lag between 
policy change and policy outcomes, hence explaining why specific ideas 
produced evolution as experiential learning and others did not.     
This section presents the conceptual choices of the thesis and defines learning 
in relation to the actors, or communities, performing it. Drawing from the 
academic literature on learning, it appraises the evolution from the notion of 
epistemic communities (epicoms) to the practice turn in IR and the growing use 
of communities of practice (CoPs) as the conceptual focus of research. 
Assessing the distinction between epicoms and CoPs is important. In fact, 
while the former have been previously used by scholars to account for the role 
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of expertise in shaping EU decisions (Cross, 2011), the latter have gained 
ground to conceptualise the EU as a set of practices (Bicchi, 2011) that 
constitute, and not result from, knowledge. Clarifying whether the carriers of 
learning are expertise or practice-based is hence crucial to determine who are 
the agents of the learning process and under what conditions the latter results in 
policy evolution.   
 
2.2.1 What does “an international organisation learns” mean? 
 
The notion of learning is, to use Jack Levy’s famous expression, a “conceptual 
minefield (…) difficult to define, isolate, measure, and apply empirically” 
(Levy, 1994: 280).4  
A fundamental distinction is between individual (Levy, 1994; Stein, 1994; 
Argyris and Schon, 1978) and collective learning (March and Olsen, 1988; 
Etheredge, 1985; Downie, 1998; Breslauer and Tetlock, 1991; Haas E.B., 
1990; Nye, 1987). Levy gives a basic definition of individual learning as “a 
change of beliefs (or the degree of confidence in one’s beliefs) or the 
development of new beliefs, skills, or procedures as a result of the observation 
and interpretation of experience” (Levy, 1994: 286). On the contrary, collective 
learning implies the possibility that a group of individuals (a government, an 
                                                
4 Each one of the major paradigms in IR Theory has coped with the problem posed by learning 
lessons to achieve change. While for neorealist scholars learning takes a “deceptively simple 
meaning” (Breslauer and Tetlock, 1991: 24 as mechanical adaptation to structural pressures 
(Waltz, 1979), neoliberals maintain that regimes may foster organisational learning by creating 
or reinforcing institutional memory (Nye, 1987). Social constructivism found a particular 
interest in collective, shared learning and socialisation (Checkel, 2001; Finnemore, 1996).  
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organisation, an institution) could learn in much the same way as single 
individuals do, thus having their distinctive (but shared) goals, beliefs, and 
memories. Collective learning is commonly classified into two similar, but not 
identical categories: organisational learning and institutional learning.5  
The literature also distinguishes between two levels of learning, determined by 
the degree of complexity and the effects of learning on the actors’ behaviour. 
The distinction is between simple adaptation, involving simple instrumental 
change, and complex learning, involving belief change (Zito, 2009; Argyris 
and Schon, 1996; Haas E.B., 1990), although the same notions have been given 
different labels by scholars.6 Haas defines adaptation as the process by which 
“behaviour changes as actors add new activities (or drop old ones), thus 
altering the means of actions, but not the ends of the organisation”. Instead, 
learning occurs when “the ultimate purpose of the organisation is redefined as 
means as well as ends are questioned and new ends are devised on the basis of 
consensual knowledge that has become available” (Haas E.B., 1990: 3). As a 
result, “true” learning involves a reassessment of fundamental beliefs and 
values. It entails a reconsidering of how policy-makers approach a major 
problem, hence referring to a situation in which the policy-makers’ 
comprehension moves towards a more complex and integrated understanding 
of an issue accompanied by a new formulation of the problem-solving.  
                                                
5 Organisational learning is commonly used in sociology, whereas political scientists give 
preference to the term “institutional learning” so as to encompass the broader definition of 
“institutions” covering organisations, rules, norms and regimes. That being said, the two terms 
have been often used interchangeably.  
6 Adaptation is also known as single-loop (Argyris and Schon, 1978) structural adjustment 
(Levy, 1994) or “simple” learning. Learning is also labelled double-loop learning (Argyris and 
Schon, 1978) or “complex” learning.   
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Since the 1990s, mainstream research on learning in IR has gone in three 
directions. A first strand of studies has analysed processes of policy change 
(foreign policy in particular), building on both collective and individual 
approaches to learning (Etheredge, 1985; Hemmer, 2000; Farkas, 1998; Stein, 
1994; Levy, 1994). A second strand has focused on the broader question of 
international cooperation and how learning between two or more states could 
lead to some form of progress in IR (Haas E.B., 1980, 1990, 1997; Adler and 
Crawford, 1991). Finally, the most recent social constructivist literature has 
emphasised processes of collective learning leading to the diffusion of norms 
(Checkel, 2001; Finnemore, 1996).  
 
2.2.2 Learning communities: clearing the conceptual confusion 
 
Learning communities are defined as those transnational communities within 
the IR literature that create the “social fabric of learning” (Adler, 2008: 199): 
they are the social and epistemological enablers of institutional learning. The 
academic literature identifies the following types of learning communities: 1) 
communities of practice (Wenger, 1998; Adler, 2008); 2) epistemic 
communities (Haas, 1992; Adler, 1992); 3) security communities (Deutsch et 
al., 1957; Adler, 2008); 4) critical communities (Rochon, 1998). It is worth 
exploring the relationship between these different types of communities and the 
difference with transgovernmental networks.  
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To begin with, communities are a type of network. The research focus on one 
or the other concept diverge in terms of the depth of relationships between 
actors and the purpose of their interaction: while communities cluster around 
the construction and codification of a common/consensual knowledge, the 
rationale for the formation of networks is the exchange of knowledge or 
information among equal actors. Networks are used to depict sets of social 
interactions (Mérand et al., 2010: 126). The focus on communities instead 
allows scholars to spot the common causal models and set of political values 
within the ties (interactions) of the network, hence paying attention to what 
factors undergird the simple “representation of the social structure” (Knoke, 
1990: 8). Learning communities are cognitive: they rest on a common learning 
objective that determines the degree of members’ involvement in the collective 
thrive of the community.7   
Let us now turn to the commonalities and differences among communities. 
From a “practice” perspective, as Adler noted, all the communities listed above 
“can be seen as subsets of communities of practice, as long as the focus of the 
analysis is on the practices that undergird the communities” (Adler, 2008: 199). 
Despite being subsumed under the practice paradigm, however, these concepts 
display some noteworthy differences, which help in clarifying their features as 
well as their contribution to specific research agendas. Critical communities, 
for instance, rest on ideas that are fundamentally critical. In that regard, they 
diverge from epistemic communities insofar as their perspectives are critical of 
                                                
7 The value of communities on networks is that a community is not just a set of relationships; it 
is “about something” (Wenger et al., 2002: 43).  
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the policy establishment rather than being oriented toward helping it to 
function better (Schurman and Munro, 2010: 54). Security communities’ inner 
features entail the process of peaceful change (Deutsch, 1957) and shared 
identities and values within a region (Adler and Barnett, 1998).  
This thesis identifies as units of analysis epistemic communities and 
communities of practice. I chose to focus on these two types for two main 
reasons. The first reason has to do with academic relevance, since there is a 
wider body of literature in International Relations, and also European Studies, 
devoted to these two specific ones. Secondly, these communities are 
comparatively knowledge-intensive, in the sense that they are the units where 
knowledge creation occurs on a regular basis. Both influence political actors’ 
decisions by developing, sharing and maintaining common causal beliefs 
through socialisation and persuasion. At the same time, they arise from two 
slightly different versions of institutional learning – one emphasizing the 
epistemic and “dominant” constitution of consensual knowledge (Foucault, 
1970; Ruggie, 1975; Haas, 1990), and the other reflecting the evolution of 
background knowledge as a result of reiteration of shared practices (Wenger, 
1998; Adler, 2008; Bourdieu, 1990; Adler and Pouliot, 2011a). Let us briefly 
overview how the two streams developed.  
    
2.2.3 The “epistemic communities approach” to learning… 
 
What is “expertise” and why should it matter in IR? Ruggie introduced the 
concept of epistemic communities in a special issue of International 
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Organization (1975) co-edited with Ernst Haas (Ruggie, 1975). According to 
Ruggie, processes of institutionalisation involve not only the grid through 
which behaviour is acted out, but also “the epistemes through which political 
relationships are visualised” (Ruggie, 1975: 569). Ruggie borrowed the term 
epistemes from Foucault (1970), and defined epistemic communities as “a 
dominant way of looking at social reality, a set of shared symbols and 
references, mutual expectations and a mutual predictability of intention” 
(Ruggie, 1975: 570). Haas later articulated the idea of epistemic communities 
as “professionals who share a commitment to a common causal model and a 
common set of political values” (Haas E.B., 1990: 41). A more precise 
conceptualisation was finally given by Peter Haas as follows: 
  
An epistemic community is a network of professionals from a variety 
of disciplines and backgrounds. They have (1) a shared set of 
normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value-based 
rationale for the social action of community members; (2) shared 
causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices 
leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain 
and which the serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages 
between possible policy actions and desired outcomes; (3) shared 
notions of validity – that is, inter-subjective, internally defined 
criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their 
expertise; and (4) a common policy enterprise – that is, a set of 
common practices associated with a set of problems to which their 
professional competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction 
that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence.8  
 
(Haas P.M., 1992: 3) 
 
 
                                                
8 Bold added for emphasis.  
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The emergence of epistemic communities is therefore related to the 
increasingly complex and technical nature of the issues decision-makers need 
to address. Accordingly, complexity and uncertainty push decision-makers to 
seek technical advice, which then contributes to the way interests are 
formulated and decisions are taken.  
Epistemic communities have provided an important stimulus to research aimed 
at explaining how policies are crafted according to knowledge flows wielded 
by transnational networks. In fact, they allow researchers to identify the 
missing link between political objectives, technical knowledge and the 
formation of interests. This has profound consequences for the study of IR. In 
the current international society, characterised by globalisation and 
interdependence, knowledge and ideas must spread across state boundaries in 
order to be recognised by the wider international community. As a 
consequence, networks of experts cannot be conceived as belonging to single 
national communities separated one from each other. Epistemic communities 
are transnational because their expertise and “vision” are carried over from the 
national levels into the international arena.  
Rejecting simple notions of causality, in When Knowledge is Power (1990) 
Ernst Haas maintains that international organisations (IOs) are created to solve 
problems that require collaborative action among states for solution; therefore, 
“the knowledge available about the problem at issue influences the way 
decision-makers define the interests at stake in the solution to the problem; (…) 
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when knowledge become consensual, we ought to expect politicians to use it in 
helping them to define their interests” (Haas E.B., 1990: 9-12). 
Consensual knowledge refers to “generally accepted understandings about 
cause-and-effect linkages about any set of phenomena considered important by 
society” (Haas E.B., 1990: 21). An important characteristic of the Haas’ 
definition is that consensual knowledge is socially constructed and it is 
constantly tested and examined through adversary procedures. For instance, as 
Haas himself put it, consensual knowledge differs from ideology because it 
must constantly prove itself against rival formulas claiming to solve problems 
better (Haas E.B., 1990: 21).     
 
2.2.4 …and Communities of Practice (CoPs) 
 
The understanding of how knowledge is formed and affects learning has been 
revisited by the agenda on international practices, which has gained momentum 
in social theory (Schatzki et al, 2001) and IR theory in the mid-2000s (Adler, 
2005, 2008; Adler and Pouliot, 2011a, 2011b; Pouliot, 2008, 2010; Bicchi, 
2011; Katzenstein, 2010; Wiener, 2008). This agenda comprises a vast array of 
analytical frameworks that see practices as the key entry point to the study of 
world politics. Practices are competent performances, that is, socially 
meaningful patterns of action, which “embody, act out, and possibly reify 
background knowledge in and on the material world” (Adler and Pouliot, 
2011b: 4). Here, knowledge is therefore understood as “practical”, since 
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intersubjectivity is bound up in performance and can only be expressed as such 
(Adler and Pouliot, 2011a: 8). In other words, social activities embedded in 
communities, routines and organizations structure experience, which in turn 
constitutes knowledge.  
Against this backdrop, the notion of communities of practice defines the 
transnational, like-minded groups of practitioners who are informally as well as 
contextually bound by a shared interest in learning and applying a common 
practice (Adler, 2008: 196).9 As in the case of epistemic communities, CoPs 
develop, share and maintain new cognitive content (originating in new causal 
beliefs), agree on a joint enterprise and have mutual expectations and 
predictability of intention. Therefore, as in the case of technical expertise 
carried through by epicoms, CoPs generate transformation, via what literature 
describes as the “practice’s lifecycle” (Adler and Pouliot, 2011a; Finnemore 
and Sikkink, 1998) involving the generation, diffusion, institutionalisation and 
fading of a specific practice. Practices can also interact with one another or 
overlap, through constellations (assemblages) of practices (Wenger, 1998), or 
communities operating at different levels (Hansen, 2011).  
CoPs expand inter-subjective knowledge and establish it as social structures by 
means of institutionalisation processes.  
 
 
 
                                                
9 Cf. Also Wenger (1998).  
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2.2.5 Epicoms and CoPs: competing or compatible? 
 
Since the practice turn, the academic literature has discarded epistemic 
communities as the unit of analysis to explain EU foreign and security policy. 
This thesis seeks to reconcile the two apparently competing conceptual tools.  
It is important to highlight the differences between the two. Professionalism or 
like-mindedness is a first key difference, as it implies that individuals 
belonging to a given community hold culture, values and interests, and 
therefore identities, which are intrinsic to their practice. CoPs are, in this sense, 
professional networks of people sharing the same background, whereas 
epicoms are networks of professionals who do share a practice, but come from 
a variety of backgrounds. It follows that what brings a CoP together is the set 
of shared expectations, routines and intentions rooted in professionalism (but 
not in uniformity10): self-consciousness develops around the activities 
commonly understood and continually renegotiated by its members, by a 
process taking the shape of “war stories” (Brown and Duguid, 1998) which 
includes a common jargon (Cohendet et al., 2001).  
Epicoms instead cluster around a common causal model or epistemic 
interpretation of reality. Identity is weaker than in CoPs. What holds the 
community together is a “procedural authority” to attain progress towards a 
cognitive goal set by the community. Individuals are creative, they gather 
                                                
10 Cf. Adler and Bernstein (2005: 296). As Adler noted, “boundaries of CoPs are determined by 
people’s knowledge and identity and by the discourse associated with a specific practice” and 
hence are not necessarily “congruent with the reified structures or institutional affiliations, 
divisions and boundaries. (…) boundaries form in and around practice” (Adler, 2008: 200). 
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knowledge not just as a result of the reiteration of know-how, or by interaction 
with other members resulting from common experiences, but also in function 
of their own experience outside the community. Agency is heterogeneous. 
Last, but not least, epistemic communities emerge in an uncertain context 
calling for the creation of a new paradigm, which is not necessarily the case for 
communities of practice (Whiteneck, 1996).   
Another difference has to do with the distinction between consensual/causal 
knowledge (episteme) and background knowledge (habitus), which can be 
simplistically redirected to the sociological divide between Michel Foucault 
and Pierre Bourdieu. Background knowledge originates in habitus, defined 
by Bourdieu as “systems of durable, transposable dispositions that 
constitute people’s thoughts and practices” (Bourdieu, 1990: 53). From a 
CoP perspective, learning entails the evolution of background knowledge 
(Adler 2005: 20), a change of habitus. Consensual knowledge has a slightly 
a different rationale. Ernst Haas then defines learning as the process by 
which “consensual knowledge is used to specify causal relationships in new 
ways so that the result affects the content of public policy” (Haas E.B., 
1990: 23). Consensual knowledge refers to “cause-and-effect linkages 
about any set of phenomena considered important by society, provided only 
that the finality of the accepted chain of causation is subject to continuous 
testing and examination”. (Haas E.B., 1990: 21).  
The table below summarises the differences between knowledge-based 
networks, epistemic communities and communities of practice. Although 
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epicoms can be seen as a subset of a community of practice if one looks at the 
common practice that undergirds them, their features actually diverge as 
regards membership, objectives, selection criteria, identity and function.11   
 
 
Table 2.1: Differences between knowledge-based networks, epistemic 
communities and communities of practice12 
 
Group 
 
Membership Practice Objective Selection Identity Function 
 
K-B 
Networks 
 
 
Heterogeneous 
 
Coordination 
(no common 
practice) 
 
 
 
Knowledge 
exchange 
 
 
 
Members have 
equal rights 
 
No common 
identity 
 
Access to 
knowledge 
 
 
Epicoms 
 
 
Heterogeneous 
 
 
Common 
practice 
 
 
Construction / 
Codification of 
consensual 
knowledge 
 
 
Authority and 
reputation: 
Members are self-
selected 
 
 
Linked to the 
objective, but 
no strong sense 
of belonging as 
agents come 
from different 
background 
 
 
 
 
External 
Advancement of 
a set of 
knowledge, 
“change the 
world” 
 
CoPs 
 
Homogeneous 
 
Common 
practice 
 
Accumulation 
of background 
knowledge 
 
 
 
Professionalism 
(“by peers”) 
 
Strong 
 
Achievement of 
internal shared 
learning 
 
 
2.3 The CSDP has learned - by doing?  
  
This thesis investigates the dynamics of the EU’s learning by doing. Did 
practices play a leading role in explaining the learning process? Communities 
of practice expand because like-minded groups of practitioners are bound by a 
shared interest in learning and the application of a common practice. This only 
partially depicts the evolutionary process of the CSDP. What about those sector 
                                                
11 On the differences between epistemic communities and other groups involved in policy 
coordination, such as interest groups and social movements, see Haas P.M. (1992: 18).  
12 The categorisation draws from Cohendet et al. (2001: 309-310).  
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areas in which a common practice (and the relevant communities) did not 
exist? To test the argument that practices matter in achieving learning and 
policy evolution, this thesis uses both the concepts of epistemic communities 
and communities of practice. In a similar way as Adler’s analysis of the role of 
communities of practices in the successful expansion of the North Atlantic 
security community (Adler, 2008), this work investigates the overlap between 
the epistemic act of knowledge creation and the (presence or absence of) 
underlying practices, to assess the effective role of the latter in explaining 
CSDP. The framework of analysis is designed to answer two underlying 
questions:  
 
1. Why has the CSDP developed a soft or civilian crisis manager, if 
Europeans drew military lessons from the failure to deal with crises in 
the Western Balkans in the 1990s?  
2. Why have some ideas been impactful in shaping CSDP policies, while 
others have not? Why has security cooperation deepened in some areas 
and not in others?    
 
A critical focus on international practices can help address the puzzle of 
European security. What ideas generated practices, and how? Is the concept of 
communities of practice the most appropriate tool to conduct investigation or 
would expertise alone suffice to that purpose?   
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Generative relationships (Adler and Pouliot, 2011b: 24-25), meaning those 
episodes of formative interactions that facilitate the emergence of a new 
practice, have not been sufficiently investigated by the academic literature. Nor 
were the dynamics of formation linked to the expansion and diffusion of 
practices, whereby intersubjective knowledge becomes established as social 
structures. Similarly, cases of “non-practice” in which practices fail to emerge 
and to meet the last phase of a “practice’s lifecycle” have been overlooked by 
the literature, hence missing an important step in the genealogy of practice 
development.13   
With those considerations in mind, the following explanations to the research 
questions are hypothesized:  
 
H1: The EU learned to become a soft crisis manager. The emergence of new 
approaches to the international provision of security influenced the way 
policy-makers conceived the EU’s role in crisis management and, as a result, 
the institutionalisation of CSDP. It follows that learning is more likely to 
occur when a consensus develops internationally and results in the 
formation of transnational communities.  
It is expected that the creation of a policy consensus on non-military crisis 
management, promoted within the EU security architecture by expert and 
practice-based communities, has been the source from which the current design 
of the CSDP stems from. EU policy-makers learned the importance of security 
                                                
13 On the genealogy of practice development, and its more general role in explaining strategic 
interaction from a practice perspective, cf. Adler and Pouliot (2011a: 24).  
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provision through civilian means, as a result of a process of diffusion of new 
ideas. It is argued therefore that epistemic innovation, supported by unfolding 
practices, has affected the first ten years of CSDP institution building, 
operational experience and strategic choices.  
This hypothesis challenges alternative explanations for the rise of civilian and 
civil-military crisis management. Dwan (2002) emphasises the convergence of 
interest between small, neutral and anti-federalist EU member states, willing to 
counterbalance the attempt to create a military CSDP. Other authors (Quille et 
al., 2006; Chivvis, 2010) account for the CSDP “soft” identity as the result of 
an ongoing struggle between Atlanticists and Integrationists and the 
troublesome relationship between NATO and the CSDP. Gross (2008) and 
Tardy (2011) focus instead on the reshuffle of the security architecture after the 
end of the Cold War, and the EU’s efforts to put into practice the 
comprehensive approach to meet the growing demand for civil-military 
planning. According to Santopinto and Price (2013), the lack of strategic 
coherence and divergence among EU member states’ interests (Kagan, 2004; 
Menon et al, 2004; Gray, 2007). Finally, Dijkstra (2013) stressed endogenous-
driven institutionalisation, and the influence of the Brussels-based bureaucracy 
on the creation of CSDP institutions. This approach, however, does not fully 
capture the diffusion of ideas outside the Brussels bureaucracy and the role of 
external (national, transnational) actors.   
A learning approach to CSDP brings new light to the debate as it goes through 
the processes of social interactions, not limited to the EU’s bureaucratic arena, 
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as a result of which a new understanding of CSDP was constructed. It stresses 
the role of agency, by investigating the way actors respond to systemic changes 
or experience of failure (e.g. the Balkan crises) so as to change the underlying 
goals of an institution. One thing is to adapt military means to changing 
warfare; another thing is to speak about a “civilian power EU” and 
implementing a soft vision of European security. Furthermore, the hypothesis 
posits that ideas are not confined to bureaucratic walls. They are transnational, 
and trickle down the EU’s policy-making environment by processes of norm 
diffusion, which this work analyses by taking learning communities as the unit 
of analysis.  
 
H2: The EU also learned by doing. Innovation has better chances to shape 
EU security policies if a community of practitioners existed in the sector area 
under consideration, and actors already share a common understanding and 
experiences of the issue at stake.  
This second hypothesis suggests that generative efforts to create a common 
knowledge (e.g. innovation from policy failure) between actors are more likely 
to be successful and impact on policy evolution if a common practice already 
exists – and a community of practice too as a result. Figure 2.2 (below) 
elucidates the expansion of a practice:  
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Figure 2.2: Practice-based learning 
 
  
Cognitive evolution is not just mediated by practice (Adler, 2008: 202). 
Cognitive evolution has more chances to succeed if it is generated into a pre-
existing practice, which facilitate social learning (Checkel, 1999: 549). This 
hypothesis switches the analytical focus from governance and network 
analyses (Mérand et al., 2011) to the investigation of the formative actions that 
explain the genealogy of ideas by mapping the communities committed to its 
institutionalisation. It also engages the debate on European strategic cultures 
(Biehl et al., 2013; Meyer, 2006; Giegerich, 2006) by placing the emphasis on 
practice-based strategic interactions and patterns of learning by experience in 
shaping the development of CSDP. From these considerations, a third 
hypothesis follows:      
 
H3: Conversely, when learning is knowledge-based, but does not rely on a 
shared practice (as in the case of a new area of cooperation or a new 
approach bridging previously separated sectors), influence on policy 
evolution is slower and change more difficult to achieve.  
• Shared repertoire • Epistemic ground for action  
Practice 
• Generation of consensual knowledge • Diffusion through pathways 
Knowledge  • Learning "by doing" • Practice's lifecycle 
New Practice 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Despite favourable conditions and supportive agency facilitating innovation 
and diffusion, some ideas may struggle to have policy impact and produce 
change. If ideas are not bound up to pre-existing or present practices (and 
hence if a community of practice is absent), they are less likely to fulfil the 
institutionalisation process and struggle to generate evolution. This third 
hypothesis is tested against the competing explanations that epistemic 
communities and networks have shaped European security and defence (Cross, 
2011; Howorth, 2004), and hence that the simple intersection between power 
and ideas (Risse-Kappen, 1994) can lead to change.  
 
2.4 Pathways of influence and impact of learning  
 
This section explains how the framework of analysis is applied to the case 
European security and the hypotheses tested. The literature describes the 
necessary steps for an idea to become a norm or a practice. These include 
generation, diffusion, institutionalisation and fading (Adler, 1991; Finnemore 
and Sikkink, 1998).  Adler and Haas elaborated a model explaining the role of 
epistemic communities in a five-step process involving policy innovation, 
diffusion, selection, persistence and evolution14 (Adler and Haas, 1992: 375-
                                                
14 According to the model, communities act first as policy innovators, by identifying the nature 
of the issue-area and framing the context in which new ideas are interpreted. Second, 
communities diffuse their policy recommendations transnationally, through communication and 
socialisation processes. New knowledge is shared and exchanged across research groups, 
national governments and international organisations through different channels (conferences, 
meetings, research networks), so that innovation becomes consensual. Policy selection 
mechanisms intervene to select certain advices and discard others. Policy persistence refers to 
the continuation of consensual and background knowledge about an issue within the members 
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387). Between generation and diffusion there is a “tipping point”, at which a 
critical mass of relevant state actors adopt the norm (Finnemore and Sikkink, 
1998).  
 
Figure 2.3: Policy evolution (Adler and Haas, 1992) 
 
  
 
The learning dynamic leading to policy evolution can take essentially two 
forms: (1) intentional, when the policy outcomes reflect the new ideas diffused 
throughout the learning process; (2) unintentional, when the policy outcomes 
are different from the ideas diffused throughout the learning process.  
Unintentional learning does not necessarily mean that an institution has failed 
to learn. It can mean, however, that policy evolution through learning by doing 
has not led to the desired policy outcomes, hence resulting in an incomplete 
learning process (this may include a “non practice” scenario).  
Based on this typology and drawing from previous works on ideas and norm 
diffusion by McNamara (1998), Adler and Haas (1992), Finnemore and 
Sikkink (1998) and Risse-Kappen (1994), the following table 2.4 maps out the 
possible interactions related to the pathways of influence through which 
                                                
of an epistemic community, to determine how long it will remain influential. Finally, learning 
communities stimulate policy evolution as learning. Cf. Adler and Haas (1992: 375-387).  
 
Innovation  Diffusion  Selection  Persistence  Evolution 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learning communities turn ideas into policy. The table identifies four main 
pathways. For each one of them, it outlines the underlying logic of action, the 
processes and actors involved, the impact on the learning process and, 
ultimately, the way it affects policy outcomes. The expectation is that for each 
one of the case studies under investigation, empirical findings will fall within 
one, some or all these pathways.  
 
 
Table 2.4: Pathways of influence: how ideas turn into policy outcomes 
 
 
Logics of 
action 
 
Pathways Ideational 
processes and 
actors 
 
Intervening 
factors  
Impact on 
learning 
Expected policy 
outcomes (cf. 
Legro’s criteria) 
 
Interest-
based 
 
 
Sponsorship Political and 
financial capital 
provided by key 
constituencies 
or “winning 
coalitions” in 
support of ideas 
 
Timing, 
domestic 
structures 
Relevance and 
dominance of 
new ideas as a 
result of the link 
with key political 
stakeholders.  
 
Durability  
Identity-
based 
 
 
Socialization Interactive 
process of 
identity 
formation 
through 
socialization 
and cross-
fertilization 
among actors, 
which creates a 
sense of 
“belonging”.  
  
Institutional-
bureaucratic  
Cohesiveness of 
the learning 
actors and 
development of a 
logic of 
appropriateness 
forging shared 
learning.  
Concordance  
Epistemic 
 
 
Innovation Shared 
understanding 
of the link 
between policy 
failure and 
policy 
innovation that 
creates the 
rationale for 
action.  
 
Institutional 
and cultural  
Authority and 
cohesiveness of 
the learning 
process as 
learning actors 
agree on a joint 
enterprise. 
Concordance, 
Specificity  
Isomorphic  
 
 
Emulation Presence of 
successful 
models that 
provides ground 
for action via 
their imitation.  
 
Cultural  Transnational 
diffusion of ideas. 
Outside-in 
process of 
diffusion.  
 
Durability,  
Specificity   
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Ideas turn into policy outcomes if the following four conditions are met:  
1. the presence of a power constituency supporting the diffusion and 
institutionalisation of the new ideas;  
2. the formation of cohesiveness and a “sense of belonging” among 
practitioners, facilitated by a common identity;  
3. a shared epistemic enterprise aimed at producing policy innovation;  
4. the emulation of a successful model of cooperation or policy 
implementation.  
 
As Cross noted (2011), the cohesiveness of a community is a key parameter to 
define its persuasiveness and impact on policy. Among the factors influencing 
cohesiveness, the creation of a sense of belonging and a common rationale for 
action through socialisation is crucial, as it defines the identitary boundaries of 
a learning community. Whether the result of organisational routines and 
experiences (CoPs) or the agreement on a common causal belief and joint 
policy enterprise (epicoms), identity formation is a main element of the set of 
generative interactions that allow a community to form.   
Constituencies denote the presence of domestic coalitions or government 
networks that advocate and support, by means of resources or political action, 
the diffusion of new ideas. These actors can be individual member states, an 
institution (i.e., the European Council) or even an external organisation, 
provided that it is able and capable of exerting an influence on the target 
institution through advocacy action. Constituencies are often related to policy 
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networks. To achieve institutional learning, experts and practitioners need 
channels into the institutional system and institutional partners (decision-
makers) to build up winning coalitions (Risse-Kappen, 1994; Heclo, 1974). 
Policy networks are therefore all important to ensure that ideas are injected into 
the institutional arena.  
Learning is also a process of acquisition of new cognitive content, or paradigm 
innovation. An experience of policy failure is a necessary condition for shared 
beliefs to be developed and diffused. Widespread perception and common 
interpretation among stakeholders of an unsuccessful policy experience is the 
key factor paving the way for the rise of an alternative paradigm. This creates 
both the “cognitive authority (Adler, 2008: 203; Antoniades, 2003: 29) or 
symbolic power (Bourdieu, 1977) to offer previously unavailable 
understanding of a cause-effect linkage.  
Policy failure concurs to define the boundaries of a learning community. The 
fiascos of the UN-led peacekeeping operations in the 1990s, as well as the 
failure of EU member states to effectively tackle conflict in the Western 
Balkans, pushed EU decision-makers and security experts, particularly in 
neutral and Nordic member states, to reconsider security policies. Similarly, 
the growing scepticism surrounding development aid in eradicating poverty 
convinced major aid donors (such as the UK, The Netherlands or the Nordic 
countries) to reframe the link between development, security and good 
governance, in order to ensure a more effective allocation of funds. In the case 
of security sector reform, the need for a transparent and democratically 
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accountable security sector gained salience in the wake of the EU and NATO 
enlargement to Eastern Europe. Public awareness in the UK, a country whose 
contribution was all-important to make SSR politically salient, was raised out 
of policy failure in Sierra Leone.  
Emulation results from the information gathered about the experiences of other 
international actors. It includes processes of institutional isomorphism15 
(Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000: 5) as well as the exchange of best practices both at 
the operational and decision-making levels. Sociological institutionalism and 
the English school approach associate policy emulation to the expansion of 
Western cultural values shaping the formation of the “international society”.16 
The concept stems from a “common perspective or international policy 
culture” (Ikenberry, 1990: 89), embedding rules and values that shape agency 
and behaviour and constitutes a precondition for emulation to occur.  
What allows international actors to reproduce institutions by imitation is then a 
common social structure, making participation in a growing multilateral 
network culturally “necessary and appropriate” (Finnemore, 1996; March and 
Olsen, 1989). Social structures constructs what actors want - think about 
member states participation in the EU or the EU relations with NATO and the 
UN – but the relation between structure and agency is mutually constitutive. 
                                                
15 Dolowitz and Marsh define policy transfer, emulation and lesson drawing as the processes 
by which “knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one 
political system (past or present) is used in the development of policies, administrative 
arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political system” (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996: 
344).  
16 On the English School approach, see Bull (1977); Bull and Watson (1984); Gong (1984); 
Buzan, (1993).  
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Therefore, inter-subjective learning dynamics and socialisation occurring at the 
micro-level between agents, do affect social structures too.  
This co-constitutive relationship between structure and agency creates the 
room for learning communities to influence policy by an emulation path. The 
presence of successful model can provide learning communities with ground 
for action via imitation. An example to be replicated facilitates the impact of 
new ideas into policy.  
On that account, figure 2.5 presents the framework and core argument of the 
thesis:  
 
Figure 2.5: The core argument of the thesis 
 
 
 
 
 Ideas  
• Transnational learning communities • Policy consensus on new solutions to a problem 
Pathways of inEluence  • Sponsorship • Socialisation • Innovation  • Emulation 
Policy evolution 
• Learning by doing  • Expansion of transnational learning communities 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2.4.1 Intervening variables 
 
Learning interactions are linked to the environment in which they operate. This 
includes domestic, institutional and cultural factors as well as time.  As 
intervening variables, these factors facilitate a better understanding of the 
relationship between ideas and policy outcomes.  
Organisational cultures shape organisations’ (or units therein) self-perception, 
hence their behaviours and calculations. When different cultures coexist in the 
same institutional space, it is likely that each of them will try to defend its 
autonomy, protect its environment and possibly dominate over the other, 
especially in those situations where cooperation and close coordination is 
required. As a result, if the institution is not able to manage conflict between 
different cultures, competition patterns across overlapping communities may 
occur, leading to confrontation, miscommunication and competing 
compartmentalised processes. This outcome is the opposite process of learning: 
instead of producing shared solutions to complex problems, it encourages 
separate habit-driven behaviours.  
Institutional factors also affect learning. Homogeneous or multi-level structures 
of governance can facilitate or hamper information sharing and the 
institutionalisation of new knowledge into the decision-making. It also affects 
the persistence – duration of lessons learned.  
Domestic conditions refer to the degree of openness of a political culture to the 
diffusion of ideas and, as a result, to their institutionalisation. Some political 
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élites are more prone than others to seek the advice of formal or informal 
epistemic communities, or to facilitate the expansion of a practice.  
 
Figure 2.6: Intervening factors 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, timing matters. I define timing as a point in time when a problem gets 
political salience, hence becoming prolematised. According to Rose and Miller 
(1992), problems involving public policy choice can first arise through a 
process of problematisation which can begin when existing practices are 
criticised as not ‘ideal’. These practices may, as a result, be made to appear 
deficient in some way or ways, leading to the identification of a “problem” for 
which an appropriate solution is required. Timing as problematisation is an 
important intervening factor to create the awareness of policy failure that help 
new ideas moving towards the tipping point.  
 
 
• Different organizational cultures may resist new ideas (e.g. civilian vs military)  Cultural 
• Institutionalisation of new norms may be hampered by inter‐institional or bureaucratic rivalries (e.g. Commission vs Council Secretariat)  Bureaucratic 
• Governance structures and decision‐making procesures may block the diffusion of norms (e.g. lack of a method of coordination)  Domestic 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2.5 Causality, case selection and methodology  
 
The thesis applies the learning communities framework to explain EU 
cooperation in the field of security and defence, and the soft or civilian design 
of the CSDP. The explanatory analysis of the role of learning communities 
relies on a constructivist approach, involving a mix of process tracing and 
content analysis. Before discussing the methodology, the question of how 
learning communities influence policies requires some clarification about 
causality and the nexus between dependent and independent variable.  
The academic literature is ambiguous as to what is actually being explained in 
analyses involving knowledge and practice-based communities. Some authors 
(Haas P.M., 1997) locate the dependent variable in the general outcome of 
international policy coordination. Others (Dunlop, 2014) are sceptical about the 
standards against which an epistemic community’s influence is judged and 
prefer to speak about different levels of influence.  
Since the purpose of this work is to make sense of the CSDP as it currently 
stands, the dependent variable can be defined as a “policy outcome” involving 
goals, means or instruments-related institutional change (figure 2.7). Goals 
refer to the ultimate purpose of the institution, its ends, values or strategic 
prescriptions underlying the institution’s means of action. Means refer to the 
organisational structures, programmes and policies that are set out to achieve 
the institution’s goals. Finally, instruments are material and non-material 
resources (capabilities) available to achieve the institution’s goals through its 
means. 
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Figure 2.7: Criteria for measuring institutional change 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As for the independent variable, and linked to it the notion of causality, this 
thesis embraces a constructivist approach. It focuses on the role of ideas and 
knowledge in politics, stressing the role of collectively held or intersubjective 
understandings of social life. Ideational factors are shared, and construct the 
interests and identities of actors. Understanding how those social facts (Searle, 
1995) construct reality is the primary objective of this work. Accordingly, the 
framework is not elaborated along causal “Big-T” claims (Price and Reus-
Smit, 1998), but in such a way as to emphasize constitutive explanations with 
some limited causal properties (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001). Understanding 
how knowledge diffuses, and assessing the role practice, allows us to 
hypothesize about the conditions that make learning in European security 
cooperation possible. Learning communities, in this regards, are neither a 
Goals   
Means 
Instruments 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proper independent variable, nor simple transmissions belts: they are part of the 
constitution process.  
The methodology used to test the hypotheses empirically is designed to capture 
the intersubjectivity at the core of this approach. To assess the relationship 
between ideas and policy outcomes, it is useful to refer to Legro’s definition of 
the “robustness” of a norm. Legro defines norms are “collective understandings 
of the proper behaviour of actors” (Legro, 1997: 33). Their robustness, defined 
as the influence on actors regardless of their identities, interests and individual 
behaviour, is determined by three criteria: specificity, durability and 
concordance (cf. figure 2.8). Specificity refers to how well the guidelines 
embedded in the norm are understood by actors. Durability is about how long 
the rules have been legitimately in effect and what factors questioned such 
legitimacy. Finally, concordance concerns the acceptance of the rules across 
formal and informal settings, that is the degree of inter-subjective agreement 
among actors (Legro, 1997: 34-35).17 
 
Figure 2.8: Norm robustness (Legro, 1997) 
 
 
 
 
                                                
17 See also Keohane (1989) and Young (1989).  
SpeciEicity 
Concordance 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In order to understand how learning communities have shaped EU security 
cooperation, this thesis tracks down the actions and processes through which 
ideas turned into policy. Ultimately, causality must reveal the impact of 
ideational factors in influencing concrete decisions, as well as their operational 
outcomes.  
The selection of case studies reflects the concern of accounting for variation in 
the way ideas influence policies. Civilian crisis management (CCM) and 
security sector reform (SSR) are part of the CSDP toolbox for crisis 
management. They can be defined as two concepts, or new forms of activity in 
international security18 that have been incorporated into the European Union’s 
functions in the late 1990s and early-2000s, became fully integrated in the 
CSDP through policy frameworks and started being implemented as part of the 
EU’s operational efforts to prevent conflicts and maintain peace and stability. 
As such, they lie at the same level of analysis. EU documents present them as 
CSDP “tools” in support of international peace and security.19 Although some 
degree of overlap between SSR and CCM missions occurs in the field, the 
borders between the two concepts are clear in terms of the activities covered, 
instruments,20 training and personnel.21  
                                                
18 Cf. Finnish Government (2008: 5) and Meharg et al. (2010: 1, 14). 
19 Cf. ENTRi (2013: 81) and European Union (2008: 2).  
20 The activities (and instruments) covered by CCM correspond to the four priority areas of 
civilian action defined by the Feira European Council in June 2000: police, rule of law, civilian 
administration, civil protection. The activities (and instruments) covered by SSR are defined in 
line with the 2004 OECD guidelines for the implementation SSR. For a detailed list, see 
chapter 5. For a discussion on the fuzziness of the SSR concept, and the confusion among EU 
policy-makers, see chapter 6.  
21 For instance, as Bloching notes, Civilian Response Teams (CRT) for CCM and the SSR Pool 
of experts belong to separate domains and do not relate to the same expertise nor mode of 
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Therefore, my case selection has targeted two examples of policy innovation. I 
singled out the analysis of concepts designed to respond to increasingly 
challenging and complicated operating environments that required 
comprehensive approach and capabilities. Both cases have concurred to the 
definition of the framework for the EU comprehensive approach, which the 
European Commission defines as the “strategically coherent use of the EU 
tools and instruments for external action”.22 Both can be also understood as 
emerging practices in EU security.  
However, despite having a similar genesis, CCM and SSR resulted in very 
different evolutionary patterns. Civilian crisis management has undergone a 
learning curve, with lessons learned growing exponentially with experience 
and leading to evolution and impact of the concept on the activities and 
institutional design of the CSDP. SSR implementation has been poor and 
learning almost absent.  
To account for such variation, the thesis compares the two cases following 
Mill's method of difference, according to which everything between the two 
cases is constant except for the explanation (dependent variable) and the 
outcome (policy and institutional evolution). My analysis certainly leaves aside 
other potentially relevant cases of evolution. I deemed it necessary to limit my 
analysis to two cases belonging to the category of soft security provision and 
whose differences in outcomes were so wide as to make a good test for the 
hypotheses presented in the analytical framework. CCM and SSR are examples 
                                                
deployment, although they operate within the framework of EU crisis management (Bloching, 
2011: 23).  
22 Cf. European Commission and HR/VP (2013: 1).  
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of epistemic innovation on which the determinant role of practices can be 
nicely tested. They are also traceable, as access to information and ability to 
understand the processes of diffusion do not pose any particular problem – this 
is not the case with al subfields of security and defence cooperation.  
Having clarified the criteria for case selection and the causality, the 
methodology of this thesis aims at identifying the processes by which 
consensual knowledge was crafted, diffused and impacted on security policies. 
It uncovers the social and epistemological structure of the CSDP, therefore 
reconciling traditional institutional and networked governance approaches 
(Smith, 2004; Mérand, 2009) with and knowledge and practice-based learning 
accounts (Haas, 1990; Cross, 2011; Adler, 2008).  
To this purpose, a combination of semi-structured experts and élites interviews, 
process tracing and document analysis was used. Interviews were structured in 
a survey,23 whose questions were inspired by social network analysis (SNA). 
The resulting map of learning communities frames and describes the distinct 
structure of epicoms and CoPs in each one of the two case studies: their 
composition, individual and institutional members, selection and socialisation 
processes, and evolution over time.  
The survey was hence designed to spot social relations among policy actors 
and experts. It allowed identifying the type, membership and boundaries of the 
learning communities in the two case study areas. In particular, it has been 
                                                
23 Cf. annexes 2 and 3.    
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used to detect the presence of a common practice binding the actors involved in 
those communities during the formative interaction and diffusion processes.  
As Hafner-Burton et al. put it, network analysis offers “a method for measuring 
the sources of socialisation and diffusion of norms based on the strength of ties 
between states, collective state identities such as security communities, and the 
importance of individual states” (Hafner-Burton, 2008: 569). Material and 
social relationships create structures among actors trough dynamic processes, 
which define, enable or constrain agency, therefore affecting collective action 
(i.e. international cooperation and governance). Network analysis concerns 
relations (ties) between nodes (or agents). Networks are defined as any set or 
sets of ties between any set or sets of nodes. It is grounded in three principles:  
(a) nodes and their behaviours are mutually dependent, not autonomous;  
(b) ties between nodes can be channels for transmission of both material 
and non-material products (i.e., information, beliefs and norms);  
(c) persistent patterns of association among nodes create structures that can 
define, enable or restrict the behaviour of nodes.   
(Hafner-Burton et al., 2009: 560-561)  
 
The population is defined by using Kriesi and Jegen's (2001) criteria for 
delineating the boundaries of the network:  
 
1) positional criterion: scanning and identification of all actors interested 
in security policy in a given area of analysis (i.e. Europe); 
Chapter 2 – Theoretical framework  
                   80 
2) participative criterion: in-depth study of conferences, seminars and 
summits in order to extract actors who took a stand on the issue at 
stake, independently or on behalf of their organisation; 
3) reputational criterion: submission of the list drafted on the basis of the 
previous two criteria to a small group of experts who would add the 
names of other experts that were mission or would subtract those who 
they would consider as playing a marginal role in the debate.  
 
These three criteria are a fairly good starting point to draw a list of the actors 
involved in one learning community, in that they can show that its members 
are:  
    
1) actively involved in the network-building phase, either by attending 
meetings and conferences or by publishing papers or getting involved in 
projects related to the issue;  
2) recognised as members of the community by other individuals or 
organisations; or that they hold as many shared contacts as possible and 
as less grades of separation as possible with other members, hence 
corroborating their affiliation with the community.  
 
More than 25 semi-structured élites and expert interviews have been arranged 
for each of the two case studies, for a total of 50+ interviews.24 Interviewed 
                                                
24 Cf. list of interviewees, annex 1.  
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people were EU and national officers (civilian and military staff), experts, 
scholars, professionals from lobby and advocacy groups involved in European 
security. All of them were asked a mix of structured questions and non-
structured ones.  
From each interviewee’s transcripts, I extracted the main relationships the 
individuals had with colleagues and acquaintances, to draw the overall network 
of communications and interactions. Drawing from Créplet et al. (2003: 49), I 
distinguished two types of relationships: groups whose members develop close 
working relationship, with similar or complementary practices (a CoP); and 
groups whose aim was the advancement of specific knowledge, for instance by 
promoting a new thinking (an epistemic community). The distinction (cf. table 
2.9) represented a way for to distinguish the two kinds of communities.  
 
Table 2.9: Attributes of CoPs and epicoms 
 
 Community of practice Epistemic community 
 
Relationship with other 
agents 
  
 
Close working experience, 
similar or complementary 
practice 
 
 
Advancement of specific 
knowledge or new thinking 
 
Expectation - case study 
 
 
CCM 
 
SSR 
 
 
The questionnaire included standardized questions related to the interviewee’s 
background (current and past affiliations, sector, type of organisations he/she 
collaborated with); the understanding of the issue areas under study (definition 
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of the concepts of CCM/SSR, identification of main challenges to 
implementation, lessons drawn; language and technical jargon used); the 
engagement in the policy areas (professional output, sources of funding, self-
perception of influence vis-à-vis policy-making, type of expert advice 
requested and frequency, list of people or organisations consulted, meetings or 
conferences attended); the relationship with other influential stakeholders 
(reputation, type of relationship).   
To ensure a rigorous data collection and analysis, I triangulated different 
sources of observation. The mapping methodology presented above was then 
complemented by process tracing and content analysis, to assess the impact of 
the communities in shaping decisions at key points in time and find a 
correspondence of their ideas into the new policy frameworks created.  
Process tracing “traces the operation of the causal mechanism at work in a 
given situation” (Checkel, 2008: 116). According to George and Bennett 
(2005: 210-211), the basic version of process tracing delineates the narrative or 
description of how events occur, and then links the events to the analytical 
framework. Process tracing was hence used in this thesis to identify the critical 
junctures and reconstruct the events leading to policy evolution in the selected 
case studies.  
Qualitative document analysis was finally used to assess whether the ideas and 
knowledge diffused by the communities reflect in the content of EU official 
documents; what conceptualisation emerged as a result of the process of 
learning; or whether emulation patterns were detected by the comparison with 
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official documents of other international actors. Specific criteria were adopted 
for documents selection, verification and analysis. EU and member states’ 
official strategies, guidelines, policy frameworks and communications were 
considered, together with other relevant written documents that were issued by 
organisations recognised as influent in the policy debate according to the 
results of the survey (for instance, definitions provided by think-tanks and 
organisations that have shaped the debate according to more than one 
interviewee). The publication date was considered to track the progress of 
knowledge diffusion over time; acknowledgments have also been useful to 
cross-check whether contributors to one influent publication were likely to 
form a community or had links with governments / policy networks. 
Documents were collected from the public domain; in some cases, confidential 
sources were used. For each document, the meaning, the relevance, the 
terminology used, the ideas expressed (objectives, aims, values), context as 
regards the two policy areas considered were assessed and related to other 
publications of the same time or by the same authors to reconstruct the 
diffusion process.  
Based on the aforementioned methodology, the analysis of the case studies 
started on background knowledge acquired through an intense review of the 
secondary literature available. Interviews were arranged in Brussels, Geneva, 
Stockholm, Rome, Pisa, London and Washington DC with multiple 
stakeholders, carried out between March 2011 and April 2012. Almost all 
interviews were face-to-face, in exceptional cases Skype and phone calls were 
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arranged. The list of interviewees was expanded through referral method – 
recommendation of suitable interviewees by initial contacts – after a 
preliminary phase of the fieldwork. Data gathered from interviews were typed 
one day (at the latest) after the interview and cross-checked with previous 
findings and results from document analysis and literature review to test their 
reliability and validity. Internet tools – in particular social networks as 
LinkedIn, Academia.edu, organisations’ databases, Alumni networks – were 
widely used to verify the professional links between individual actors, joint 
publications, common experiences. I am grateful to those interviewees who 
have accepted to submit their resumes and share personal information to 
facilitate this research. Interviews were never recorded to facilitate a relation of 
trust with the interviewee. In some cases, group interviews with up to three 
experts were arranged.  
While this is by no means a research work without limits, this methodology has 
allowed me to get an in-depth understanding of the actors who have promoted 
SSR/CCM ideas in Europe, their belonging to specific learning communities 
and the way their enterprise translated into observable policy outcomes. The 
extent to which the conclusions can be generalised beyond the boundaries of 
European security will be discussed in the concluding chapters. 
 
 Chapter 3 
 
A paradigmatic shift in security: CSDP and the EU’s 
comprehensive approach  
 
 
Introduction  
 
A Joint Communication by the High Representative and the European 
Commission, released in December 2013, defines the EU comprehensive 
approach (CA) as the “strategically coherent use of EU tools and instruments” 
(European Commission, 2013: 1) for external action in crisis or conflict 
situations.25 As tools for crisis management, security sector reform and civilian 
crisis management are embedded in the EU’s CA at three levels. Conceptually, 
coordinated cooperation and coherent measures resulting from a 
comprehensive or integrated approach are essential preconditions for an 
effective use of the crisis management tools. Institutionally, CA offers the 
organisational basis for cooperation, encouraging the creation of structures and 
the division of labour/distribution of resources. Finally, at the planning and 
operational level, the coordination between actors enables the definition of the 
common objectives, of the instruments to be used as well as the criteria for 
appropriate and timely action (SWP/ZIF, 2012: 25). Therefore, CA provides 
                                                
25 Cf. European Commission and HR/VP (2013).  
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the basis for the crisis management tools to be effectively operated within the 
CSDP.  
On that account, the purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, it illustrates the 
conceptual origins of the EU’s comprehensive approach and the new global 
security agenda since the end of the Cold War. The EU has in fact developed 
its crisis management structures and capabilities at a time of profound change 
and re-conceptualisation of the definition of security. The changing nature of 
security threats compelled international actors to adapt their responses, 
therefore altering the character of crisis management. Chapter 4 will outline the 
impact of this new multi-dimensional understanding of security provision on 
the actors, structures and networks involved in European security cooperation.  
Second, this chapter is a starting point to explain the civilianisation of CSDP 
(Drent, 2011). It addresses the normative transformations that underpin the rise 
of “comprehensiveness”, which, combined with experiences of policy failure 
(e.g. the Balkan crises in the 1990s), drove the evolution of the CSDP. By 
doing so, it paves the way for the empirical analysis, which investigates why 
some tools for crisis management within the comprehensive approach have 
been more impactful than others in shaping CSDP activities.   
Comprehensiveness refers to the need for multi-faceted, rapid response 
capabilities, and a complementary long-term strategy, to address all possible 
aspects of a particular crisis in a coherent manner (Barry, 2012: 2). It embraces 
a holistic approach in resolving crisis situations and moves away from purely 
military responses that dominated the security discourse during the Cold War.  
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There is no single or common definition of comprehensive approach in the 
international community. States and international organisations understand and 
implement comprehensiveness in slightly different ways, in most cases using 
different models, strategies and terminology (Wendling, 2010: 10). The 
European Union translated the idea of comprehensiveness into a framework for 
coordination among the different EU actors. CA acquires hence a very specific 
meaning in the EU jargon, although the same term may be present in member 
states’ national doctrines or other international organisations’ policies.26 
Accordingly, this chapter locates the EU CA within the broader emergence and 
evolution of “comprehensiveness”. This overview is necessary in order to 
understand the environment in which two elements of the comprehensive 
approach, SSR and CCM, developed. The deepening of security cooperation in 
Europe through the CSDP and the paradigmatic shift in security are in fact part 
of the same package and cannot really be analysed as two free-standing 
processes. Notwithstanding the military orientation of the St Malo declaration 
(1998),27 this paradigmatic shift heavily influenced the CSDP, as shown by the 
institutional consolidation of the CA with the Lisbon Treaty as well as by the 
importance of civil-military coordination and cooperation for CSDP missions.  
Therefore, it is important to link broader norm generation and diffusion at the 
international level (new concepts and security paradigms), to the narrower 
                                                
26 For instance, NATO’s Strategic Concept adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010 
calls for a comprehensive approach involving political, civilian and military instruments. Cf. 
the definition of the comprehensive approach on NATO’s website: 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_51633.htm (Accessed 7 February 2014).  
27 As a matter of fact, the British-French joint declaration does not contain any reference to the 
development of civil-military, civilian or comprehensive crisis management capacity for the 
EU. 
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development of the Union’s CA, in order to pave the way for the two in-depth 
case studies analysed in chapters 6 and 7. My empirical analysis will then show 
to what extent the civilian side has prevailed in shaping the EU’s 
comprehensive approach to crisis management, and why.  
Building on the literature available and on interviews with security experts and 
practitioners, this chapter identifies human security and peacebuilding as the 
intellectual and paradigmatic ground upon which the foundations of 
comprehensiveness were laid. In the following sections, I explore the 
conceptualisation of these two key paradigms in order to explain how the EU 
has responded to the need for a more integrated understanding of crisis 
management by developing its own concept of CA. Doing so, the chapter pays 
special attention to analytical and conceptual challenges rather than operational 
ones, although transformations were in part triggered by the need to revise 
missions’ character and design.  
In line with previous works on the subject, my analysis acknowledges that 
contemporary crisis management has essentially changed in three dimensions: 
(1) an expansion of the spectrum of tasks beyond traditional military 
peacekeeping; (2) a dilation of the timeline of intervention (from short to long-
term conflict prevention interventions); (3) as a result of the previous two, the 
rise and diversification of the actors involved (Major and Molling, 2009: 21). 
These changes created the international awareness for new appropriate 
responses on three levels: a broader level where new global norms are 
generated, leading to the peacebuilding international agenda; a theoretical one, 
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prompting the human security approach; and the narrower, implementation 
level of the CA.  
 
3.1 Concepts and practices of peacebuilding in international politics 
 
The term “peacebuilding” (PB) officially entered the international politics 
lexicon in 1992, with the report An Agenda for Peace released by UN 
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (United Nations, 1992). However, it 
is widely recognised that the conceptual origins of the term date back to the 
mid-1970s, thanks to the work by Johan Galtung Three Approaches to Peace: 
Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding (Galtung, 1976). Galtung 
posited that “structures must be found that remove causes of wars and offer 
alternatives to war in situations where wars may occur” (Galtung, 1976: 298). 
His observations provided the intellectual cradle for the subsequent evolution 
of the peacebuilding concept during the 1980s/1990s and its integration in the 
peace studies academic debate. Along a social and holistic vision of the 
resolution of conflict, a consensus progressively developed within the 
academic and intellectual community on peacebuilding as tool for conflict 
transformation (Lederach, 1997): a comprehensive concept encompassing “the 
full array of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict 
toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships” (Lederach, 1997: 20). 
As it is often the case, major structural transformations – the end of the Cold 
War – and subsequent changes in the morphology of conflicts created a 
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window of opportunity for new principles to be officially adopted by 
international actors. The window of opportunity was further opened by a sharp 
increase in unsolved, protracted and complex conflicts across the globe – 
Sudan, Somalia, Rwanda, Mozambique, Afghanistan – and relevant dramatic 
episodes such as the Rwandan genocide - that highlighted the fiasco of 
international responses and the need for more appropriate instruments for 
intervention. Both in global (e.g. the UN’s failure to deal with fragility in Sub-
Saharan Africa) and regional policy arenas (e.g. Western European states 
facing instability in their immediate neighbourhood), all conditions were met 
for the peacebuilding principles to become mainstream, and for conflict 
prevention and development assistance tools to be integrated. Institutional 
change occurred through the creation of new policy and planning 
methodologies (Gaigals and Leonhardt, 2001: 8). In many cases, these 
processes overcame bureaucratic resistance to maintain conventional aid and 
post-conflict assistance (Menkhaus, 2004). The new approaches also coped 
with the general reluctance of international agencies to intensify mutual 
dialogue and to deepen coordination as required by the integrated approach.  
UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali outlined the principles of post-
conflict peacebuilding as regrouping “comprehensive efforts to identify and 
support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of 
confidence and well-being among people”, and based on the belief that “only 
sustained, cooperative work to deal with underlying economic, social, cultural 
and humanitarian problems can place an achieved peace on a durable 
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foundation” (United Nations, 1992: VI). Initially linked to preventive 
diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping, the UN’s work on peacebuilding 
continued steadily throughout the 1990s, nailing down the conceptual links 
between previously disconnected fields of interventions (security, 
development, governance etc.). The table 3.1 lists the different initiatives and 
publications contributing to a deepened shared understanding and 
implementation of peacebuilding within the UN system. 
 
Table 3.1: Institutionalisation of peacebuilding (UN) 
 
UN Document Year Contribution to PB 
An Agenda for Peace 1992 PB officially enters the UN language. Definition of PB.  
An Agenda for Development;  
UNDP Report on Human Security;  
An Agenda for Democratization.  
1994 
1994 
1996 
Conceptual work on the links between security, development, 
democratization and human rights feeding the debate on PB.  
Supplement to An Agenda for 
Peace 
1995 Expansion of the PB concept to address all conflict phases. 
PB aim: institutionalization of peace.  
An Inventory of Post-Conflict 
Peace-Building Activities 
1996 Identification of PB activities to be undertaken by UN 
agencies.  
Brahimi Report 2000 Re-definition of PB: "activities undertaken on the far side of 
conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide 
the tools for building on those foundations something that is 
more than just the absence of war”.  
Review of Technical Cooperation 
in the United Nations 
2003 Call for an action plan to identify ways in which different 
actors within the UN system may devise joint, country 
specific PB strategies.  
A More Secure World 2004 Recommendation for the establishment of a PB Commission 
and Support Office.  
In Larger Freedom 2005 Further elaboration of PB Commission plan.   
 
Establishment of the Peacebuilding 
Commission, the Peacebuilding 
Fund and the Peacebuilding 
Support Office  
(UNSC and UNGA) 
 
 
2005 
 
Creation of permanent institutional structures to address PB 
needs. 
 
 
In the UN context, the new PB structures became operational by the mid-2006. 
They succeeded in breaking new ground in the organisation’s security agenda, 
although in stark contrast with poor operational achievements in theatres such 
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as East Timor, Democratic Republic of Congo and Kosovo. Criticism over PB 
practices was also expressed by some analysts and scholars (Betts, 1996; Rieff, 
2002; Le Sage, 1998), who highlighted the gap between the neoliberal 
international consensus28 on PB and the inadequacy of interventionary 
commitment (Richmond, 2004).  
Despite such growing criticism of the effectiveness of UN peace operations, 
the institutionalisation of peacebuilding within the UN system contributed to 
raise international awareness concerning the need for multidimensional and 
comprehensive missions to consolidate peace and preventing the recurrence of 
conflicts. States, international organisations and non-state actors (NGOs and 
civil society organisations in particular) jumped on the bandwagon (Barnett et 
al., 2007). It was not just a consequence of the UN’s legitimising power in the 
international arena, nor a mechanical cascade effect originating in structural 
changes affecting conflicts. According to Mankhouse (2004), think-tanks and 
advocacy groups on conflict prevention and peacebuilding sprang up in the 
mid-1990s, producing fieldwork-based research and intense lobbying aimed at 
convincing donors and multilateral agencies that narrow sectoral strategies 
were ineffective in complex post-conflict environments (Mankhouse, 2004: 3). 
This advocacy strategy eventually paid off in mainstreaming PB. Certainly, the 
UN cover was essential to give credibility and legitimacy to those voices, and 
so certainly was the adherence to a specific epistemic – Western, liberal – 
vision of PB (Paris, 2002). Tschirgi (2003) describes a “gradual elaboration of 
                                                
28 On the “liberal bias” of peacebuilding, see Paris (2002).  
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an expanded normative framework” (p. 3) for international affairs under the 
UN umbrella, with a series of international conferences in the early part of the 
1990s seeking to generate an agenda with the concept of peacebuilding at its 
core.  
Swift normative diffusion through bandwagoning produced a general overhaul 
of structures and policies to respond to the security challenges under the new 
paradigm. Institutional revisions affected individual governments and IOs 
alike, through the establishment of conflict prevention and/or peacebuilding 
units (e.g. CHAD in DFID, the Post-Conflict Unit at the World Bank etc.) or 
networks (the OECD’s CPDC, now INCAF). Many governments attempted to 
align their programs in the foreign, security and development policy fields 
(Tschirgi, 2003). However, these efforts did not produce substantial results in 
terms of overall coherence of peacebuilding objectives. A major side effect of 
the swift diffusion was therefore the proliferation of definitions and approaches 
to PB, many of which went far beyond the principles established at the UN 
level in an uncoordinated manner.  
Terminological confusion and inconsistency between different organisations’ 
PB objectives undermined multilateral cooperation, and affected 
implementation and impact assessment matters, with obvious implications on 
learning infrastructures.29 As Barnett et al. (2007) put it, actors comply with 
notions of peacebuilding that are consistent with their own mandates, 
                                                
29 On organisational learning and peacebuilding, see Benner et al. (2007).  
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worldviews, and organisational interests (p. 53); consequently, the idea of 
building peace is operationalised with considerable differences.  
The table 3.2 provides an overview of the different international actors 
involved in PB, and the different concepts and practices developed within each 
one of them.  
 
Table 3.2: Definitions of peacebuilding 
 
Agency 
 
Concept Definition 
UN DPA Post-conflict 
peacebuilding 
All external efforts to assist countries and 
regions in their transitions from war to 
peace, including all activities and programs 
designed to support and strengthen these 
transitions.  
 
UNDP Conflict prevention 
and peacebuilding 
Activities undertaken on the far side of 
conflict to reassemble the foundations of 
peace and provide the tools for building on 
those foundations.  
World Bank  Post-conflict 
reconstruction 
Activities that support the transition from 
conflict to peace in an affected country 
through the rebuilding of the socioeconomic 
framework of the society 
European Commission Conflict prevention 
and crisis management 
Activities aiming not only at easing a 
situation where an outbreak of violence is 
imminent (conflict prevention in a narrow 
sense) but also at preventing the occurrence 
of such a situation (conflict prevention in a 
wider sense)  
US Department of state Post-conflict 
reconstruction and 
stabilization 
Activities to help post- conflict states lay a 
foundation for lasting peace, good 
governance and sustainable development.  
UK Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office 
Post-conflict 
reconstruction 
An umbrella term covering a range of 
activities required in the immediate 
aftermath of a conflict 
 
UK Ministry of Defence  Peacebuilding Activities relating to the underlying causes 
of conflict and the longer-term needs of the 
people require a commitment to a long-term 
process 
 
UK Department for 
International Development 
Conflict reduction and 
post-conflict 
peacebuilding 
Conflict reduction includes conflict 
management (activities to prevent the 
spread of existing conflict); conflict 
prevention (short term activities to prevent 
the outbreak or recurrence of violent 
conflict); conflict resolution (short term 
activities to end violent conflict); and 
peacebuilding (medium and long term 
actions to address the factors underlying 
violent conflicts). Essential post-conflict 
peacebuilding measures include 
disarmament, demobilization and 
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reintegration programs, and building the 
public institutions that provide security, 
transitional justice and reconciliation and 
basic social services.  
German Federal Foreign 
Office 
Civilian crisis 
prevention 
The concept of civilian crisis prevention 
encompasses conflict resolutiona nd post-
conflict peacebuilding and is understood 
through a number of strategic leverage 
points, such as the establishment of stable 
state structures (rule of law, democracy, 
human rights and security) and the creation 
of the potential for peace within civil 
society, the media, cultural affairs and 
education.  
German Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and 
Development 
Peacebuilding Peacebuilding attempts to encourage the 
development of the structural conditions, 
attitudes, and modes for political behaviour 
that may permit peaceful, stable and 
ultimately prosperous social and economic 
development. As conceptualized in the joint 
Utstein study, peacebuilding activities fall 
under four many headings: security, 
socioeconomic foundations, political 
framework for long term peace, and 
reconciliation.  
French Ministry of Defence Peace consolidation Activities in support of peace consolidation 
include monitoring compliance with arms 
embargoes, deployment of peacekeeping 
troops, DDR and deployment of police and 
gendarmerie in support of the rule of law.  
French Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
Crisis management Policy primarily pursued through 
multilateral organizations: peacekeeping, 
political and constitutional processes, 
democratization, administrative state 
capacity, technical assistance for public 
finance and tax policy, and support for 
independent media.  
Canadian International 
Development Agency 
Peacebuilding Efforts to strengthen the prospects for 
internal peace and decrease the likelihood 
of violent conflict in order to enhance the 
indigenous capacity of a society to manage 
conflict without violence  
Department of National 
Defence and Canadian 
Forces 
Peacebuilding Actions to support political, economic, 
social and military measures aimed at 
strengthening political stability, which 
include mechanisms to identify and support 
structures that promote peaceful conditions, 
reconciliation, a sense of confidence and 
well-being, and support for economic 
growth.  
 
 
 
Against this backdrop, it is worth stressing that the EU is a distinctive actor in 
peacebuilding. From a normative standpoint, the EU was, since the beginning, 
conceived as a peace project. Many of the notions underlying PB (sustainable 
peace, conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction, effective 
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multilateralism, democracy promotion and human rights) are part of the EU’s 
DNA and figure in the Lisbon Treaty and other EU official documents.  
The significance of the EU as the most ambitious elaboration of the link 
between a durable form of peace and factors such as democracy, the rule of 
law, security and prosperity has been studied both in terms of historical legacy 
(Anastasiou, 2007) and normative vision for a value-based foreign policy 
(Tocci, 2008). Politically, the EU is also the world’s biggest donor and a key 
provider of security in its neighbourhood. Finally, the EU can be seen as the 
incubator of evolving, puzzle-like communities of peacebuilding practices, 
built on a habitus that has pioneered new forms of internal post-sovereign 
politics (Björkdahl et al., 2009) together with an integrationist, humanitarian 
and multilateral outward focus.  
Because of these features, which outline a very peculiar relation between 
outward “vision” (normative power Europe) and inward “practice” of peace 
resulting from historical and political legacies, the EU has been described as a 
PB actor distinct from the others. This peculiarity is also due to the way the 
Union has internalised PB. On the one hand, the EU consensus on PB emanates 
from the international consensus on liberal PB and follows closely on the UN 
PB agenda, adding the focus on regional frameworks of integration and 
association (Björkdahl et al., 2009: 8); on the other hand, however, EU 
institutions and member states have developed different strategies and 
methodologies, thus generating additional confusion and overlap to an already 
complex concept.  
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The on-going institutional reform launched by the Lisbon Treaty so far has not 
introduced a coherent model. Despite the creation of a specifically dedicated 
division on “Conflict prevention, peacebuilding and mediation instruments” 
within the EEAS, fragmentation persists.30 The complexities of the EU’s PB 
practice are due not just to the different notions or operational approaches. Part 
of the problem is also the multi-dimensional nature of the concept, which 
entails, in some cases, a conflict of responsibilities among institutions. PB 
areas are manifold31 and the distinction between Commission’s long-term or 
CFSP’s short-term interventions tends to be fuzzy.  
 
3.2 Human security: theory, narrative and praxis 
  
Peacebuilding and human security (HS) are two interrelated concepts. Both 
have dominated the post-Cold War conflict transformation, and challenged the 
traditional security paradigm based on state power and military force, which no 
longer seemed well-equipped to meet challenges facing weak and fragile states. 
HS and PB were boosted by the same factors: intra-state conflicts 
outnumbering interstate ones, underdevelopment as a source of increased 
violent upheavals (security-development nexus), relationship between conflicts 
and social development.  
                                                
30 For a detailed description of the roles of the EU institutions in peacebuilding following the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, see EPLO (2011).  
31 For a list of PB areas and activities, and their definitions, cf. Appendix 1 in Barnett et al. 
(2007: 56-57).  
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The fundamental difference between the two concepts is epistemological. PB is 
an international, multidimensional agenda redefining actors’ engagement in 
promoting sustainable peace and providing the practical guidelines to achieve 
such goal. HS is a new paradigm that ensues from a paradigmatic shift, 
meaning a profound change in the basic models of thinking explaining a social 
reality. This revolution aimed at changing the way academics and professionals 
view and talk about security. Therefore, in addition to the normative thinking 
on the root causes of conflicts, a broader and more theoretical debate opened 
up in the early-mid 1990s on the subjective nature of security, leading to the 
fundamental question: “whose view of security should count?” (United 
Nations, 2009: 6).  
Proponents of HS demand a deepening and widening of the notion of security, 
traditionally understood as defence of a sovereign state or territory from a 
military threat. Human security refers to the welfare of individuals and 
communities, expressed in its security and development dimensions as 
“freedom from fear” and “freedom from want” respectively (Kaldor et al., 
2007: 273). Officially launched through the UNDP report in 1994, HS was 
endorsed by a group of states and NGOs led by the governments of Canada and 
Norway, which took the organisational shape of the Human Security Network32 
(Paris, 2001: 87). HS principles had already entered the security discourse 
during the 1970s-1980s, although at that time they were not part of a compact 
theoretical framework, and not labelled as “human security”: for instance, the 
                                                
32 The network originally included also Austria, Chile, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the 
Netherlands, Slovenia, Switzerland and Thailand (Paris, 2001: 87).  
Chapter 3 – A paradigmatic shift in security  
                   100 
pioneering 1982 Report of the Palm Commission used the term “Common 
Security”.33  
Progressively, from the late-1990s onward, the paradigm made its way through 
academia (Richmond, 2001; Stoett, 1999; Suhrke, 1999), while actors begun to 
adopt more or less similar conceptual templates to institutionalise the 
concept.34 Degree and research programmes on human security proliferated in 
the early-2000s and a new body of literature emerged to engage, expand or 
even attack the paradigm (Fukuda-Parr and Messineo, 2012). Since the HS 
suffered from the a lack of consensus, disagreement over common parameters, 
purposes and contexts, international debates on broad/narrow formulation and 
institutionalisation across different organisations blossomed (Tadjbakhsh and 
Chenoy, 2007). As in the case of PB, actors and authors offer competing 
definitions, according to different visions of HS (Liotta and Owen 2006; 
MacFarlane and Khong 2006; King and Murray, 2001).  
The 1994 UNDP’s Human Development Report is generally considered as the 
standard and most diffused reference for HS, although detractors point out that 
such definition fails to introduce criteria facilitating implementation. The key 
dimensions identified by the UNDP report are economic, food, health, 
environmental, personal, community, and political security (UNDP, 1994: 24-
25). The table below (3.3) displays the main definitions of human security.  
                                                
33 The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (aka the “Palm 
Commision”) was formed to examine international security problems. Available from 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/36555/andrew-j-pierre/common-security-a-blueprint-
for-survival (Accessed 9 August 2012).  
34 Criticism has been raised, however, about how states have customised their definition of 
human security to suit their own foreign policy or strategic needs. Cf. Paris (2001: 90).  
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Table 3.3: Definitions of human security 
 
International 
Actors 
(Organisations/Stat
es/Individuals) 
 
Definition / Components of HS* 
 
 
UNDP 
 
Human security can be said to have two main aspects.   It means, first, 
safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression.  
And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in 
the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities.  
Such threats can exist at all levels of national income and development.  
 
(UNDP, 1994: 23)  
 
 
 
Human Security 
Network 
 
 
 
A humane world where people can live in security and dignity, free 
from poverty and despair, is still a dream for many and should be 
enjoyed by all. In such a world, every individual would be guaranteed 
freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to 
fully develop their human potential. Building human security is 
essential to achieving this goal.  In essence, human security means 
freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, their safety or even 
their lives  
 
(Human Security Network’s official website) 
 
 
 
Japan 
 
Japan emphasizes "Human Security" from the perspective of 
strengthening efforts to cope with threats to human lives, livelihoods 
and dignity as poverty, environmental degradation, illicit drugs, 
transnational organized crime, infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, 
the outflow of refugees and anti-personnel land mines, and has taken 
various initiatives in this context. To ensure "Human freedom and 
potential," a range of issues needs to be addressed from the perspective 
of "Human Security" focused on the individual, requiring cooperation 
among the various actors in the international community, including 
governments, international organizations and civil society.  
 
(Government of Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Diplomatic 
Bluebook 1999, Chapter 2, Section 3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Canada 
 
For Canada, human security means freedom from pervasive threats to 
people’s rights, safety or lives.”…“Canada has identified five foreign 
policy priorities for advancing human security: 
 
1. Protection of civilians, concerned with building international will 
and strengthening norms and capacity to reduce the human costs of 
armed conflict. 
 
2. Peace support operations, concerned with building UN capacities 
and addressing the demanding and increasingly complex requirements 
for deployment of skilled personnel, including Canadians, to these 
missions. 
 
3. Conflict prevention, with strengthening the capacity of the 
international community to prevent or resolve conflict, and building 
local indigenous capacity to manage conflict without violence. 
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4. Governance and accountability, concerned with fostering improved 
accountability of public and private sector institutions in terms of 
established norms of democracy and human rights. 
 
5 . Public safety, concerned with building international expertise, 
capacities and instruments to counter the growing threats posed by the 
rise of transnational organized crime 
 
(Foreign Ministry’s official website) 
 
 
 
Kofi Annan 
 
In the wake of these conflicts, a new understanding of the concept of 
security is evolving. Once synonymous with the defence of territory 
from external attack, the requirements of security today have come to 
embrace the protection of communities and individuals from internal 
violence. The need for a more human-centred approach to security is 
reinforced by the continuing dangers that weapons of mass destruction, 
most notably nuclear weapons, pose to humanity: their very name 
reveals their scope and their intended objective, if they were ever used 
 
(United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Millenium Report, 
Chapter 3, p.43-44) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Astri Suhrke 
 
Whether the threat is economic or physical violence, immediate 
protective measures are necessary if longer-term investments to 
improve conditions can be relevant at all.  It follows that the core of 
human insecurity can be seen as extreme vulnerability.  The central task 
of a policy inspired by human security concerns would therefore be to 
protect those who are most vulnerable. …The philosophers do not tell 
us precisely who the vulnerable are, but it is self-evident that those 
exposed to immediate physical threats to life or deprivation of life-
sustaining resources are extremely vulnerable. …Other persons can be 
place in equally life-threatening positions for reasons of deep poverty 
or natural disasters.  This gives us three categories of extremely 
vulnerable persons: 
 
• victims of war and internal conflict; 
 
• those who live close to the subsistence level and thus are structurally 
positioned at the edge of socio-economic disaster; and 
 
• victims of natural disasters. 
 
In this schema, the condition of abject poverty or powerlessness is not 
qualitatively different from vulnerability to physical violence during 
conflict.  Indeed, it recalls the concept of ‘structural violence’ 
developed in the 1970s by Johan Galtung.  
 
(Suhrke, 1999) 
 
 
 
Gary King and 
Christopher 
Murray 
 
“…the number of years of future life spend outside a state of 
“generalized poverty” 
 
“…our suggestion for a parsimonious set of domains for measuring 
human security would be income, health, education and political 
freedom and democracy” 
 
(King and Murray, 2001) 
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David T. 
Graham and 
Nana K. Poku 
 
 
Rather than viewing security as being concerned with ‘individuals qua 
citizens’ (that is, toward their states), our approach view security as 
being concerned with ‘individuals qua persons’ (Krause and Williams 
1997).  Implicit then, in this conjunction of issues with ideas of human 
security and liberation is the notion of the ethical and moral.  As an 
approach that focuses upon the importance of the insecurities facing 
people rather than governments or institutional agencies, human 
security is concerned with transcending the dominant paradigmatic 
orthodoxy that views critical concerns of migration – recognitions (i.e. 
citizenship), basic needs (i.e. sustenance, protection (i.e. refugee 
status), or human rights (i.e. legal standing) – as problems of interstate 
politics and consequently beyond the realm of the ethical and moral.  
 
(Graham and Pok, 2000: 17) 
 
 
*Source: Global Development Research Center (GDRC) website, “Definitions of Human 
Security”35  
 
 
As the dimensions of human security encompass, as the UNDP definition 
admits, a complex net of tasks and categories, their practical use for policy-
makers and analytical feasibility for scholars has been questioned (Paris, 2001).  
An interesting illustration of this problem has to do with the linkage between 
the theoretical precepts of HS and the operationalisation of peacebuilding 
missions in fragile contexts. According to Cockell (2000), conducting 
peacebuilding following a human security approach implies the selection of 
four basic parameters: focus on root causes of conflict, attention to differences 
in local conditions when launching new operations, target of sustainable and 
durable results, and mobilisation of local actors and resources in support of 
peace. This narrows down the applicability of HS to a necessary “arbitrary 
understanding” of its prescriptions.  
                                                
35 Available from: http://www.gdrc.org/sustdev/husec/Definitions.pdf (Accessed 1 October 
2012).  
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Since HS means practically anything, then it effectively means nothing (Paris, 
2001: 93) unless actors single out a specific operational orientation to avoid 
problems of “conceptual stretching” (Sartori, 1970). If follows that when it 
comes to conceptual confusion, HS and PB show similar shortfalls, although at 
different levels of analysis. How is this confusion reflected in the EU approach 
to human security policies?  
Studying the importance of HS as a new strategic narrative for the EU, Kaldor 
et al. (2007) distinguish between lexis – what is written about HS – and praxis 
– HS-based actions, policies and tactics on the ground (p. 273). They argue that 
HS is in essence European. It is deep rooted in the EU security discourse. What 
the CSDP does in three areas – crisis management, civil-military co-ordination 
and conflict prevention – already is a HS approach, only it is not called that 
way (Kaldor et al., 2007: 274). The main contribution of HS to European 
security is to bring greater coherence to the formulation of EU policies by 
offering a set of principles applying to the ends and means of CSDP, namely 
(1) the respect for human rights, (2) the establishment of legitimate political 
authority through limitations in the use of military force and (3) effective 
multilateralism (Kaldor et al., 2007).  
But why should the EU adopt a new paradigm, if this is already done in the 
current praxis? Why should the EU embark upon a human security template? 
Glasius and Kaldor (2005) argue that the motivation is threefold: morality (e.g. 
moral commitment to provide security where this is lacking), legality (e.g. 
obligations coming from the EU legal framework) and self-interest (e.g. 
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Europeans cannot be safe as long as other states and people live in insecurity), 
underpinned by the outcomes of globalisation impacting on traditional state 
security (Sira and Grans, 2010). Furthermore, when translating into policy 
practice, the terminological and conceptual fragmentation into multiple policy 
labels (Kaldor et al., 2007) ineluctably adds up to cumbersome inter-
institutional dynamics and the lack of a clear definition of tasks and objectives 
of EU foreign policy. Advocates of HS claim that the only way to bring clarity 
to the plethora of concepts, norms and labels is to reframe the definition of 
“security” from the theoretical/paradigmatic levels, which would allow to put 
in place customised policies “to the complex needs of contemporary global 
security” (Kaldor et al., 2007: 288).     
 
3.3 The EU’s comprehensive approach to security 
 
3.3.1 Genesis of the EU’s CA 
 
The previous sections help us grasping the external normative context in which 
the notion of comprehensive approach, and the CSDP framework for it, 
developed. The present section, and the next one review respectively the 
genesis of the CA and its implementation within the CSDP.  
Notwithstanding the tendency to conceive PB and HS as “catch-all labels”, the 
difference between them can be framed in these terms: HS has to do with a 
shared understanding of the why, whereas PB relates to the how 
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comprehensiveness in security is implemented through integrated policies.36 
Against this backdrop, it is important to note, for the sake of analytical clarity, 
that comprehensiveness and the comprehensive approach implemented by the 
EU are not the same thing. Comprehensiveness denotes a general 
understanding in the international community that responses to security threats 
cannot be strictly military and, therefore, links with other dimensions or 
different types/methodologies of interventions are necessary alongside the use 
of force. Governments and international organisations have gradually adapted 
their strategic doctrines and procedures so as to take into account greater 
comprehensiveness, with many overlapping terms such as “whole of 
government” (used by the British government), “multi-dimensionality” or 
“integrated mission” (United Nations), 3D approach (Defence, Development 
and Diplomacy, in Canada and the Netherlands).37  
The EU’s comprehensive approach is the process of institutional change within 
the Union aimed at instilling a “culture of co-ordination” among the different 
actors involved in crisis management and as part of a broader holistic 
framework for intervention by means of the Petersberg tasks. Accordingly, CA 
can be described as the operationalisation of “the why” and “the how” within 
the EU institutional setting.  
The history of the EU CA is linked to the circumstances leading to the launch 
of the CSDP in the late-1990s. As some authors have argued, while widespread 
                                                
36 This differentiation takes inspiration from Drent (2011): “Key to comprehensive approaches 
to security is the shared understanding of the why (human security), but also of the how (with 
integrated policies)” (Drent, 2011: 4). 
37 Cf. Drent (2011: 4).  
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agreement emerged over the nature of past errors (e.g. policy failure in the 
Western Balkans) and justified the design of new instruments to deal with 
crises, consensus on the errors was more evident than the agreement on the 
institutional means to fix them (Menon and Sedelmeier, 2010).38 Squabbles 
pertained to the relationship with NATO (Howorth and Menon, 2009) and the 
appropriate level of military build-up, but also to the neutral and Nordic states’ 
emphasis on conflict prevention in the new policy design, given their tradition 
in this area (Ojanen, 2000; Olsen and Pilegaard, 2005). The reasons why this 
led to the “civilianisation” of the CSDP (Drent, 2011) will be discussed more 
extensively in the next chapters.  
CA essentially relies on two components: civil-military cooperation (CIMIC)39 
at the tactical level and civil-military coordination (CMCO)40 at the 
political/strategic/institutional levels.  
The CIMIC doctrine is a military development, introduced in NATO member 
states since the mid-1990s as a result of a set of lessons learned on the ground, 
namely in the Western Balkans. The EU officially adopted the CIMIC concept 
in 2002, upon recommendation of the EU Military Committee and based on a 
Council’s decision (Council of the European Union, 2002a).41   
                                                
38 According to Menon and Sedelmeier, the tension between the military solution foreseen by 
the early initiatives on CSDP (Saint Malo and Cologne) and the shaping of a civilian CSDP 
lies at the basis of EU security cooperation: “the subsequent history of ESDP reveals the way 
in which the unintended consequences of the introduction of new instruments can profoundly 
shape outcomes” (Menon and Sedelmeier, 2010: 83). 
39 Cf. Council of the European Union (2009a).  
40 Cf. Council of the European Union (2003; 2006a).  
41 On the origins of CIMIC in the EU and on the distinction between CIMIC and CMCO, cf. 
Khol (2006: 122).  
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CMCO serves a more internal function of coordination of the planning and 
implementation phases of the EU’s crisis response, therefore addressing “the 
need for effective coordination of the actions of all relevant EU actors involved 
in the planning and subsequent implementation of EU’s response to the crisis” 
(Council of the European Union, 2003). Furthermore, CMCO is a concept that 
was developed in the EU context only, given the sui generis nature of EU 
decision-making and has no homologue in other organisations.  
Understanding the genesis of CMCO implies grasping the contextual nuances 
of the EU multi-level governance and the divide between the European 
Commission, the Council and member states in handling an expanding security 
agenda. The conceptual initiation of CMCO comes at a crucial point in time, 
where debates intensify over the future trajectories of the CSDP and a growing 
consensus arises on the need to equip crisis management policies with non-
military, conflict prevention and integrated civil-military means. In particular, 
this resulted in the European Commission (through Development Cooperation, 
Humanitarian aid etc.) potentially exerting influence in the security dimension 
of European integration and, as a result, in the urgency to establish mechanisms 
for effective coordination to avoid a deadlock. Accordingly, while CIMIC is 
the integration of a doctrine within the EU crisis response machinery to satisfy 
operational needs, CMCO has both an external (building up a more holistic 
crisis response capacity) and an internal (avoid turf wars between new and 
previously existent institutions dealing with overlapping agendas rooted in PB 
and HS) rationale.  
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The establishment of a “culture of coordination” can be seen as one of the most 
important examples of institutional learning in EU security. From the 
beginning in 2001, the implementation of CMCO built on the awareness of 
previous policy failures to create and revise CSDP institutions. Specifically, it 
concentrated on the following aspects: the sharing of knowledge and 
experiences between relevant actors (e.g. the European Commission and the 
Council Secretariat)42 to create synergies and enforce coordination, especially 
during the routine phases of crisis management planning (Mostl, 2011: 32; 
Khol, 2006); the accumulation of experiences through EU missions, leading to 
implementation of a structured operational evaluation process and drawing 
from shared comprehensive assessments of CMCO operationalisation43 
(Perruche, 2006; Erhart, 2007; Khol, 2006).  
All this was complemented by a strong national backing, as three consecutive 
presidencies of the EU (the United Kingdom, Austria and Finland)44 made CA 
and CMCO the centrepiece of their agendas (Drent, 2011: 8). In sum, the 
creation of a “culture of coordination” can be described as getting practices 
closer to each other, sharing previously existing knowledge and gathering new 
experiences under the same roof.  
                                                
42 As Mostl notes (2011: 32), “the first conceptual work on CMCO took up the issue of inter-
institutional coordination in 2001, when the European Commission and the Council of the EU 
shared their relevant experiences”.  
43 For instance through the EU Concept for Comprehensive Planning (GAERC, 2005). Cf. also 
Juncos (2006).  
44 See, for instance, the non-paper on CMCO produced by the three member states in 2005, 
addressing the issue in terms of five parameters: analysis, planning, management of operations, 
methodology of measuring progress, and management of capabilities (Perruche, 2006). Cf. 
Non-paper by the United Kingdom, Austria and Finland (2005).  
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On a conceptual level, through the institutionalisation of CIMIC and CMCO, 
the EU has fully taken on board the concept of CA. A shared understanding 
developed among member states and institutions on the use of comprehensive 
tools and procedures for all phases (planning, conduct, as well as routine 
procedures) leading to concrete operations. Institutional, structural and tactical 
problems remain, notwithstanding the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and 
the consequent reform of the pillar structure: do coordination problems really 
lie in practice, as it has been argued (Ehrhart, 2007: 10)?  
 
3.3.2 The implementation of the comprehensive approach 
 
The academic literature has extensively focused on the creation of the EU’s 
comprehensive actorness in the field of crisis management, including the 
operational developments. Pirozzi and Sandawi (2009) identify the following 
main features: a) the progressive expansion of the operational area and 
spectrum, that is the operative readiness to intervene in traditional (i.e. 
Balkans) and new (i.e. Central Asia) scenarios and the broadening of the 
security-related range of tasks; b) the low-escalation spectrum of military 
operations, which eventually casts doubts about the capacity of the EU to act 
autonomously and efficiently in high-intensity conflicts; c) an increasing 
integration of civilian-military components of crisis management and the 
inclination towards a comprehensive approach to crisis management, which 
however has not led (yet) to a genuine civil-military coordination at the 
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planning level; d) a growing intertwining of the first (Commission) and second 
(Council) pillars; e) an increasing importance of the EU Special 
Representatives, considered as playing a big role in the field in terms of 
managing coordination between the different parts involved in the theatre of 
operations; f) a truly multinational character and a high degree of participation 
by non EU states; g) an increase of financial requirements for CSDP 
operations45 (Pirozzi and Sandawi, 2009: 9-12).  
The integration of civilian and military instruments of crisis management can 
be considered as vital for the operational success of CSDP, due to the emphasis 
put by European policy-makers and by the former High Representative, Javier 
Solana, on the capacity of the EU to effectively apply a comprehensive 
approach to crisis management46, as opposed to other institutions that are ill-
designed for such coordination (i.e. NATO).  
The debate has also highlighted the initial problems for CSDP missions in 
assuring an effective coordination of its military and civilian operations and 
instruments.47 Ladzik (2009) and Juncos (2006) point out the example of 
Bosnia, where the military operation (EUFOR Althea) clashed in many areas 
with the work of the police mission (EUPM). As a result, the police mission 
(whose mandate was too weak to deal with a precarious situation in the theatre) 
suffered in terms of reputation and motivation for not having the power to fulfil 
those tasks for which the mission was deployed. The military, instead, were 
                                                
45 On this point, see Scannell (2004) and Menon (2009: 238-239). 
46 The literature on the civil-military co-operation and integration is abundant. For a good 
introduction into the topic, see Weiss (1999). 
47 For an introduction of decision-making procedures and the resources of crisis management 
operations, see Gourlay (2004).  
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entrusted with the police tasks, thus leading to a general confusion about 
relative commitments (Gross, 2007). At the same time, Ladzik observes that in 
the most recent operations (such as Aceh Monitoring Mission, EUFOR RD 
Congo and EUPOL Kinshasa) the EU has succeeded in improving civil-
military coordination, partly thanks to the creation of the Civil-Military Cell 
within the EU Military Staff in 2005 (Ladzik, 2009; Pullinger, 2006). 
The problems arising from the implementation of civilian-military crisis 
management, as well as from the predominance of civilian over military 
missions (Keukeleire, 2010), are reflected in the confusion generated at the 
level of inter-institutional coordination between the European Commission and 
the Council. Problems of consistency and coordination mainly stem from the 
overlapping between the CSDP civilian capabilities and the civilian crisis 
management instruments of the first pillar, which gave rise to turf battles 
between Council actors and the European Commission, leading to an 
inefficient use of resources (Keukeleire, 2010).  
There are many aspects that can be analysed when raising the question of inter-
institutional coherence. Police missions, for instance, fall within the category 
of CCM, but rely on the comprehensive approach as they involve a highly 
complex cross-pillar coordination, which may include also instruments from 
the III pillar for the combat against crime and border management (Gross, 
2007).48 The literature has stressed, in particular, the inter-institutional 
problems encountered by EU missions in Bosnia (EUPM), RDC (EUPOL 
                                                
48 On the governance aspects of EU crisis management and inter-institutional coordination, see 
Ursula Schroeder, Governance of EU Crisis Management, 2007 (in Emerson and Gross); For a 
more detailed account of civilian crisis management, cf. Nowak (2006).   
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Kinshasa, EUFOR, EUSEC) and Macedonia (PROXIMA). In the latter case, 
fierce battles took place over competence between the Head of the Mission, the 
Special Representative and the European Commission delegation, with no 
effective division of labour between existing development efforts and CSDP 
activities (Ladzik, 2009; Ioannides, 2007).  
Ursula Schroeder has analysed the inter-institutional issues by using the 
theoretical framework of “negative coordination”, according to which 
institutions act on the basis that any new initiative from another conflicting 
body will not undermine its status or interests. Schroeder’s findings show an 
expansionary strategy of the Council, giving itself mandates to enter fields such 
as rule of law and civil protection, and a defensive reaction by the 
Commission, which resulted in the emergence of a large grey area of 
competences and an enduring institutional tension in the field of peacekeeping 
and crisis management (Emerson and Gross, 2007). Gross points out that lately 
the two institutions have “learned” to work more smoothly (Gross, 2007): the 
creation of the Civil-Military Cell is a good example of how a certain degree of 
inter-institutional coordination was achieved, since in this body experts of the 
European Commission are associated to the Council staff.  
In line with these conclusions, Juncos argued that, resulting from a process of 
learning by doing in the implementation of EU missions Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (EUPM and EUFOR Althea), new institutional arrangements 
(such as the Civil-Military Cell and the CMCO) have been established both at 
the decision-making level and on the ground to guarantee a better coordination 
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of military and civilian crisis management instruments (Juncos, 2006). The 
implications and limits of experiential learning in the sub-fields of SSR and 
CCM will be discussed in chapters 6 and 7.  
 
3.4 Conclusion  
 
These operational complexities presented in the previous section show that 
conceptualising the broader CA framework is essential to narrow down the 
analysis to the EU tools for crisis management, such as SSR and CCM. 
Comprehensive approach is in fact the attempt to reach a coherent division of 
labour between the Brussels bureaucracy and member states, and link it to 
operational effectiveness in crisis management. SSR and CCM activities are 
not separated from the comprehensive approach: they are embedded in it.  
This chapter has explained the link between global norm generation in 
response to structural changes and the rise of the comprehensive approach to 
crisis management within the European Union. The analysis has explored the 
way a new, multi-dimensional understanding of security translated into a 
paradigmatic shift, which in turn has impacted on the way international actors 
define their commitment to security provision through peacebuilding and 
human security. The EU internalised and operationalised these norms within 
the CSDP through the integration of civilian and military tools and the creation 
of an internal culture of coordination.  
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Conclusions point to several directions and pave the way for the empirical 
analysis offered in the next chapters. First, the chapter offers a thus far missing 
investigation into how the EU CA integrates and relates to the wider debate on 
human security and peacebuilding. Addressing a veritable conceptual labyrinth, 
the chapters provided a clear account of the relationship between “the why” 
(HS), “the how” (PB) and the operational (CA) aspects of the complex 
paradigm innovation process aimed at introducing comprehensiveness and 
holism in peace and conflict studies and practices. The CA concept is too often 
taken as granted by the literature, which does not go deep enough into its 
genesis, thus leaving the impression that the integration of civilian and military 
instruments arises, somewhat inexplicably, out of the blue in the early-mid 
2000s. This chapter (and my next one on CSDP structures) explicitly links CA 
to a broader normative evolution occurring at the global stage and shaping EU 
policy-makers beliefs.  
Second, the analysis also explains the relevance of national and transnational 
networks and communities for norm generation and diffusion. As the three 
cases of PB, HS and CA have shown, activities aimed as sharing knowledge 
and practices and the creation of communities in support of the new agendas 
contributed to mainstreaming new norms by means of “bandwagon effect”, 
lobbying and advocacy, complemented by states support and under the 
legitimacy of key international bodies (e.g. the UN). At the same time, the 
chapter has demonstrated that a high degree of fragmentation over the 
definitions and the scope of human security and peacebuilding exists, 
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hampering the effective use of multilateral instruments when translating 
policies into practices. Shared beliefs produced only limited international 
policy consensus, and mostly tied to a liberal or Western conception of 
interventionism. It therefore failed to translate into “global networked 
governance” in the field of security. 
Third, by investigating the rise of the CA in the EU, this chapter has not only 
clarified the circumstances leading to the adoption of the new integrative 
approach, but has also shed light on its limits. The latter essentially result from 
the persisting gap between the member states’ agreement over past failures 
(e.g. Western Balkans) and the more fragile consensus on how to 
operationalise shared ideas about comprehensiveness into institutional reform.  
To sum up, this chapter stressed the importance of understanding the causes 
and effects of the paradigmatic shift in security in order to explain how 
consensual and influential knowledge shaped the current institutional design 
and policy objectives of the CSDP, as they go beyond military peacekeeping. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Chapter 4 
  
The Common Security and Defence Policy: structures, actors, 
networks 
 
 
Introduction  
 
This chapter outlines the main features of the EU security architecture, by 
reviewing the roles and responsibilities of the CSDP institutional structures, 
before and after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. It also identifies the 
key actors involved in security and defence matters and the relations among 
them (networks). The CSDP decision-making environment is in fact 
characterised by networked governance. Different types of networks and 
communities interact and, in some cases, overlap. By structuring the 
relationships and balance of power among actors, this system of interactions 
determines the institutional configurations and the policy outcomes of the 
CSDP. Understanding how networked governance is applied to CSDP is then 
crucial to come to grips with norm diffusion and policy evolution. The 
emergence of new dimensions of security and the paradigmatic shift of the 
post-Cold War system left its mark on the institutional design of EU security 
cooperation. Therefore, before investigating the way norm diffusion shaped 
institutionalisation in the two empirical case studies, it is important to provide a 
Chapter 4 – The CSDP: structures, actors, networks  
                   118 
more general overview of the CSDP construction and highlight its consonance 
with the unfolding of the multidimensional understanding of security.   
In line with the mainstream academic literature on the subject (Khol, 2006; 
Quille et al., 2006; Gross, 2008; Emerson and Gross, 2007; Grevi, 2007; 
Ehrhart, 2007), this chapter places emphasis on the comprehensiveness of 
CSDP structures, or the attempt to improve institutional coordination between 
the civilian and military instruments of crisis management. Therefore, whereas 
the previous chapter has shown the theoretical and conceptual levels at the 
origins of the comprehensive approach, this one deals with the institutional 
interface connecting traditional military structures with non-military, civilian 
ones in the broader sense of the term. Analytically, it is argued that each one of 
the three dimensions (structures, actors and networks) contains three levels of 
analysis: 1) governance processes (supranational, intergovernmental, 
transgovernmental); 2) actorness (state and non-state actors); 3) field (military, 
civilian, civ-mil, industrial, political). Each section will be structured so as to 
examine the interplay between these dimensions, with the overall target to 
provide an exhaustive explanation of the CSDP system. The European Union is 
often depicted as the actor with the greatest ability and experience to 
operationalise the comprehensive approach (Major and Molling, 2009), and 
also one that has made significant efforts to adapt its institutions in accordance 
with the demand for greater internal coordination.  
Broadly speaking, the comprehensive approach “enhances the likelihood of 
favourable and enduring outcomes in the political, diplomatic, security, 
Chapter 4 – The CSDP: structures, actors, networks  
                   119 
economic, development, rule of law and human rights dimensions of 
international engagements in pursuit of a common goal both within and beyond 
the EU” (Wendling, 2010: 27). In a narrower sense, it allows to locate the 
CSDP perspective on civil-military co-ordination, understood as the “effective 
co-ordination of the actions of all relevant EU actors involved in the planning 
and subsequent implementation of EU’s response to the crisis” (Council of the 
European Union, 2003). This chapter focuses mostly on the latter, although the 
wider framework must be taken into account too.  
The next three sections analyse, respectively, structures, actors and networks 
that compose the CSDP system and their evolution. The purpose is to show that 
such system reflects changes in the definition and understanding of security 
that have permeated EU decision-making. From a methodological standpoint, 
the analysis relies on secondary sources available and it is complemented by 
interviews with EEAS officials.  
 
4.1 An overview of CSDP structures: the institutionalisation of 
“comprehensiveness” 
 
CSDP falls under the authority of the European Council and the Foreign 
Affairs Council. Its key feature, in terms of decision-making and compared to 
other fields or policies of the EU, is the requirement for unanimity, which 
makes the CSDP governance fully intergovernmental.49 That being said, the 
                                                
49 Cf. Rehrl and Weisserth (2010: 38).  
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bureaucratic structures also reveal a mix of supranational (e.g. the Council 
Secretariat’s structures), intergovernmental (e.g. the PSC) and national (e.g. 
Foreign or Defence Ministries) bureaucratic actors.  
Until the mid-2000s, the literature on CSDP institution building has been 
surprisingly poor. Accounts for the institutionalisation of security cooperation 
in Europe were first derived indirectly from studies focusing on the broader 
CFSP dynamics (Smith M.E., 2004). It was not until very recently that the 
academic community started regarding bureaucratic developments in the EU as 
a research focus, mostly under institutionalist lenses50 - this seems almost 
commonsensical given that changes have taken place in less than a decade 
since 2000 (Vanhoonacker et al., 2010: 13).  
Mainstream academic thinking on security co-operation has evolved around the 
works of Christopher Hill (1993) and Jolyon Howorth (2000, 2007, 2011), 
followed up by debate on CFSP institutionalisation (Smith M.E., 2004; 
Moravcsik, 1998), on strategic cultures (Meyer, 2005; Giegerich, 2006) and on 
socialisation affecting identities and preferences (Checkel, 2003). Towards the 
end of the 2000s, the “governance turn” brought a revival of public 
administration and organisational theories applied to EU security, together with 
the growing interest on the actors and the communities affecting policy-making 
                                                
50 Bureaucratisation means the process by which the establishment of international 
organisations (like the EU) entails the creation of professional and permanent bureaucracies to 
manage current affairs and facilitate intergovernmental policy-making (Weber, 1978; Rosenau, 
1992; Barnett and Finnemore, 1999; Olsen, 2006). By contrast, institutionalisation is a broader 
process involving the creation of formal and informal institutions, and shared norms and rules 
within those institutions (Breuer, 2012; Smith, 2004; Meyer, 2004), to support international 
cooperation. The creation and evolution of bureaucracies can be analysed under institutionalist 
theoretical lenses.  
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(Cross, 2010; Howorth, 2004; Dijkstra, 2008, 2010), hence bringing CSDP to 
the forefront of European Studies.  
The dynamics of defence cooperation within the 2nd pillar attracted scholars’ 
attention, particularly as regards the themes of (inter)institutional 
coherence/coordination and the impact of organisational structures on policy 
outcomes. Works explored issues of institutional coordination and coherence 
(Blockmans, 2008) between civilian and military dimensions (Norheim-
Martinsen, 2010; Gross, 2008; Wendling, 2010), across external and internal 
EU policies (Duke and Ojanen, 2006; Keohane, 2008; Eriksson and Rhinard, 
2009) and between the EU and other international actors (Tardy, 2005; Duke, 
2008; Wouters and Ruys, 2008; Hofmann, 2009); division of tasks and 
competences allocation within and among CSDP institutions or fields such as 
civilian crisis management (Duke, 2005; Duke and Vanhoonacker, 2006; 
Dijkstra, 2009); analyses of the relationship between bureaucratic entities and 
civil servants in shaping policy and institutional outcomes, particularly as a 
process of learning or institutional isomorphism (Cross, 2010; Howorth, 2011; 
Juncos and Pomorska, 2010). More recently, the principal-agent theories 
seemed to open new venues for research on the relation between political 
preferences, institutional design and policy outcomes.  
As the nature of this literature shows, the creation of Brussels-based 
bureaucracies characterises much of the initial efforts by EU member states in 
the wake of St Malo (1998) and Cologne (1999) (Grevi et al., 2009). 
Permanent structures are established since the Helsinki Council (1999) to run 
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the CSDP according to the objectives outlined in Council documents and, 
subsequently (2003), to the strategic guidelines provided by the European 
Security Strategy. Although member states’ intentions to centre on 
comprehensive and civil-military integrated structures dates back to the very 
beginning of CSDP (cf. creation of Civcom in 2000 stemming from 
recommendation by the PSC or establishment of the CivMil Cell in 2003), the 
Treaty of Lisbon constitutes a landmark development.  
The treaty provisions, in fact, place the comprehensive approach to crisis 
management and a holistic view of intervention in crisis situations at the 
cornerstone of capacity-building and institutional reform processes. 
Accordingly, the Treaty envisages a major reconfiguration of EU institutions in 
the CFSP and CSDP fields to achieve better internal coordination, 
management, efficiency and coherence among crisis management structures 
(Barry, 2012: 3). Changes include the creation of the post of High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice 
President of the Commission (HR/VP) and the establishment of the European 
External Action Service (EEAS). Since its official opening (1 January 2011), 
the EEAS has integrated permanent civilian and military crisis management 
bodies as well as intergovernmental committees. The former include the new 
Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD),51 the Civilian Planning 
and Conduct Capability (CPCC) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS). According 
to the division of tasks among these three permanently-based structures, the 
                                                
51 On the creation of the CMPD, cf. Gebhard (2009).  
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CMPD deals with strategic planning for CSDP missions and operations and is 
tasked with creating synergies between their civilian and military aspects; the 
CPCC covers operational planning and conduct of CSDP civilian missions; the 
EUMS carries out early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning 
for CSDP activities; finally, the EU Operation Center (OPCEN) becomes also 
part of the permanent structures, although it was activated for the first time in 
March 2012 to support the EU’s operations in the Horn of Africa.52 
Intergovernmental committees, bringing together representatives from member 
states (diplomats, seconded experts and military representatives – chiefs of 
defence) inside the EEAS include Civcom, the EU Military Committee and the 
PSC, as well as the EU Special Representatives, the EU Delegations in third 
countries and the Politico Military Group (PMG).  
The institutional landscape is completed by the EEAS’ geographical and 
thematic desks as well as by the Commissions DGs (e.g. DEVCO, ECHO, 
Justice and Home Affairs) and European Parliament Committees and Council 
bodies (e.g. COREPER) associated with security. The HR/VP and the Crisis 
Management Board (CMB), chaired by the HR/VP herself or by the EEAS 
Executive Secretary, is in charge of discussing organisational and coordination 
aspects of crisis response, crisis management and conflict prevention to ensure 
coherence in the EU external action.53   
                                                
52 A summary of the main features of the OPCEN and details on its activation can be found in 
the OPCEN factsheed issued by the EU: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/1634515/factsheet_opscentre_22_may_12.pdf 
(Accessed 21 October 2012).  
53 Details on organisation and membership of the CMB can be found on the EEAS website: 
http://eeas.europa.eu/background/organisation/index_en.htm (Accessed 21 October 2012).  
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As this overview has shown, despite huge operational challenges and problems 
in implementation-effectiveness-efficiency, the institutional make up 
introduced by the Lisbon Treaty has made the EU the “home” of the 
comprehensive approach (Barry, 2012). It also reveals two inner peculiarities 
of the institutionalisation of EU security cooperation within CSDP.  
First, the shape of the CSDP in the post-Lisbon era results from the 
internalisation of a new set of collective norms falling under the umbrella of 
comprehensiveness. Institutions, through the diffusion of norms, did shape 
states’ interests and triggered further institutionalisation. States have not ceded 
interests to a supranational cause, but have reconstituted them in terms of 
European norms rather than just national ones (Smith M.E., 2004).  
Second, Brusselsisation (Nuttall, 2000; Allen, 2004) shows that, through the 
institutional nexus constituted by the vast number of committees, institutions 
did also play a role in shaping security identities (March and Olsen, 1989; 
Powell and DiMaggio, 1991) towards new collective scopes for action – in our 
case, the call for a comprehensive understanding of EU security and defence 
policy.  
The Brussels-based institutions created since 1999 facilitated the adoption of a 
comprehensive approach by the actors involved in the CSDP. As both the 
governance and institutionalist literature contend, institutions act as socialising 
agents, and not just arenas for coordinated action. This last claim, however, 
requires us to sketch out the actors and ties (networks) among them that form 
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the CSDP institutional environment, so as to provide a “morphology” of CSDP 
and visualise the environment in which normative processes operate.  
 
Figure 4.1: Institutional structures in CFSP/CSDP (Rehrl and Weisserth, 2010: 
39) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Bureaucratic actors in the CSDP and levels of governance 
(Vanhoonacker et al., 2010: 12) 
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4.2 Comprehensiveness and actorness: the proliferation of security actors 
and its implications for the CSDP 
 
A major implication of the rise of a comprehensive approach is that a multitude 
of public and private actors have called into question the role of states as the 
only security providers. Security actors have proliferated so as to include 
judges, police officers, private contractors or development agencies due to the 
new multi-dimensional understanding of security as going beyond pure 
military interventions.  
The EU decision-making has evolved not just in terms of bureaucratic 
structures, but also as far as the actors who interact within institutions (and 
produce policy outcomes) are concerned. Specifically, the objective of 
integrating long-term conflict prevention with short-term crisis management 
policies, resources and capabilities has reduced the number of tasks carried out 
exclusively by states. Within the CSDP institutional set-up, a number of non-
state actors offer advice or influence (formally or informally) security 
decisions, particularly in those contexts where member states lack sufficient 
information or expertise.  
Accordingly, a typology of CSDP actors can be built across several dividing 
lines. One is between state and non-state actors. State actors include all 
member states bodies, representations, ministries and assets in Brussels, 
capitals and on the ground, but is not limited to defence and foreign ministries. 
When it comes to crisis management, in fact, ministries of interior, finance, 
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justice also play a role, raising important questions in terms of functional needs 
and coordination mechanisms (Vanhonacker and Jacops, 2010).  
Non-state actors constitute a complex galaxy. On the one hand, it is composed 
of permanently or temporary established supranational EU institutions and 
relevant units (Council of the EU, European Commission, European Parliament 
and EU agencies) and CSDP agencies (e.g. the European Defence Agency, the 
EU Institute for Security Studies and the EU Satellite Centre). On the other 
hand, NGOs, think-tanks, research institutes and consultancies involved in the 
multi-level, transnational social network that characterises the CSDP “field” 
and the private sector (defence industry, private security and military 
companies) are also part of it. 
The academic literature is divided over the real impact of the non-state actors 
on the CSDP policy-making. Some authors believe that supranational elements 
are indeed creeping into the second pillar intergovernmental logic (Allen, 
1998; Cross, 2008; Ojanen, 2006). Others contend that, despite the existence of 
clear elements of transgovernmental and transnational cooperation alongside 
narrow intergovernmental relations (Mérand et al., 2010), non-state actors in 
the CSDP remain in practice fairly marginal: in the end, a handful of state 
actors are really decisive and exert influence by reconstituting power at the 
supranational level (Mérand et al., 2010).  
The truth seems to be somewhere in a middle ground between these two view 
points. Recent studies, particularly in the fields of governance and network 
analysis, have in fact provided enough evidence that the CSDP has become a 
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highly networked policy area. Therein, a variety of actors influence the agenda 
and have to be taken into account when analysing the factors affecting policy 
outcomes. At the same time, it seems clear that the “supranational 
intergovernmentalist” vision of EU security (Howorth, 2007, 2011) gets 
constrained, at all levels of policy-making, by the definition of a strategic 
vision for the CSDP. The latter remains a prerogative of member states.  
A second cleavage concerns military vs civilian actors. This cleavage stems 
from the traditional tension between civil and military cultures deep rooted in 
member states and uploaded at the EU level. Since uniformed officers entered 
the Council’s building in the early 2000s, professional and cultural barriers 
with civil servants have appeared. Problems of communication and 
coordination between civilians and the military have then become a distinctive 
feature of a CSDP viewed as “flawed by design” (Norheim-Martinsen, 2010). 
Furthermore, the process set off since 2003 to enhance coordination in the 
EU’s civil-military interface, after the “cultural revolution” initiated by the 
CMCO concept, is largely a result of the dialectic between civilian and military 
actors. This process can be seen as a struggle to find a balance of power for 
new structural and procedural arrangements. Under this perspective, the 
framework for crisis management structures and procedures should be viewed 
not only as the result of compromises between member states “more or less” 
influenced by non-state actors; but also, and perhaps most importantly, as a 
struggle between civilian and military inputs on how to structure strategic 
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planning and ensure effective civil-military organisation. In this struggle, the 
military has certainly been more influential than the civilians (Khol, 2006).  
In addition to the two cleavages introduced above, a comprehensive mapping 
exercise cannot overlook the fact that the CSDP system is not segregated from 
the rest of the world. Although bureaucracies tend to delimit and defend their 
“territories”, and abide by their own organisational rules (Downs, 1967; 
Allison, 1971), CSDP institutions are part of a broader policy environment and 
are entrenched in a complex net of inter-institutional relations and flows of 
influence. Third players (NATO, the UN, the US) intervene in the policy 
debate and their influence cannot be overlooked. For instance, the EU has 
established with the UN a mutually-influencing networks, which regularly 
engage in cooperative and supportive initiatives. The networks have shown a 
fair level of convergence on issues relating to peacekeeping and peacebuilding. 
Inter-institutional cooperation54 between the two organisations resulted in the 
creation of the EU-UN Steering Committee. The relationship is even tighter 
with NATO, going well beyond the Berlin Plus capacity framework to include 
expanding security communities (Adler, 2008) and institutional isomorphism 
(Koops, 2012).  
There is, finally, the problem of leadership. Leaders are a precious – yet scarce 
– resource. EU security makes no exception, especially if one considers the 
tension between legitimacy (consensus and equality underlying decisions) and 
effectiveness a times when external and internal pressures are significant 
                                                
54 On inter-institutional cooperation, cf. Tardy (2005), Hofmann (2009), Wouters and Ruys 
(2008), Duke (2008).  
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(Giegerich and Gross, 2006). Although the literature identifies the heart of the 
matter in the presence of directoires and their role in assuming control over 
planning and initiation of missions, individual leaders also count, as 
demonstrated by the patterns of co-operation and integration during the Solana 
(1999-2009) and Ashton (1999-present) mandates. This is particularly relevant 
in the EU, were the interactions between different levels of governance and the 
ensuing dispersion of authority/accountability can go to the detriment of 
efficiency and result in bad, or ill-timed policies. Furthermore, it is useful to 
recall that, in a social network, power is situational: it depends on one’s 
position in the social structure, which grants the ability to control the flow of 
information or cooperation (brokerage). If the structure is “social”, then 
individual brokers (who are located at the very basis of the social structure) can 
be as influent as organisational units.  
Actors interact within institutional structures by means of transgovernmental 
and transnational networks. The next section introduces the concept of 
networked governance and track the networks existing in the CSDP field.  
 
4.3 Connecting the dots: CSDP networks and communities 
 
The actors and structures of the CSDP have been widely debated in the 
academic literature. Nonetheless, a comprehensive analysis linking these two 
analytical tools is still missing.  
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Between the micro-perspective (actors and structures shaping policies) and the 
macro-one (CSDP as a “system” producing a set of policy output) lies a meso-
level where interactions and processes take place. In this level, characterised by 
networked governance, the decision-making environment is influenced by the 
presence of different types of networks and communities that structure the 
relationships, links and the balance of power between actors, and consequently, 
structures.  
Networked governance constitutes a step forward vis-à-vis traditional 
governance approaches. The latter stress the existence of entry points allowing 
policy entrepreneurs to intervene in decision-making (Mérand et al. 2010: 123). 
In European security studies, they put emphasis on the multiple patterns of 
cooperation among a variety of state and non-state security actors, authorities 
and formal and informal arrangements that define institutional configurations 
(Krahmann, 2005: 16; Kirchner and Sperling, 2007) and policy outcomes 
(Webber et al., 2004: 4).  
Networked governance introduces the configuration of ties between actors and 
EU structures, leading to the assertion that a policy area is embedded in a set of 
social – hence dynamic and evolutionary – relations. Ideas, knowledge, 
interests and preferences are contained in this fluid, enclosed and inclusive 
environment surrounding the CSDP institutional nucleus, like molecules in the 
cytoplasm.  
Within this environment, socialisation processes induct actors into the norms 
and rules of the communities they belong to (Checkel, 2005; Bauer, 2012). 
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Socialisation is a widely used approach in the recent IR literature, with a 
soaring number of studies addressing the role of institutions as sites of 
socialisation for individuals, and their consequences as regards the formation 
of preferences and policy decisions. Checkel (2011) identifies regular 
interaction between members of a particular group and learning and persuasion 
processes as the two key mechanisms leading to socialisation.  
In this regard, my contribution to the debate is to clear up the mechanisms 
through which norms, through socialisation, are internalised by actors and 
reflect in the compliance to specific institutional and policy arrangements. 
According this perspective, rules and norms are seen as essential to maintain 
social order (Kratochwil, 1989), and the dynamic normative and epistemic 
interpretations of the material world become determinant of human action 
(Adler, 1997).  
It is important to differentiate analytically between networks and other 
knowledge and practice-based communities (Bicchi, 2011). Networks are 
constituted by actors who are formally equals (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 
2009: 797), whereas communities are studied on the basis of the practices and 
knowledge underpinning them (Bicchi, 2011: 1119). In other words, whereas 
the core constituent of a network is the relationships (their depth and thickness) 
between nodes having equal rights, communities arise out of a shared activity 
that is narrowly associated with the exercise of power.  
What networks and communities are hence relevant in the CSDP field?  
According, to Smith, national actors are primarily involved and, although they 
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act mainly as national agents, they find themselves mediating between national 
capitals and the Brussels-based centres of foreign policy-making (Smith M.E., 
2004: 118). Some institutions, such as the Council Secretariat DG-E, facilitate 
socialisation as they instil a feeling of ownership in national civil servants 
seconded to CSDP bureaucracies of the Council. Once socialised, many of 
these agents import that spirit back to capitals. According to Breuer (2012), 
PSC Ambassadors adapt national positions according to what they deem 
appropriate as a result of the knowledge and interactions they had in the 
Brussels CSDP networks.55 Duration of appointment might reinforce the 
impact of socialisation as those who has served for longer time in Brussels may 
feel closer to PSC colleagues than other diplomats in national ministries 
(Breuer, 2012).  
The study by Mérand et al. (2010) points out that the CSDP network is quite 
dense with links between bureaucratic actors in Brussels and national desks, 
although state actors occupy a prominent position – namely through PSC 
ambassadors. Their empirical findings suggest that states reconstitute power at 
the supranational level rather than ceding it (Mérand et al., 2010).  
Another way to detect networks active in the CSDP realm is to pick up specific 
cases of intergovernmental agencies or transnational committees, such as the 
EUMC and Civcom (Cross, 2010, 2011), the PSC (Howorth, 2011; Juncos and 
Reynolds, 2007), COREPER (Cross, 2007, 2011), the Council Secretariat 
Working Groups (Juncos & Pomorska 2006; Beyers 2007) and the COREU 
                                                
55 On the PSC, cf. also Duke (2005) and Howorth (2007, 2011).  
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(Bicchi, 2011). The advantage of this kind of analyses is that institutional 
boundaries simplify the task of detecting inner working processes, practices 
and knowledge flows. The downside, however, is that single institutions or 
groupings of professionals (e.g. the Committee of Permanent Representatives, 
aka COREPER) may say little about the causal force of ideas, except in those 
cases where a specific bureaucratic unit holds the monopoly of norm 
entrepreneurship and diffusion.  
Networks and communities operate across, not within institutions. Analyses 
that take structures as isolated from one another fail to focus on how social 
relationships are constructed (Hoffmann et al., 2005: 5). The result is that 
network constellations that are not institutionalised, or not part of a given 
structure, fall outside the radar.  
Hoffman et al. (2005) contend that actors and their collocation (centrality, or 
importance) within the network depends upon four variables: (1) presence in 
Brussels, with Brussels-based actors being more central than capitals-based 
ones; (2) professionalism (e.g. diplomats and military officers); (3) 
participation in transgovernmental groups (e.g. Franco-German group); (4) 
involvement in operations, as operational actors are more central than policy 
makers as their activity forges stronger common practices.  
My reading is somewhat different. The results of the mapping exercise of 
CSDP communities question both the four determinants of network’s centrality 
and the identification of a practice with a single, specific institutional body.  
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To start with, interviewees’ answers to structured questions confirm that that 
EU policy-makers judge as very influential for their work the advice coming 
from organisations and individuals who are not, or not necessarily Brussels-
based.56  
Secondly, professionalism is of course considered as important, but the circle 
of practice is wider and stretches well beyond a specific group. As a matter of 
fact, many diplomats and civilian officers working in CSDP confirmed that 
they are regularly in touch with professionals from other backgrounds or 
countries (e.g. the US) and that cross-fertilisation and knowledge-sharing (for 
instance, during international conferences) influenced their perceptions and, 
their position towards policy agendas.57 Evidence from interviews also suggest 
that the participation to field missions reinforced individual actors’ beliefs and 
views on CSDP, for instance as far as more emphasis on the comprehensive 
approach and integrated civilian/military crisis management tools are 
concerned.58  
As a result, my research fieldwork confirms that the networks and communities 
within the CSDP field are manifold and extend beyond the CSDP nucleus 
where formal institutional structures are located.  
Moreover, networks seem to have different configurations depending on the 
sector concerned. As the two cases of seemingly overlapping policy agendas 
(SSR and CCM) will show, norm diffusion might follow similar patterns or 
                                                
56 Interviews of the author with policy-makers and practitioners in Brussels, Spring 2012.  
57 Ibid.  
58 Interviews of the author with policy-makers and practitioners in Brussels, Stockholm, 
London and Rome, Spring-Winter 2012.  
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originate in the same paradigmatic shift, but the communities as well as the 
actors affiliated to them are not quite the same. Analyses of the main agencies 
acting in the CSDP field (Cross, 2010) do tell us how socialisation (Checkel, 
2007) affects decision-shaping and decision-taking. Nonetheless, they 
completely overlook how (and why) agencies are crafted in the first place; 
what (state, non state) actors drove the institutionalisation of EU cooperation in 
specific security areas (civilian, military, integration of both); and, most 
importantly, who or what shaped the views of these actors. 
Therefore, any attempt to chart the network and communities in the CSDP 
environment should start from a comprehensive listing of the relevant actors 
involved. It should also take into account context and norm-specific factors to 
spot the communities within which practices and knowledge are contained and 
carried. The table 4.3 below provides a useful template to locate the actors 
involved in the CSDP:   
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Table 4.3: CSDP levels of actorness   
 
 
Entity/Field 
 
MILITARY 
 
CIVILIAN 
 
 
 
 
CIV-MIL 
 
INDUSTRIAL 
 
POLITICAL 
 
Field/Governance 
 
 
STATE 
 
E.g. MS 
Military 
Staff; 
Ministries 
of Defence; 
National 
Defence 
Colleges 
 
 
 
 
 
E.g. MS 
National 
Police; 
Ministry of 
Interior/Justice;   
 
Folke 
Bernadotte 
Academy; 
National 
Defence 
Colleges 
 
 
E.g. BAE 
Systems, 
Finmeccanica, 
Airbus 
Military; 
EADS; 
Dassault 
Aviation 
 
E.g. 
Ministries of 
Foreign 
Affairs; PM 
Cabintes; 
Parliaments’ 
Committees; 
Political 
Parties 
 
 
INTERGVT 
 
 
 
NON-
STATE 
 
 
 
E.g. EDA; 
EUMS; 
EUMC;  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E.g. CPCC; 
Civcom;  
 
 
 
E.g. 
CMPD; 
ESDC; EU 
ISS; 
DCAF 
 
 
 
E.g. EDA; 
 
 
 
PSC; 
COREPER;  
 
 
 
SUPRA/TRANS 
-national 
 
 
THIRD 
PARTIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NATO;  
 
 
 
OSCE, UN, 
OECD, World 
Bank;  
 
 
 
OSCE, 
UN;  
 
 
 
Boeing;  
 
 
 
US 
Government 
 
 
 
- 
 
   
 
Building on this template, CSDP networks develop – and can hence be 
detected - across the norms or policy areas they engage with. Accordingly, 
since the actors dealing with police missions under the civilian crisis 
management framework and counter-piracy & naval strategies are not the 
same, there cannot logically be a perfect overlap as far as their relationships 
and grouping into knowledge or practice-based communities are concerned.  
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4.4 Conclusion 
 
As this section sought to show, structures, actors and networks within the 
CSDP need a more careful scrutiny. Previous academic works have failed to 
provide an exhaustive overview of the net of formal and informal relationships 
between institutions and other relevant stakeholder. The governance turn in EU 
studies certainly raised awareness about the multi-level nature of decision-
making in the hard case of security co-operation. However, it fell through 
extending the same logic to the multi-dimensional and multi-faceted shape of 
the environment surrounding governance dynamics.  
The rise of comprehensiveness and the push towards a more holistic approach 
in EU security policies, particularly after the Lisbon Treaty, have multiplied 
the actors influencing security decisions. As a consequence, networks and 
communities have proliferated beyond formal institutional structures or 
committees. With these considerations in mind, chapters 5, 6 and 7 look into 
the CSDP’s cognitive architecture and the diffusion of SSR and CCM. The two 
case studies show that, as a result of the broadening security landscape, new 
actors, networks and communities emerged besides traditional ones and 
influenced, with different outcomes, the institutionalisation of security 
cooperation. 
 
 
 
 Chapter 5 
 
Introduction to the case studies: the EU frameworks for 
Security Sector Reform and Civilian Crisis Management  
 
 
Introduction  
 
This chapter introduces the two case studies, which test my argument that 
ideational factors, through practice and expert-based communities, have driven 
the evolution of the CSDP. There are a few reasons why security sector reform 
and civilian crisis management – and not other CSDP thematic areas of 
cooperation – were chosen.  
As discussed in chapter 1 and 2, in selecting my cases I wished to single out 
two examples of innovative concepts that have shaped the EU’s development 
as a crisis manager. According to the 2013 ENTRi’s handbook on EU’s crisis 
management, SSR is “based on the concept of human security, has formed part 
of the toolbox in international crisis management”, and it is both “an 
operational as well as a normative concept” (ENTRi, 2013: 81). Activities 
falling under SSR are cross-sectoral59 and encompass the reform of 
institutional structures, the improvement of capabilities, the establishment of 
civilian offices for the supervision of security forces (ENTRi, 2013: 82). As the 
                                                
59 They include military, police and intelligence agencies, ministries, parliament, civil society 
organisations, judicial and criminal prosecution boders, paramilitary groups. Cf. ENTRi (2013: 
81).  
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next sections will discuss, the EU’s involvement in SSR follows the guidelines 
for implementation elaborated by the OECD-DAC (OECD, 2005, 2007).  
CCM is also considered by EU documents as “an important tool under the 
CSDP in support for international peace and security” (European Union, 2008: 
2). CCM activities cover the four priority areas defined by the Feira European 
Council (2000): police, rule of law, civilian administration, civil protection. As 
innovative concepts providing new tools for the CSDP, SSR and CCM operate 
at the same level of analysis (cf. table 5.1).  
 
Table 5:1: Levels of analysis in EU crisis management 
 
 
EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
 
 
Guiding principle  
 
 
COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH 
 
Tools 
 
 
CCM 
 
SSR 
 
Activities  
 
Four priority areas (Feira 
2000):  
 
- Police 
- Rule of Law 
- Civilian Administration 
- Civil Protection 
 
 
 
 
 
Cross-sectoral and 
multidisciplinary activities. 
Holisitc approach aimed at 
reforming the security system 
of a country, including 
institutional structures and 
operational capabilities:  
 
- Defence and armed forces 
reform 
- Security forces and services 
reform  
- Judicial reform 
- Police reform 
- Prison reform  
- Establishment of civilian 
authorities for the control of 
the security sector  
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These two thematic cases are also highly relevant to illustrate the learning 
framework. In both cases, ideas emerging in the post-Cold War setting have 
shaped the EU security discourse, leading to the adoption, and subsequent 
implementation, of new policy frameworks. SSR and CCM are deeply 
entrenched in the new understanding of security and crisis management 
involving the development of non-military approaches and tools for 
intervention.  
Second, these two cases were singled out because they display slightly 
different empirical manifestations of policy evolution. While CCM had a huge 
institutional and operational impact on the CSDP, the SSR framework has been 
far away from ensuring effective implementation and a coherent management 
of the mechanisms at disposal. EU-led SSR missions have been few and low 
scale, with uneven or disappointing results in the field. In institutional terms, 
SSR impact has been hardly detectable when compared to CCM. Therefore, by 
applying the same methodology to the analysis of these two cases, I intend to 
account for difference in outcomes and further specify the hypotheses set out in 
the theoretical framework.  
Finally, availability of empirical material and comparability between the cases 
also influenced my choice. SSR and CCM documents are not subject to 
significant restrictions, hence making it possible to configure a comparative 
research design. In sum, when thinking about what case studies should be 
selected, I took into account the three key criteria of relevance, contribution to 
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illustrate/refine my theoretical argument and feasibility. Against this backdrop, 
the empirical part of this thesis is structured as follows.  
This chapter introduces SSR and CCM. In each one of the two areas, the 
chapter overviews the academic literature available. It then illustrates the main 
characteristics of the policy frameworks, as well as all other relevant aspects 
such as structures, procedures, practices as they have developed from the late-
1990s onward. The purpose is to provide a reader with a clear understanding of 
the empirical universe, before embarking upon the analysis and hypotheses-
testing in chapters 6 and 7. Chapter 8 will then summarise the conclusions on 
the basis of the comparative findings.  
 
5.1 Introducing Security Sector Reform  
 
Although SSR is not explicitly mentioned in the Treaties, its place in the EU 
security architecture is validated by two concept documents issued by the 
Council Secretariat (Council of the European Union, 2005d) and the 
Commission (European Commission, 2006), as well as by the Report on the 
implementation of the European Security Strategy60 (2008). Lately, the 
development of SSR approaches to conflict resolution in general (Law, 2006; 
Peake et al., 2006; Brozka, 2006), and the EU’s engagement in particular 
                                                
60 As regards SSR, the Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy (2008: 
8) states “Conflict is often linked to state fragility.  Countries like Somalia are caught in a 
vicious cycle of weak governance and recurring conflict.  We have sought to break this, both 
through development assistance and measures to ensure better security. Security Sector Reform 
and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration are a key part of post-conflict 
stabilisation and reconstruction (…)”.  
Chapter 5 – Introduction to the case studies: SSR and CCM  
                   143 
(Sheriff, 2007; Spence and Fluri, 2008; Law and Myshlovska, 2008; Ekengren 
and Simons, 2010) have attracted scholars’ attention, particularly as far as the 
practices and challenges arising from the implementation of SSR policies are 
concerned (Dursun-Ozkanca and Vandemoortele, 2012). The literature, 
however, is mostly based on policy analysis and a case-by-case or comparative 
methodology, typically focused on assessment and evaluation matters as well 
as the problems of coordination and cooperation among multilateral actors. 
Theory development, aimed at accounting for the processes and outcomes of 
SSR, has thus far lagged behind: the current knowledge about EU SSR needs 
further exploration to uncover processes of institution building, policy 
evolution and the factors shaping different actors or organisations’ 
perspectives.  
 
5.1.1 The literature on SSR 
 
As a few academics have noted (Brzoska, 2000; Dursun-Ozkanca and 
Vandemoortele, 2012), accumulation of knowledge about security sector 
reform has only begun recently and the debate has been marked by general 
recommendations on the wider goals of the new policy framework, and some 
quite rare more detailed analytical suggestions for improvement, based on 
specific case studies in post-conflict situations. The literature shows, in other 
words, a rich policy-related and empirical orientation, but overlooks 
completely rigorous academic focus on the causes and implications of norm 
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evolution. As a result, the debate on the emergence of SSR tends to be fenced 
off: studies emphasise the importance of development concerns (i.e. major 
donors)61 or changes in the security/strategic environment (i.e., NATO or the 
OSCE)62 in shaping SSR inception depending on the writer’s affiliation. This is 
due to a congenital incoherence within the SSR debate and agenda, originating 
in the difficult (re)conciliation between security and development, which 
resulted in an incoherent academic debate. As Chuter put it, SSR is the 
“bastard child of civil-military relations and development studies” (Chuter, 
2006: 3). A key consequence is that SSR studies show such a significant 
variation as regards SSR definitions, objectives, processes, recipients, 
implementing institutions and methodologies that is appears almost impossible, 
if not useless, to bring them under the same roof.  
In spite of these complexities, one shall not deduce that tracking down the 
evolution of SSR is an impossible enterprise, for two reasons. First, the 
existence of different perspectives does not imply the absence of unbiased 
processes of systemic change across the end of the Cold War, as a result of 
which important challenges such as the causes of conflicts and the impact of 
aid policies begun to be seen under a different light. As Hendrickson put it, 
dramatic social and political upheaval in many of the lesser developed 
countries (including in the former Soviet space) at the end of the Cold War 
                                                
61 See, for instance, the bulk of the academic literature in the UK, which emphasises the role of 
DFID as the godfather of SSR and the central focus of this policy in poverty alleviation, hence 
upholding the view that development incorporated security concerns (and not vice-versa).  
62 Cf. Schnabel and Ehrhart (2005), Brzoska and Heinemann-Gruder (2004). Cf. also the 
documents produced by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 
(DCAF).  
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brought forth a real change in thinking (Hendrickson, 1999), reducing the deep 
split that had previously existed between development and security 
communities.63 The next section will deal with these processes and put SSR 
into historical perspective.  
Secondly, the analysis presented in this chapter does not drift uncontrolled 
across the broader international community, but is contextually bounded to its 
institutionalisation in the EU. This provides the researcher with the theoretical 
coordinates to engage the debate on SSR conceptual origins and evolution with 
a fair degree of objectivity.  
Against this backdrop, a first, quite striking feature of SSR lies in the fact that 
the EU, namely the European Commission and some member states, have been 
engaged for a long time in what can be defined as SSR policies ante-litteram. 
Even before the label “SSR” was created and the concept mainstreamed at the 
international level, the EU was involved in reconstruction and institutional 
reform policies, as part of its external action tools, that today fall under the 
conceptual umbrella of SSR. Several interviewed experts confirmed that 
different bits of SSR policies were in fact operational well before the SSR 
concept was created.64 In particular, the European Commission and member 
states were exposed to aspects of security sector reform through their 
membership in other international organisations active in the areas of human 
                                                
63 On this point, see Hendrickson (1999: 15-16).  
64 Interview of the author with experts in Brussels and Geneva, Summer/Winter 2011.  
Chapter 5 – Introduction to the case studies: SSR and CCM  
                   146 
rights, conflict prevention, post-crisis reconstruction and rehabilitation and 
governance, such as the OSCE65 or the UN (Law and Myshlovska, 2008: 10).  
Despite these examples of sectoral cooperation, security and development 
actors, including those inside the EU policy-making, hardly appreciated the 
importance of a comprehensive SSR framework. Doelle and Gouzée de Harven 
(2008) note that the nature of international relations during the Cold War was 
not conducive to the acknowledgment of this framework. Ideological enmity 
between the superpowers fuelled proxy wars and hence the re-emergence of 
conflicts between developing countries. Furthermore, donors’ dogmatic view 
of aid policies was limited to economic growth, with no recognition of the 
mutual influences of security and good governance on development. Only with 
the end of the Cold War’s structural constraints could a window of opportunity 
open up for the international community adopt the paradigm of human security 
and pave the way for the emergence of SSR (Doelle and Gouzée de Harven, 
2008: 39).  
Touching on the link between human security and security sector 
governance/reform, Hanggi and Tanner observe that what shaped the 
international security agenda in the 1990s towards a human security approach 
was a whole new set of previously existing phenomena, from small arms and 
light weapons to food, health and environmental security. These became 
                                                
65 The Commission was among the signatories of the OSCE 1999 Charter for European 
Security and during the 1990s EU officials met regularly (both at the ministerial and lower 
levels) with OSCE colleagues to discuss common areas of action such as enlargement, 
stabilisation and association processes, ENP, the Western Balkans, South Caucasus etc. 
Similarly, the EU and its member states have traditionally provided support to UN agencies 
and programmes in fields that are now embedded in the SSR template.  
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“securitised”, meaning characterised and treated as security concerns (Hanngi 
and Tanner, 2005: 12). The problem was that, before the mid-1990s, 
development agencies and security institutions (including the EU), despite the 
progressive acknowledgment that security had a crucial role in sustainable 
development, only focused on narrow sections of SSR (e.g. demobilisation or 
police reform) but did not look at the wider context through a long-term 
strategy connecting them (Hendrickson, 1999: 18). From the mid-1990s, key 
international organisations (the OECD, UNDP, the World Bank) started 
profiling SSR, setting norm standards and promoting norm transfer (Hanggi 
and Tanner, 2005). This process was driven by the emerging consensus that an 
unreformed security sector represented an obstacle to the promotion of 
sustainable peace, democracy and development, but was also thwarted by the 
challenges arising from the conceptualisation of SSR (a contested concept) and 
its implementation (due to the scarcity of SSR practices and lessons learned).   
Before focusing on the genesis and evolution of SSR in the EU, it is useful to 
provide a brief overview of the existing definitions of SSR according to the 
context, implementing actors, operating principles and activities. 
To start with, it is useful to point up that the notion of SSR is associated with 
security sector governance, According to DCAF:  
 
Security Sector Governance (SSG) refers to the structures, 
processes, values and attitudes that shape decisions about 
security and their implementation.66  
 
                                                
66 DCAF (2009: 1).  
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Security Sector Reform (SSR) aims to enhance SSG through 
the effective and efficient delivery of security under conditions 
of democratic oversight and control. SSR offers a framework 
for conceptualising which actors and factors are relevant to 
security in a given environment as well as a methodology for 
optimising the use of available security resources. By 
emphasising the need to take a comprehensive approach to the 
security sector, SSR can also help integrate a broad variety of 
actors and processes.67 
 
The standard definitions of “security sector” and “security sector reform” are 
provided by the OECD Development Assistance Committee and are today 
commonly used by international actors to formulate their SSR policies. 
According to the DAC, the key actors in the security sector are “the security 
forces and the relevant civilian bodies and processes needed to manage them”.  
Security sector reform involves “transforming the way the security sector is 
managed and monitored to ensure that the security organisations are 
accountable to democratic civil authorities and that sound principles of public 
sector management are applied to the security sector” (Ball, 2002: 8). But what 
does security sector mean exactly, in other words what types of institutions and 
activities are covered when we use the term “SSR”?  
The terminology note to the OECD Handbook on Security System Reform 
(OECD, 2007: 5), which is based on the OECD DAC Guidelines on Security 
System Reform and Governance (OECD, 2005), defines the security system as:  
  
(…) including core security actors (e.g. armed forces, police, 
gendarmerie, border guards, customs and immigration, and 
intelligence and security services); security management and 
oversight bodies (e.g. ministries of defence and internal affairs, 
                                                
67 Ibid. 
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financial management bodies and public complaints commissions); 
justice and law enforcement institutions (e.g. the judiciary, prisons, 
prosecution services, traditional justice systems); and non-statutory 
security forces (e.g. private security companies, guerrilla armies and 
private militia). 
   
The note adds that:  
 
(…) this definition has become established internationally and so in 
the handbook, “security system”, “security system reform” and 
“SSR” all refer to that broad range of security and justice 
institutions. The terms also denote activities sometimes referred to by 
international actors as “security sector reform”, “security and 
justice sector reform” and “rule of law”. 
   
With respect to this last point, it is important to stress that although the OECD 
guidelines allow the use of SSR for both security “system” and “sector” 
governance and reform, the gap between systemic and sectoral approach 
triggered an intense debate in the expert communities on how to conduct SSR, 
with serious policy implications.  
In fact, the OECD’s “systemic” recommendations have not been automatically 
followed by all the actors involved in SSR implementation. Some institutions 
continued to have a narrow understanding of SSR, limited to activities in the 
security sector. The systemic approach, instead, entails a fuller developmental 
and holistic viewpoint. The DAC Guidelines on Helping Preventing Violent 
Conflict (OECD, 2001) clarify this point by saying that:  
 
security system include the traditional security forces but indicates a 
broader approach: security system reform is understood as the 
transformation of security systems so that they are managed by, and 
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operate in manner more consistent with, democratic norms, rule of law 
– which includes well functioning and just judicial and penal systems 
and sound principles of good governance. Therefore, the term security 
system reform no longer refers only to the reform of the armed forces, 
which is only one aspect or sector of security. The idea is to reform the 
entire security system.  
 
(OECD, 2001). 
 
For instance, a joint paper by the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID), the Department of State and the Department of Defense from 2009, 
fully takes on the systemic definition of SSR and defines it as: 
  
the set of policies, plans, programs and activities that a government 
undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security and justice. 
The overall objective is to provide these services in a way that 
promotes an effective and legitimate public service that is transparent, 
accountable to civilian authority, and responsive to the needs of the 
public. From a donor persective, SSR is an umbrella term that might 
include integrated activities in support of: defense and armed forces 
reform; civilian management and oversight; justice; police; 
corrections; intelligence reform; national security planning and 
strategy support; border management; disarmament, demobilization 
and reintrgration (DDR); and/or reduction of armed violence.68  
 
 
Hanggi and Tanner’s influential work on security sector governance in the 
EU’s neighbourhood (Hanggi and Tanner, 2005) acknowledges the holistic 
approach to the provision of security along the OECD lines, in its “double 
sense”. First, by integrating all those partial reforms (such as defence reform, 
police reform, intelligence reform), which in the past were generally seen and 
                                                
68 USAID, DOS, DOD (2009: 5).  
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conducted as separate efforts. Second, by putting the security sector and its 
components under democratic governance, given its normative commitment to 
the consolidation of democracy, promotion of human rights and 
implementation of the principles of good governance (Hanggi and Tanner, 
2005: 17). The EU, as the next section will show, has fully adopted this 
approach at the declaratory level. On that account, the figure 5.2 summarises 
the categories of actors influencing security sector/system governance and 
reform:  
 
 
 
 
Major Categories of Actors Influencing Security Sector Governance 
 Organizations authorized to use force - armed forces; police; paramilitary forces; 
gendarmeries; intelligence services (including both military and civilian agencies); 
secret services; coast guards; border guards; customs authorities; reserve or local 
security units (civil defense forces, national guards, presidential guards, militias, etc.). 
 Civil management and oversight bodies - the president/prime minister; national 
security advisory bodies; legislature and legislative select committees; ministries of 
defence, internal affairs, foreign affairs; customary and traditional authorities; financial 
management bodies (finance ministries, budget offices, financial audit & planning 
units); and statutory civil society organizations (civilian review boards and public 
complaints commissions).  
 Justice and public security bodies - judiciary; justice ministries; prisons; criminal 
investigation and prosecution services; human rights commissions and ombudsmen; 
correctional services; customary and traditional justice systems. 
 Non-statutory security body actors:  liberation armies, guerrilla armies, traditional 
militias, political party militias, private security companies 
 Civil society actors:  professional organizations, including trade unions; 
research/policy analysis organizations; advocacy organizations; the media; religious 
organizations; non-governmental organizations; concerned public. 
 
Figure 5.2: Main actors in SSR and SSG (Ball et al., 2002: 4) 
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Despite the existence of a standardised template for SSR, based on the 
systemic approach and codified by the OECD work, in practical terms SSR 
varies substantially according to factors such as the specific reform context, the 
implementing organisations, and has been shaped by several policy experiences 
and practices.  
The SSR approach is holistic: whereas some generic features are considered as 
common to any type of involvement in SSR, many different sub-approaches 
have arisen and been developed by the several external actors engaged in SSR. 
These include state and non-state actors, NGOs and civil society organisations. 
In the last ten years, intergovernmental organisations have tended to play a 
leading role in conceptualising and implementing the SSR agenda (DCAF, 
2009). IOs tend to approach SSR from either a development (i.e., World Bank), 
security (i.e., OSCE, NATO, EU) or democratic perspective (i.e. Council of 
Europe); have a global (i.e., UN, EU, OSCE), regional (i.e., African Union, 
Council of Europe) or sub-regional focus (i.e., ECOWAS); maybe active in 
field activities, such as capacity building and technical assistance (i.e., Council 
of Europe), norm development (i.e., OECD) or both (i.e., EU, OSCE); can 
operate in different country contexts, such as post-conflict (i.e., EU, NATO, 
OSCE), transition countries (i.e., Council of Europe) or developing countries 
(i.e., OECD, ECOWAS, World Bank). Although the overarching principle and 
framework of SSR remains the same, each IO has experienced SSR 
programmes in different ways, depending on its specific concerns (problem-
solving), capabilities or geographical scope.  
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5.1.2 A policy framework for EU SSR 
 
In light of the importance of international organisations and their practices in 
shaping the SSR concept, this section introduces the distinct features of the EU 
as an actor in this field.     
Since the early 2000s, the EU has constantly increased its focus on SSR as part 
of its external action. Like other fields, this policy innovation process is part of 
the evolving goals and means for the EU security, resulting from its growing 
fields of competences and the changes occurring in its security environment. 
The EU has progressively internalised the SSR discourse and practice as part of 
the security-good governance-development paradigm. However, the rise of 
SSR did not come about from scratch. As a major provider of external 
assistance, the European Commission has been engaged in over 70 countries 
around the world in support of a wide spectrum of sub-sectoral SSR activities, 
several years before SSR entered the EU debate (Buxton, 2008: 29). Activities 
included justice reform, capacity building of interior and justice ministers, 
prison services, legal aid, human rights commissions and ombudsman 
functions, border guards and custom institutions and in some cases also the 
reform of armed forces).69  
                                                
69 These figures are drawn from a survey conducted by the Commission in the summer 2005, to 
map the past and current EC’s activities in support of SSR related programmes in the period 
2000-2005. The results are annexed to the EC Communication on Security Sector Reform of 
June 2006 (European Commission, 2006).  
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Similarly, both the CSDP and its predecessor, the Western European Union 
(WEU),70 have been engaged in missions falling under the SSR template, 
particularly police ones (van Eekelen, 2008: 117). This spectrum of activities 
rapidly became a key element justifying EU interventions and CSDP 
operations (Sabiote 2010). As of September 2011, two EU missions fall 
explicitly under the SSR field (EUSSR Guinea-Bissau, EUSEC Democratic 
Republic of Congo) while other 14 missions out of 27 are partially related or 
fully cover SSR aspects such as rule of law, police and judicial assistance.71 In 
this regard, what the new SSR paradigm added to the pre-existing framework 
was not a simple “relabeling”, but the more complex transformation of ad-hoc, 
sub-sectoral intervention scattered across a broad range of activities under 
different EU instruments to an holistic, coherent approach based on the 
“whole-of-government” and involving enhanced coordination between EU 
institutions as well as a comprehensive framework for action. Accordingly, the 
peculiarity of the EU’s involvement in SSR and understanding of the security-
development nexus arises from the fact that it affects all EU institutions 
(Sheriff, 2007). This is due to the cross-cutting nature of the concept and the 
presence of several interlocking agendas, from development cooperation to 
enlargement, from conflict prevention to human rights.  
                                                
70 The literature tends to downplay the WEU’s engagement non-military missions before the 
transfer of its crisis management functions to the EU, particularly since, as noted by van 
Eekelen (2008) the WEU task of elaborating decisions concerning defence issues was, in its 
practical dimension, more often police-oriented than military. In this regard, it is worth 
reminding that, until 1995, Germany could not constitutionally contribute with military units to 
out-of-area operations: providing police, border-guards and custom officers was to a number of 
operations was then seen as a way to circumvent the problem (van Eekelen, 2008: 117).  
71 Figures taken from CSDP MAP.  
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Although the EU cannot be depicted as a “leader” in SSR (Dursun-Ozkanka 
and Vandemoortele, 2012: 140), it is true that EU-led initiatives have gained 
momentum after the creation of the Union’s SSR policy framework in 2005-
2006. The DCAF’s report on Intergovernmental Approaches to SSR identifies 
the EU as “potentially the most important resource provider for SSR 
programmes” (DCAF, 2006: 9).  
The European Security Strategy (2003) underlines the importance of the 
security-development nexus (p. 2) and contains a brief but noteworthy 
reference to SSR as a means to “increase capabilities in different areas (…) in 
terms of a wider spectrum of mission” and as “part of broader institution 
building” in third countries (p. 12-13). Two years later, in November 2005, the 
EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform was adopted 
(Council of the European Union, 2005d) bringing into being the effective 
integration of the concept.72  
Making explicit reference to the core objectives of the European Security 
Strategy, the document underlines the role of EU SSR in “…putting fragile 
states back on their feet…enhancing good governance, fostering democracy 
and promoting local and regional stability”, placing special emphasis on local 
ownership and inter-institutional coherence with other areas of EU external 
action. In many respects, the concept adheres to the OECD DAC guidelines. 
For instance, the definition of security sector replicates the categories listed in 
the OECD DAC document, although it is stated that the guidelines do not 
                                                
72 The draft concept document was produced by the Council Secretariat on the basis of a paper 
titled “Initial elements for an EU security sector reform concept” discussed by the Political and 
Security Committee (van Eekelen, 2008: 113).  
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“reflect the specificities of the EU, nor those security aspects that fall under the 
CSDP” (Council of the European Union, 2005d: 5).  
Six months after the Council’s concept, in May 2006, the Commission issued 
its own framework document through a Communication to the Council and the 
European Parliament titled A Concept for European Community Support for 
Security Sector Reform (European Commission, 2006), accompanied by 
annexes on previous areas of European Community support to SSR and 
international standards relevant for SSR activities. The document stated that 
“SSR is an important part of conflict prevention, peace-building and 
democratisation…SSR concerns reform of both the bodies which provide 
security to citizens and the state institutions responsible for management and 
oversight of those bodies”. From a content analysis of the Communication it 
emerges that the Commission, taking also the OECD DAC guidelines as its 
conceptual basis, intended to stress more forcefully the “security system” (as 
opposed to “security sector”) approach to SSR, underlining that reform should 
be understood as part of a governance reform policy and public sector strategy 
going beyond the security sector (van Eekelen, 2008: 115). Therefore, the 
Commission and the Council have articulated their approaches in slightly 
different ways, with the latter pursuing a narrower agenda based on security 
and crisis management, and the former relying on a broader one associated 
with good governance and conflict prevention.  
Despite the scarce attention given by the Council Secretariat and the PSC to the 
Commission communication and differences between the two documents in 
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terms of conceptual nuances, operational focuses and implementing bodies, a 
Council of Ministers’ decision of 12 June 2006 resulted in the release of the 
EU Policy framework for Security Sector Reform (Council of the European 
Union, 2006c). This third document pulled together the Commission’s related 
activities and doctrines with the military route available to execute and support 
SSR through the common security and defence policy (Ekengren and Simons 
2011). 
On that account, the Commission and the Council have indeed become active 
players in SSR. As far as the latter are concerned, the CSDP missions and the 
Community’s Rapid Reaction Mechanism and the Instrument for Stability have 
contributed to this rapid development by complementing the adoption of an 
overarching holistic and coordinated framework. However, as some authors 
have pointed out (Sheriff, 2007), challenges for SSR implementation in the EU 
arise precisely from an erroneous use of policy and operational instruments. On 
the one hand, although developed with reference to the OECD model pledging 
effective cross-pillar mechanisms, the EU SSR policy framework has suffered 
from the EU institutional fragmentation and the presence of too many levels of 
governance (and hence too many bureaucratic structures snooping into 
decision-making about SSR). On the other hand, and partly as a result of 
institutional framework, the EU has lacked common operational guidelines 
(Sheriff, 2007: 98) to evaluate and assess SSR activities in order to improve 
conceptual, planning and implementation tasks.  
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5.2 Introducing Civilian Crisis Management 
 
The development of civilian crisis management in the EU is commonly seen as 
a process of capacity-building, aimed at equipping the Union with the 
instruments to carry out successful non-military peace-building and crisis 
response within the framework of the “Petersberg tasks” defined by the Article 
17.2 of the Amsterdam Treaty. Nowak (2006), stresses such instrumental 
nature, defining CCM as “the civilian-operational capacities of the EU member 
states that have been developed since 1999 in parallel with the military aspects 
of crisis management under ESDP” (Nowak, 2006: 17). No study, however, 
has approached the rise of CCM through the lenses of its conceptual evolution, 
and the resulting diffusion of norms and practices across EU member states. 
Whereas the operational and institutional aspects related to CCM 
implementation have produced an intense debate, its genesis has been largely 
neglected or superficially regarded as a way to avoid the militarisation of the 
CSDP and draw the line between NATO and the EU’s roles in global security. 
Although these factors have undoubtedly paved the way for the evolution of 
European security cooperation towards a non-military or civil-military 
approach, there is still no clear understanding of the drivers that have 
influenced EU member states’ decision to move into this direction. This is a 
rather paradoxical situation given the prominence of civilian missions over 
military operations in CSDP73 (as of March 2012, 22 out of 28 missions 
                                                
73 Such prominence reveals a striking (and unaccounted for) changing conception of CSDP, as 
at the time of policy creation member states intended to establish a European military 
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launched by the EU since 2003 are civilian). Previous works have mentioned, 
usually through a few introductory lines, the origins of EU CCM at the 1999 
Cologne Council, propelled by policy failure over the Western Balkans and, in 
particular, by the troubled encountered by UN (UNMIK), NATO (KFOR) and 
OSCE (OMIK) missions to ensure peacebuilding in Kosovo. However, the 
processes through which policy failure turned into policy evolution, and hence 
the way non-military crisis management was adopted by EU policy-makers, 
lacks of details and systematic explanation. 
 
5.2.1 The literature on EU CCM 
 
This section briefly reviews the main competing explanations for the EU’s 
early engagement in CCM. The literature on this aspect of CSDP is 
surprisingly poor and displays an inexplicable gap between, on the one hand, 
the fuss about the EU’s incapacity to become a fully-fledged military power or 
a muscular crisis manager and, on the other, a very simple question that has not 
generated explanatory writings: how do we explain the rise of EU civilian 
crisis management within CSDP, the policy convergence towards the 
establishment of institutional structures and the consequent operational 
outreach?  
The starting point everyone seems to agree upon is change in the post-Cold 
War international system. Contextual factors and changes in the global security 
                                                
capability in crisis management that would allow the Union to act independently from NATO. 
This eventually changed as the value added of CSDP turned out to be “civilian” (Gross, 2008: 
314).  
Chapter 5 – Introduction to the case studies: SSR and CCM  
                   160 
environment generated a momentum for non-military crisis management to 
become accepted as a key issue in the security policies of EU member states. 
The awareness that peacekeeping should go beyond the borders of military 
intervention spread rather fast. By the mid-1990s, an international policy 
consensus and convergence appeared on the need for more comprehensive, 
coordinated civil-military planning and intervention in crisis situations (Duke 
and Courtier, 2010). It is worth reminding that the Charter of Paris (OSCE, 
1990) can be considered as the key document showing for the first time the 
relationship between the end of the Cold War and the implications for the 
future course of global security. 
However, systemic pressure would not have been enough to create the urgency 
for EU’s involvement in civilian crisis management to arise in the early 2000s. 
In the scant literature on CCM, a few factors are deemed as crucial in 
explaining the creation of EU CCM. Focusing on cooperation between the EU 
and the UN, Thierry Tardy (2011) argues that a fundamental reshuffle of the 
international security architecture, security governance actors and methods 
after the end of the Cold War led to the emergence of regionalisation – that is, 
international organisations that aspire to play a role in the security realm at a 
regional level. As a response to UN’s inappropriateness or ineffectiveness in 
maintaining international peace (cf. policy failure in Rwanda, Bosnia, Somalia 
and Timor Este during the 1990s) the transformation of the EU into a regional 
peacekeeper was initiated by member states as a way to overcome the rising 
distrust vis-à-vis UN crisis management (Tardy, 2011: 13). In addition to the 
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EC’s involvement in areas such as post conflict recovery and humanitarian aid, 
the CSDP increasingly engaged in peacebuilding and, in particular, CCM 
(Tardy, 2011: 16).  
Other authors (Dwan, 2002) identify the internal politics of EU and its member 
states as heavily shaping the EU’s move towards civilian crisis management. 
Dwan notes that the swift creation of a military rapid reaction force caused the 
consternation of three overlapping constituencies: the neutral states (Austria, 
Ireland, Finland and Sweden), concerned about the prospects of military 
alignment that could follow the commitment to an EU military capacity; the 
smaller member states, fearing that a military directoire of bigger powers 
(Britain, France, Germany) would control the fate of the EU security and 
defence policy; and the anti-federalists (Denmark, the UK) willing to 
counterbalance the push towards military integration. As far as the latter is 
concerned, a similar viewpoint is offered by Quille et al. (2006), who account 
for the creation of the Civilian Military Cell – and its contribution to 
developing EU civil-military coordination – as an identity-driven struggle 
between Atlanticists and Integrationists over the EU’s autonomy in defence 
planning and conduct (the autonomous operational HQ), particularly following 
the April 2003 initiative in Tervuren.  
The CSDP’s “civilian” identity can therefore be understood as a by-product of 
the controversy surrounding EU-NATO relationship and the degree of 
autonomy / complementarity of the newly created EU military identity. 
Combining civilian and military power in crisis management, however, cannot 
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be seen as the sheer result of a package deal between member states’ diverging 
national interests and visions of EU defence. Chivvis (2010: 5) notes that the 
driving ideas behind civilian CSDP were rooted in the belief that the EU was 
better equipped than NATO to handle post conflict reconstruction, namely in 
the Western Balkans.  
Certainly, the strategic debate on the nature of EU power had a prominent role 
too. Focusing on the broader notion of comprehensive approach, Gross (2008: 
9) argues that its formulation and implementation is grounded on the 
formulation of the EU strategic goals through the European Security Strategy 
(2003) in response to the changing security framework. According to Gross, 
the EU’s comprehensive set of military, political and economic tools justifies 
the effort to put into practice the link between security and development and 
combine civilian and military instruments to meet the growing demand of civil-
military planning.  
In sum, the literature concurs with the view expressed by Duke (2008: 90) that 
the development of civilian aspects of crisis management in CFSP was heavily 
reactive in nature. The term “reactive” can be interpreted in three ways. First, 
as observed by Duke, reactive refers to the need to respond to existing crisis 
situations, such as Kosovo. Second, reactive also implies that inter-institutional 
forces (cf. EU-UN and EU-NATO relations) have been at play and shaped the 
way the EU built its identity in relationship to other international organisations 
and, as Tardy (2011: 35) put it at the junction between institutional and inter-
governmental dynamics. Third, reactive may refer to the linkage between the 
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internal politics (and cultures) of member states and the search for a common 
“vision” for CSDP, which ultimately resulted into enhanced civilian and civil-
military structures and instruments for the conduct of crisis management.   
 
5.2.2 The rise of EU as a civilian crisis manager: framework, institutions and 
capabilities  
 
Having reviewed the main accounts for the emergence of CCM, let us now turn 
to its practical development through the establishment of EU CCM conceptual 
framework, institutions and capabilities. This section illustrates the trends on 
which the EU has become a civilian crisis manager, drawing on the literature 
on the topic and on primary sources available. It looks at how institutions and 
capability building were launched following the inclusion of the Petersberg 
tasks in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty. It also analyses further conceptual, 
institutional and capacity development as a result of learning by doing from the 
early CSDP missions.   
Since the beginning of its security and defence policy, the EU has been 
involved in the development of a civilian crisis management concept under the 
legal framework of Article 17.2 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU): 
“Questions referred to in this Article shall include humanitarian and rescue 
tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, 
including peacemaking”.  
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The Lisbon Treaty has amended Article 17 TEU and the new formulation is 
now included in the Articles 28 A [42] and B [43] (cf. table 5.3).     
 
Table 5.3: Extract from Art. 28 of the Treaty of Lisbon, the “Petersberg tasks”  
  
“The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common 
foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity 
drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside 
the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international 
security in accordance with the principle of the United Nations Charter (...)” {Art. 28 
A [42(1)]}  
 
“Member States shall make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union 
for the implementation of the common security and defence policy, to contribute to the 
objectives defined by the Council” {Art. 28 A [42(3)]}  
 
“The tasks referred to in Article 28 A(1) [42(1)], in the course of which the Union may 
use civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmament operations, 
humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict 
prevention and peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, 
including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation (...)” {Art. 28 B [43(1)]}  
 
 
The EU involvement in civilian crisis management is distinctive and different 
from any other international organisation in the field of security, as the 
literature has already shown (Nowak, 2006; Duke, 2008). First, the EU 
activities in crisis management and peacebuilding are divided into first-pillar 
Community actions and second-pillar civilian and military crisis management, 
with different actors, budget procedures and policies. Accordingly, although 
this research tackles the CSDP dimension of CCM only, it is important to 
reiterate that the structures and resources for CCM are physically located both 
within the Community and the Council Secretariat. Therefore, they do not 
conform to the purely intergovernmental method of military crisis 
management.   
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Second, and unlike NATO or the OSCE, the EU has clearly declared its 
ambition to develop both military and civilian capabilities to support a 
comprehensive approach. Therefore, besides the adoption of a Civil-Military 
Co-operation (CIMIC) concept to ensure coordination with external actors 
(IGOs and NGOs) in EU-led operations, the Civil-Military Coordination 
concept (CMCO)74 was produced to ensure effective internal coordination “of 
the actions of all relevant EU actors involved in the planning and subsequent 
implementation of the EU’s response to the crisis”75 (Khol, 2008). When 
accounting for the institutional genesis and evolution of CCM,76 it is therefore 
important to take these complexities into account and, in particular, to bear in 
mind the broader civil-military developments, which are closely related to and 
often overlap with the question of purely “civilian” capacity building. 
Against this backdrop, the rise of CCM was characterised initially by three 
elements: under-thematisation, conceptual looseness and rapidity. First, the EU 
CCM was neither a policy priority, nor was it in the limelight of academic and 
media debates. In fact, while the Saint Malo Declaration and the proposed 
creation of rapid reaction corps for autonomous EU capacity in crisis 
management received media attention, the significance and potential 
development of non-military crisis response tools passed almost unnoticed.  
                                                
74 For a definition of CIMIC and CMCO, and the difference between the two concepts, see 
Khol (2006: 124).  
75 Cf. Council of the European Union (2003).   
76 When using the acronym CCM (whether preceded or not by EU) I refer to the civilian crisis 
management framework developed and used by the European Union only. When referring to 
the broader concept of civilian crisis management, also adopted by other international 
organisations, I will use the formulation “civilian crisis management”, without acronym.     
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Second, civilian crisis management has been for a long time an ambiguous and 
not clearly defined concept, which has led to a significant amount of 
conceptual confusion in international peacekeeping. According to previous 
works (Nowak, 2006; Ioannides, 2010), the first definition was provided in 
March 2002 by a special report of the British American Security Information 
Council (BASIC), defining civilian crisis management as: “the intervention by 
non-military personnel in a crisis that may be violent or non-violent, with the 
intention of preventing further escalation of the crisis and facilitating its 
resolution” (Lindborg, 2002: 4).  
Third, institutionalisation of crisis management (including its civilian facet) in 
the EU has been remarkably fast. Such rapidity was made possible by a number 
of facilitating factors (lessons from the collapse of Yugoslavia, the Anglo-
French Saint Malo declaration), among which the institutional precedent – the 
WEU  - provided the new crisis management structures with consolidated 
practices and experiences (Duke, 2008: 76).  
Contrary to what is commonly reported, the inception of the EU’s CCM was 
not the Cologne Summit (June 1999), but, two years earlier, the inclusion of 
the Petersberg Tasks in the Amsterdam Treaty (signed on October 1997), as a 
result of the Swedish-Finnish initiative during the intergovernmental 
conference in 1996-1997. The initiative, which led to the adoption of the 
Article 17.2 TEU, was aimed at providing the Union with the tools to carry out 
peace support operations, out of the realisation that the EU could not stand 
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powerlessly in the event of situations like the violent conflicts that erupted in 
the Balkans.  
At the Cologne Summit, one month after the entry into force of the Amsterdam 
Treaty, the European Council decided to mandate the upcoming Finnish 
Presidency to address non-military crisis management, besides the work 
undergoing on the military side. A “Security Working Group” (SWG) was 
tasked to deal with this question and produced a list of the existing instruments 
at the Union level, in cooperation with the Council Secretariat, the Commission 
and member states.77 The result of this was an inventory of non-military crisis 
response instruments available in EU member states forwarded to Delegations 
on November 24, 1999.78 As an example, the table 5.4 shows the list of pre-
existing structures, instruments and expertise of civil police in some of the EU 
member states:  
 
Table 5.4: Non-military crisis management tools available in EU member states 
in the field of civilian police (1999)79 
 
 
 
EU 
member 
state 
 
Tools and resources available (CIVIL POLICE)  
 
 
 
 
DK 
Denmark participates in civilian police missions implemented by the UN, 
OSCE, WEU, as well as other multilateral and bilateral operations. Denmark 
at present participates in international missions with approximately 80 police 
officers (of whom 68 are deployed in various missions in the Balkans - IPTF, 
UNIP, ECMM, PMG, and MAPE). 50 of these officers are permanently at the 
disposal for international operations and are registered with the UN Stand-by 
arrangement system 
 
ES 
At present, 42 members of the Spanish national police and 188 members of 
Guardia Civil are serving in missions under NNUU, NATO, OSCE, and 
WEU. Tasks involve monitoring of human rights violations, local police 
forces, refugee/displaced persons movements, as well as control and police 
tasks of refugee camps, borders and embargoes 
                                                
77 Cf. Council of the European Union (1999a: 2).  
78 Cf. Council of the European Union (1999b).  
79 Source: Council of the European Union (1999b: 3-4).  
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IR 
Irish police have a long tradition of service as civpols in UN missions and 
have participated in a number of OSCE and EU missions. Coreu DUB109 
sets out the position regarding the training of police officers in Ireland for 
such missions 
 
IT 
Italy has a territorial police, a state police and a custom police, which are 
autonomous forces that can and have been employed in crisis management. A 
school of advanced police studies offers two "stages" yearly to form around 
70 international police trainers. This facility is at the disposal of international 
organisations (i.a. the EU) 
 
 
NL 
A total of around 70 military police officers from the Netherlands are currently 
deployed in various crisis regions, mainly in Bosnia-Herzegovina in IPTF, and 
some in Albania (MAPE). 
- A group of civil police officers has been deployed on an ad hoc basis in crisis 
regions (e.g. forensic experts assisting the Rwanda Tribunal or the ICTY). 
- The Government is currently looking into ways to enhance its capacity to 
deploy civil police in crisis regions to assist in the establishment of structures for 
democratic policing as an integral part of peace building 
AUS Long-standing experience for forces for international (especially UN) missions; 
for training: see coreu VIE 350/99 
 
P 
National civil police force (Polícia de Segurança Pública - PSP - depending on 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs) has been participating in international police 
missions (monitoring human rights and local police forces, refugee/displaced 
movements) humanitarian assistance to refugees, local police training, police 
counselling and consulting, voters registration and election monitoring 
FIN A rostrum of trained civilian police (CIVPOL) available. 110 trained experts in 
reserve. 16 civilian police at the moment in field operations (UN, OSCE, and 
WEU) 
 
 
 
SW 
Currently about 180 Swedish police in international missions: 148 in UN, 
OSCE or WEU missions (IPTF, UNMIK, UNAMET, PMG, and MAPE). 
Before departure, training at the Swedish Armed Forces International Command 
(SWEDINT). Also bilateral missions (e.g. support for legal sector in Central and 
Eastern Europe). 
- Responsibility currently shared between National Police Force and Swedish 
Armed Forces. Government proposal forthcoming that National Police Board 
takes a collective responsibility for all international police activity and creates a 
Foreign Force within the Police Force 
 
 
 
 
These inventories served as the basis for the Action Plan for non military crisis 
management of the EU subsequently adopted by the December 1999 Helsinki 
European Council,80 and designed to indicate the steps the Union should 
undertake to develop a rapid reaction capacity in the field of non-military crisis 
management. The Action Plan identifies three objectives for the Union’s 
approach to CCM:  
 
                                                
80 Cf. Helsinki European Council (1999: 6). 
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- Strengthening the synergy and responsiveness of national, 
collective and NGO resources in order to avoid duplication and 
improve performance (...);  
- Enhancing and facilitating the EU’s contribution to, and 
activities within, other organisations, such as the UN and the 
OSCE whenever one of them is the lead organisation in a 
particular crisis, as well as EU autonomous action;  
- Ensuring inter-pillar coherence.81  
 
To that purpose, three tools are foreseen:  
 
- An inventory of national and collective resources, to give an overview 
of resources that could be marshalled within a rapid reaction framework 
(...). In this process Member States and the EU institutions could, if 
they wish, highlight sectors in which they find that they have 
acknowledged expertise; 
- A database to maintain and share information on the pre-identified 
assets, capabilities and expertise within all areas relevant to non-
military crisis management;  
- A study taking into account lessons learned, to define concrete targets 
for EU Member States’ collective non-military responses to 
international crises (e.g. the ability to deploy at short notice and sustain 
                                                
81 Ibid. p. 6.  
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for a defined period a set number of civilian police as a contribution to 
civpol missions; to deploy a combined search and rescue capability of 
up to 200 people within twenty-four hours).82   
 
The purpose of these three tools was to identify areas of relative strength and 
weakness to improve training standards, sharing of experience and best 
practices, as well as bilateral or multilateral projects between Member States.83  
The Action Plan, in turn, paved the way for the work undertaken by the 
Portuguese Presidency on the development of the CSDP civilian capabilities. 
In accordance with the recommendations contained in the Helsinki Presidency 
Report, the work of the Portuguese Presidency largely relied on the study that 
drew on “experience from recent and current crises, on the expertise of the 
Member States and on the results of the seminar on civilian crisis management 
in Lisbon on 3-4 April 2000”, and “carried out to define concrete targets in the 
area of civilian aspects of crisis management.84 The study concluded that four 
priority areas should constitute the bulk of EU civilian crisis management: 
police, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection. It gave priority 
to the development of rapid reaction response capabilities “fully taking into 
account, and building upon, existing experiences, instruments and resources”.85  
The rationale for choosing these areas reflected a concern to pay particular 
attention to the fields where “the international community so far has 
demonstrated weaknesses”, which hence would “provide "added value" as it 
                                                
82 Ibid. p. 6.  
83 Ibid. p. 7. 
84 Santa Maria da Feira European Council (2000). Cf. also Nowak (2006: 19).  
85 Santa Maria da Feira European Council (2000).  
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would improve the Union's capacity to react as well as the Union's capability to 
meet the requests of the other lead organisations: they would be able to count – 
on a more systematic basis – on a sizeable quantitative and qualitative 
contribution which could represent the nucleus of some of their missions. This 
would, in turn, increase the Union's visibility”.86 
Therefore, capacity building relied on the expertise made available by member 
states. Civilian police and, to a lesser extent, rule of law assumed a leading role 
in improving EU crisis response capabilities. The targets for the police were set 
by the Santa Maria da Feira European Council (June 2000) set the targets for 
the police: 5.000 police officers available for international police missions, 
with 1.000 of them deployable within 30 days.  
The Gothenburg Council (June 2001) later adopted a Police Action Plan to 
further develop the planning capacity of police operations at the strategic level. 
The presence in some of the member states of specialised police forces ready to 
be deployed87 facilitated the task of capacity building. In addition, the 
Gothenburg Council set up the targets in the area of the rule of law, with a 
commitment to 200 experts to train, advice and in some cases carry out 
executive tasks when local structures are failing or inexistent. Targets and 
guidelines for civilian administration and civil protection were also set, 
although in a less precise and sustained way compared to the other two priority 
areas. Member states committed to provide a pool of experts for quick 
                                                
86 Ibid.  
87 Gendarmerie-type forces were already present in France (Gendarmerie Nationale), Italy 
(Arma dei Carabinieri), Spain (Guardia Civil), The Netherlands (Marechaussee) and Portugal 
(Guarda Nacional Republicana).  
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deployment in civilian administration missions across a variety of functions, 
with emphasis on the promotion of a swift transition to local ownership. 
Targets for civil protection included intervention teams of 2,000 personnel and 
assessment teams to support humanitarian assistance (handled by the 
Commission).   
From this inception phase (1999 – 2001) onward, conceptual, institutional and 
operational aspects of CCM make significant progress, sustained by those 
member states that were already disposing of expertise in the civilian aspects of 
crisis management. Institution building went in parallel with the creation of 
military structures. By Swedish initiative, in May 2000, the Committee for 
Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (Civcom), composed of official from 
the Commission and the Council Secretariat, mid-ranking national diplomats 
and a number of police experts (Cross, 2012: 187) was formally established by 
a Council decision (it met for the first time on June 16, 2000). Civcom was to 
advice the PSC and other Council’s bodies on civilian crisis management 
matters, therefore in parallel with the work of the European Union Military 
Committee (EUMC) for military affairs. 
These improvements need to be understood in relation to the efforts to 
implement more coherent civilian military co-ordination as well as to an 
evolutionary path characterised by intense learning by doing.88 It begun with 
the planning of the first civilian mission, the EU Police Mission on Bosnia and 
                                                
88 See chapter 7.  
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Herzegovina (EUPM) in early 200289 (EUPM was launched on 1 January 2003, 
taking over from the UN International Police Task Force).  
 
5.2.3 Civilian crisis management after Lisbon  
 
The last wave of institutional change occurred with the Treaty of Lisbon, as a 
result of two growing trends affecting the development of EU crisis 
management. The first trend is the continuing dissolution of the border between 
civilian and military intervention, which requires a consolidation of the hybrid 
structures and procedures to implement the comprehensive approach. The 
second one is the demand for more sophisticated expertise and specialisation in 
the conduct of crisis management tasks.  
In an attempt to complement the restructuring of the EU external action 
through the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the 
Lisbon Treaty tried to further enhance civil-military co-ordination by 
integrating the former DG VIII (military) and DG IX (civilian) into a single 
new directorate, the Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD). The 
CMPD, the CPCC and the EUMS are now placed under the same roof (the 
EEAS) and the authority of the High Representative. The restructuring was 
supposed to enhance a culture of integration, in theory at least.   
As this chapter has shown, between 1999 and 2011, civilian crisis management 
has become a central part of the CSDP, in institutional, conceptual, strategic 
                                                
89 The decision to deploy an EU police mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina was taken by the 
General Affairs Council on 18-19 February 2002.  
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and operational terms. Because of the expanding geographical and thematic 
reach, number of personnel deployed, growing complexity and scale of 
missions and institutional/conceptual innovation, CCM can be defined as the 
“ugly duckling” of CSDP: neglected at its origins and often overshadowed by 
the military debate, it constitutes nonetheless the bulk of the EU’s role as a 
global security provider. At the same time, as the academic literature has 
pointed out, a number of challenges and shortfalls prevent the EU from 
becoming an effective crisis management in the civilian field. For instance, 
Jakobsen (2006) argues that the expectations-capability gap is much harder in 
the civilian domain than it is in the military one. This could severely damage 
the EU’s reputation as a global leader in civilian crisis management. Korski 
and Gowan (2009) contend instead that different commitments of member 
states loose support from Brussels are the main factors responsible for poor 
training and wobbly capability building. 
 
5.3 Conclusion  
 
To conclude, this chapter has presented the EU frameworks on SSR and CCM. 
By doing so, it challenged the conventional wisdom on the two issue areas on 
two grounds. First, concerning SSR, the chapter has shown that the creation of 
an EU policy framework was more than a simple “relabeling” of previous 
European Commission activities in post conflict environments; as a matter of 
fact, framing SSR has meant putting a wide range of sectoral and sub-sectoral 
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activities under the same roof, with a specific emphasis on the holistic 
approach. Second, as regards CCM, the chapter has underlined the existence of 
expertise and know-how, provided by member states, alongside the process of 
capacity-building that has caught the attention of scholars. It also elucidates the 
relation between the conceptual efforts aimed at producing a CCM framework, 
and the expansion of structures and activities over time.  
On that account, the following chapters explore the extent to which learning 
communities shaped the evolution of SSR and CCM from the conceptual 
framework to institutionalised practice.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Chapter 6 
 
Learning communities and the CSDP: Security Sector Reform 
 
 
Brian: “Excuse me. Are you the Judean People's Front?”  
Reg: “F… .ff! We're the People's Front of Judea” 
(Monty Python’s The Life of Brian) 
 
 
Introduction  
 
This case study-chapter tests the hypothesis that the emergence of the EU’s 
approach to security sector reform has been driven by learning communities, 
which introduced new ideas into the EU’s decision-making process. This 
chapter analyses the extent to which the EU has learned to adopt and 
implement SSR, in order to enhance its conflict prevention and post-conflict 
reconstruction capabilities as well as to better address changing security 
threats. The learning process was ideational in nature and driven by 
transnational communities, who acted as agents of institutionalisation of the 
SSR principles into the EU policy arena. Individuals belonging to these 
communities carried their expertise into the EU decision-making system and 
mainstreamed a new security thinking based on the post-Cold War paradigm of 
“human security” and on the integration between security, development and 
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good governance. EU SSR is hence understood as a policy innovation process 
to enhance the Union’s commitment as a security provider, by stressing the 
need for a holistic approach to security aimed at ensuring effective crisis 
management, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction.  
Against this backdrop, the obvious questions arise as to why (and how) 
member states decided to institutionalise and operationalise the SSR 
guidelines, what influenced EU policy-makers choices and, finally, how a 
consensus on the EU approach to SSR emerged and turned into a policy 
framework? The less obvious and trickier question has to do with the outcomes 
of this diffusion process. Contrary to civilian crisis management and in spite of 
the growing recognition of the EU as a SSR provider, European SSR 
programmes have been very far from ensuring effective implementation and a 
coherent management of the available mechanisms. The policy-practice gap 
and the challenge of coherence (Bryden, 2011) are particularly relevant in the 
case of the EU. Detractors point out, quite rightly, that “pure” EU-led SSR 
missions have been few and low scale, with uneven or disappointing results in 
the field. In institutional terms, SSR seems to suffer from a “firefly complex”: 
whereas EU officials acknowledge its presence, the actual impact on 
institutional structures and procedures is hardly detectable when compared to 
other policies.  
This chapter addresses the first, general question and the second, comparative 
one, by exploring the pathways of influence triggering the dynamics of policy 
failure, policy paradigm innovation, emulation and learning (McNamara, 1998; 
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Adler and Haas, 1992) with respect to SSR. It explains why the SSR 
framework did not generate learning by doing through systematic practice. For 
comparative purposes, the structure of this chapter replicates the other case 
study on CCM. Accordingly, the next section goes through the process of SSR 
formation and its diffusion in the EU, outlining the structure of learning 
communities and assessing SSR persistence. Section 6.2 discusses the EU’s 
operational experience in the field of SSR. It shows that the lack of a fully 
developed SSR practice resulted in shortfalls in the learning process. The 
conclusion summarises the key challenges for the evolution of EU SSR in light 
of the empirical findings.  
Unpacking the construction of the EU approach to SSR bears two important 
normative implications. First, a deeper understanding of the genesis of SSR 
would allow us to better capture the distinct features of the EU’s involvement, 
and achieve a more rigorous assessment of its SSR practices. This can 
positively contribute to identifying useful lessons to improve the coordination 
among EU external action instruments and procedures. Second, this exercise 
also sheds light on the complexities of the SSR concept and, potentially, clears 
up the confusion that obstructs effective international cooperation in this field. 
In fact, it is worth reminding that SSR activities take place in different contexts 
(transition and developing countries, post-conflict situation but also developed 
countries) and encompass a wide array of dimensions (defence, justice, 
development, governance etc.), making the delimitation of their conceptual and 
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operational borders, and hence division of tasks among international actors, 
difficult at best.  
The study is based on a content analysis of official documents and reports on 
SSR as well as on interviews with more than 25 élites from the Council 
Secretariat, the European Commission and member states as well as experts 
from leading European think-tanks and NGOs carried out between March and 
December 2011 in Brussels, Geneva, Paris and London.  
 
6.1 Learning communities and EU SSR: between knowledge and power 
 
The emergence of SSR coincides with, and hence must be understood in the 
context of the rapid expansion of the EU’s crisis management structures and 
activities (Grevi et al., 2009). Taking such contextual factor into account, this 
section casts light on the driving causal forces that underlie the emergence of 
the EU SSR framework. It shows that SSR originates in policy failure and in an 
effort to merge different perspectives into a single episteme, prompting a 
holistic understanding of security, development and good governance. The 
whole SSR conceptualisation’s enterprise can therefore be seen as an attempt 
to gather different sub-communities in order to form, through socialisation and 
knowledge sharing, a new epistemic community of SSR. The EU case shows 
that this venture has been only partly successful. The creation of the SSR 
policy framework displays a significant degree of institutionalisation of the 
concept in the EU security architecture. However, the glass can be also seen as 
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half-empty, due to the limited record of policy experience (CSDP missions 
have been few, and low-scale) and further institutional reform to make the EU 
SSR practice more effective. In other words, compared to CCM, the process of 
SSR norm diffusion resulted in a much less robust outcome and a lower impact 
of the norm on EU security policies.  
To account for this variation as well as for the genesis of SSR as a process of 
learning, this section is structured in three parts:  
 
(1) the attempt to form an SSR epistemic community, bridging previously 
separated communities and building a new cognitive architecture;  
(2) the influence of the SSR concept on the CSDP, through the analysis of 
the four pathways of influence and intervening factors;  
(3) SSR policy outcomes, addressing whether the diffusion of ideas has led 
to policy evolution as learning by doing.   
 
6.1.1 The learning communities of SSR 
 
The conceptualisation and consolidation of security sector governance and 
reform have been influenced by three factors: first, a structural change in the 
nature and scale of conflicts characterising the post-Cold War period; second, 
the emergence of human security as a new thinking linking security to 
development and good governance; and third, the consequences of the 
traumatic experience of the conflicts in the Western Balkans, which eventually 
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reinforced the need for a more coherent and integrated approach to security 
including civilian and military aspects.  
Linked to these major systemic events, three epistemic communities flourished 
in the 1990s: the security policy community, the development cooperation 
community and, with a lesser degree of engagement, the one dealing with the 
promotion of democracy, good governance and justice. Although the three 
communities had varied discourses and slightly different focuses and causal 
beliefs, their policy enterprise was based on the common assumption that a 
well governed and transparent security sector and/or system is a key factor to 
ensure socio-economic development, conflict prevention and peacebuilding. 
The genesis of SSR is deep-rooted into the interaction between these three 
communities. Security sector governance and reform are in fact bridging 
concepts joining distinct fields of expertise and, as a consequence, experts who 
are not used to talking to each other. Therefore, when the need for a holistic 
approach to crisis management and conflict prevention begun making headway 
at the international stage, the idea of integrating security/development/good 
governance into a single policy framework was advocated by untied networks 
of individuals, who did not necessarily share the same view on the terms of this 
integrative process. As a result, much of the efforts that underlie the promotion 
of SSR were aimed at addressing the cleavages between independent epistemic 
communities, by having people sit around the table in view of setting up expert 
consensus around the new norms. 
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6.1.1.1 The security/defence community  
 
Since the end of the Cold War, the concept of security has widened and 
deepened. Systemic factors have led to the proliferation of failing states and 
intrastate wars, entailing the progressive blurring of the boundaries between 
external and internal security. Declining military expenditures and downsizing 
state armies (SIPRI, 2006) also played an important role in opening a window 
of opportunity for a change to the old notion of security. In practical terms, this 
meant understanding peacekeeping as going beyond military intervention, and 
led to a blossoming debate on civil-military relations and, at a later stage, on 
governance issues as well. As non-military security issues (i.e. political, 
economic, judicial and societal aspects) were adopted by the global security 
agenda, the practices of IOs switched towards a comprehensive approach 
tackling a wide range of activities within the broader security sector (Hänggi 
and Tanner, 2005). The endorsement of the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) notion of “human security”, encompassing the broader and 
non-military nature of security concerns (UNDP, 1994), spurred the 
affirmation of the “security-development nexus” (Williams, 2002; Chandler, 
2007) as the absolute protagonist of the peacebuilding discourse.   
As a result, a “new thinking” regarding security emerged during the 1990s 
(Barbé, 1995) and can be divided into three major strands. First, the call for 
democratic control of armed forces as well as oversight of the defence sector 
and, to a broader extent, of the whole spectrum of security forces emerged. 
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These norms were first adopted by the OSCE in the 1994 Code of Conduct on 
Politico-Military Aspects of Security, followed by the Charter for European 
Security agreed at the OSCE Istanbul Summit in November 1999. A second 
major strand was connected with NATO’s emphasis on civil-military relations 
during the enlargement process to the post-Communist countries of Eastern 
Europe. The promotion of defence and security sector reform was one of 
NATO’s central goals in the post-Soviet, new NATO candidate countries. 
Therefore, NATO became the first and most active provider of external 
assistance in SSR (though with a different label) under the Partnership for 
Peace (PfP) framework launched in 1994. A third strand of the debate, very 
much connected to the previous two but less transnational in focus, centred on 
the “new defence diplomacy” implemented by Western governments to ensure 
conflict prevention and stable relationships with other countries through 
bilateral and multilateral agreements, in order to make armed forces democratic 
and accountable. Members of the security/defence policy community are 
military and civilian staff from the Ministries of Defence, diplomats and 
officers seconded to security organisations (mostly NATO and OSCE) and the 
network of strategic studies institutes (academia and think-tanks) dealing with 
defence matters.  
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 – Case study: the EU and Security Sector Reform   
                   184 
6.1.1.2 The development cooperation community    
 
A new paradigm also developed in the development discourse, stressing that 
security and stability, including the transformation of ineffective, inefficient 
and corrupt security forces, would become a necessary pre-requisite for 
development and aid delivery (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2006). The security-
development nexus stimulated multilateral and bilateral donors to embrace 
SSR as an instrument to improve the effectiveness of development assistance. 
Development experts and practitioners acknowledged that the foundation for 
sustainable development is in the capacity to address the root causes of 
conflict, hence integrating development aid with a new hybrid sphere of 
intervention called “post-conflict peacebuilding”.  
In May 1997, OECD countries’ Development Ministers issued the Policy 
Statement on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold 
of the 21st Century, stressing that the “development co-operation efforts should 
strive for an environment of ‘structural stability’ as a basis for sustainable 
development (…), embracing mutually reinforcing objectives of social peace, 
respect for human rights, accountable military forces and broadly-shared social 
and economic development” (OECD, 1997: 2).  
This first policy statement initiated the process leading to the adoption of the 
OECD guidelines, which set the standards for SSR implementation and 
mainstreamed the security-development nexus into the development discourse 
(see the next section). European donor states headed by the United Kingdom 
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and operating under the institutional umbrella of the EU, were the first to 
embrace the concept, concerned about the effectiveness of their development 
policies in post-conflict situations and with significant impact on their policy 
preferences (Sabiote, 2010). Much of the debate initially revolved around 
military spending: that is, on the way governments would be expected to 
control and administer the security sector and the difficulties in managing the 
accountability of institutions. The enlargement of the Euro-Atlantic institutions 
as well as the “baptism by fire” (Ginsberg, 2001) for the EU in the Western 
Balkans dramatically accelerated the development and diffusion of the 
security-development nexus. The EU and NATO’s support to the transition 
from authoritarian rule in Eastern Europe empirically demonstrated that good 
governance in the rule of law and defence sectors were crucial for sustainable 
economic and social development. The central link between development and 
security became mainstream in the Balkans as well (Spence and Fluri, 2007). 
The EU’s South-eastern neighbourhood, pretty much like the Eastern, was 
composed of states having serious deficits in security, development and 
democracy, with regime types ranging from new but weak democracies to 
regimes with authoritarian features and limited political participation (Hänggi 
and Tanner, 2005). The challenge for European donors was to prevent conflicts 
in the Balkans from undermining their own security, and to ensure the 
effectiveness of the stabilisation mechanisms (i.e. the Stability Pact for South 
Eastern Europe).  
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6.1.1.3 The genesis of SSR 
 
Against this backdrop, the conceptual roots of SSR are twofold. First, they 
arise from what was described as a “developmentalisation” of donor countries’ 
security discourse.90 The increasing influence of the development community 
in security affairs was aimed at emphasising transparency, comprehensiveness 
and a system-wide approach to the establishment of good governance starting 
from the security sector. Second, a “securitisation” of the development 
assistance also came about.91 This process aimed at making aid and state 
building more effective in the long-term, by integrating the conflict-peace-
development agenda and reduce the security threats associated with state 
failures.  
Mainstreaming the security-development nexus and achieving a whole-of-
government approach to SSR is therefore to be understood as a complex 
process of knowledge formation, whereby security and development experts 
came to talk to each other intensively, in order to strengthen linkages between 
the two communities and produce consensus over the trajectories of policy 
change. It is correct to describe this as an attempt to merge what would 
previously be different epistemic communities by instilling a culture of 
integration.  
The “bicephalous” structure of SSR communities is reflected in their shape and 
extension. The shape is simple and narrow: although no institutionalised body 
                                                
90 Interview of the author with an expert (via Skype), January 2012.  
91 Ibid.  
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was tasked with advancing the SSR agenda transnationally, SSR actors are 
easily identifiable and in many cases received strong financial and political 
support from Governments. SSR experts are very likely to be affiliated or 
associated, if not employed in, a relatively small batch of organisations. 
Secondly, as regards the extension, expertise does not overlap with practice: in 
the SSR case (as opposed to CCM, cf. next chapter), empirical findings show 
that there are no pre-existing, shared experiences within the same or contiguous 
organisational unit (a network of professionals) that generated a change of 
habitus. Most of the interviewees deny having been involved in a working 
relationship with SSR professionals before the term “SSR” was created. 
Differences in their backgrounds, jargon used and professional output confirm 
these statements.92 Those who did share a working routine either belonged to 
the development community or to the defence community, with very few 
people brokering in between. Therefore, not only an SSR community of 
practice did not exist when the concept began making headway in the 
international community and, subsequently, in the EU, but professional had 
very different perspectives on crisis management.  
The SSR genesis is therefore associated with a new vision of a specific social 
reality (conflict and fragility), namely the idea that the security sector or 
system is crucial to improve donors and security providers’ operational 
outreach. Interviewees describe the relationship with other SSR experts as the 
explicit attempt to forge a new understanding of things, beyond the simple 
                                                
92 Answer to semi-structured questions during interviews and via telephone. See questions in 
the SSR questionnaire annexed.  
Chapter 6 – Case study: the EU and Security Sector Reform   
                   188 
sharing of knowledge. People’s participation in conferences was associated 
with the objective of promoting a mutual understanding, aimed to the 
achievement of a common policy goal. Table 6.1 shows the participants’ list to 
four selected conferences on SSR that took place between 2005 and 2007. The 
sample draws from the interviewees’ answer to the question on their 
participation to conferences they considered most important for the formation 
of their expertise on SSR.93 The table shows the attempt to gather experts and 
officials with different backgrounds (security and development). It also gives 
an idea of some of the organisations that are systematically represented at these 
knowledge-sharing events.  
 
Table 6.1: SSR Conferences 2005-2007 
 
The EU and Security 
Sector Reform 
(3-4 May 2007, 
Stockholm) 
 
 
 
Security Sector 
Governance and 
Reform: A 
Challenge for the 
European Union (30 
September 2005, 
Brussels) 
 
Coordination or 
confusion? The 
integration of security 
and development in 
EU policy  
(29 November 2005, 
Brussels) 
 
Security sector 
reform in 
peacebuilding: 
towards an EU-UN 
partnership  
(28 June 2006, 
Brussels)  
 
Organiser: DCAF 
Venue: Swedish 
National Defence 
College 
 
Organiser: DCAF 
Venue: CEPS  
Organisers: Egmont 
Institute (Brussels), 
International Peace 
Information Service 
(IPIS, Antwerp) and 
DCAF 
Venue: Chateau de Val 
Duchesse, Brussels 
 
Organisers: DCAF, 
EPC, King Badouin 
Foundation 
Venue: Residence 
Palace, Brussels 
 
Expert Defence 
(DCAF) 
Scholar 
Security/Defence 
(Bristol University) 
EU Official (European 
Commission) 
Expert Security (EPC) 
Diplomat (SNDC) 
Expert Defence 
(DCAF) 
Diplomat (EU PSC) 
Expert Defence 
(DCAF) 
Expert Defence 
(DCAF) 
Expert Security 
(GCSP) 
Expert Defence 
(Egmont) 
Expert Defence (IPIS) 
Scholar Development 
(Oxford) 
Expert Development 
(German Development 
Institute) 
Expert Development 
Expert Security (EPC) 
Expert Defence 
(DCAF) 
EU Official (UN 
DPKO)  
EU Official (EUSR) 
Expert Defence 
(DCAF) 
EU Official (Council 
                                                
93 Cf. questionnaire in annex.  
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UN Official (UN, 
Disarmament Affairs) 
Expert Defence 
(Defence Academy of 
the UK, Conflict 
Studies Res. Centre) 
EU Official (Deputy 
Director General for 
Political and Military 
Affairs, Council EU) 
Former Minister 
Defence (The 
Netherlands) 
 
Expert Defence (EU 
ISS) 
NATO Official 
(NATO PA) 
Expert Security 
(CEPS) 
 
(Sussex IDS) 
Expert 
Security/Defence 
(DCAF)  
EU Official (DG 
RELEX, European 
Commission) 
EU Official (EUMS) 
 
EU) 
 
 
 
On that account, the criteria of position, participation and reputation were used 
during my interviews to map the population of SSR communities. I cross-
checked the data gathered from the interviews with the analysis of 
reports/documents/publications of relevant individuals and organisations on 
SSR, as well as with research on open sources (institutions websites and 
available contact lists).  
Table 6.2 provides a list of the institutions that form the epistemic communities 
of SSR, divided into five areas: (1) Education/Research (University 
departments, think-tanks, research institutes); (2) Government (Ministries, 
Agencies, national defence colleges); (3) Training centres; (4) NGOs; (5) IOs 
(and related bodies).  
The results of the empirical research indicate that intense collaboration took 
place from the early-2000s among the individuals belonging to the 
organisations in all the five areas listed in the table. The organisations marked 
with the green colour are those that were more frequently referred to according 
to the reputation criteria. Individuals met frequently during conferences, 
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seminars and knowledge-sharing initiatives organised or co-organised by these 
institutions. Through a scrutiny of the “acknowledgments page” of major SSR 
publications (for instance, the OECD Guidelines), I found that those experts 
who contributed more substantially to the definition of the SSR concept had 
already collaborated in previous occasions (mostly to produce joint 
publications or attending conferences). Furthermore, the professional 
background of the people listed (accessed through open source, such as 
LinkedIn or resumes available on Google or, in some cases, shared 
confidentially by the individual) shows that the vast majority of the 
contributors was affiliated or had been affiliated with one of the institutions 
that figure in the table below.  
At the same time, major differences in terms of objectives of the SSR process, 
jargon used and personal views of the operational challenges for SSR missions 
were detected across the military vs development/civilian divide. The learning 
communities of SSR appeared fragmented, with no or very poor sense of 
belonging among individuals committed to advance SSR principles. Experts 
working for DFID had a radically different view of the subject matter than 
those working for EPLO. Similarly, their account of the origins of SSR as more 
security or defence-focused differs substantially. In a few cases, interviewees 
would speak about a “wall” that has yet to be torn down between the vision of 
SSR as strictly relating to the defence sector and a more systemic 
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understanding, which should take into account development as well as good 
governance challenges and closer inter-institutional cooperation.94 
 
Table 6.2: SSR epistemic communities 
 
Institution Sector Country Staff 
 
Function Website 
Scuola Superiore 
Sant’Anna 
1, 3 Italy  Training http://www.sssup.
it/  
Netherlands Institute of 
International Relations - 
Clingendael  
1 The 
Netherlands  
 Research, Consultancy, 
Training 
http://www.clinge
ndael.nl/  
European Union Institute 
for Security Studies  
5 -   Research www.iss.europa.e
u  
European Peacebuilding 
Liaison Office 
4 -   Advocacy network www.eplo.org  
Austrian Study Center for 
Peace and Conflict 
Resolution 
1 Austria  Research, Training http://www.aspr.a
c.at/aspr/  
Institute for Peace Support 
and Conflict Management 
– National Defence 
Academy  
2 Austria  Research, Training, 
Political Advice 
http://www.bunde
sheer.at/organisat
ion/beitraege/lvak
/eifk/eifk.shtml  
UK Department for 
International 
Development (DFID) 
2 UK  Government www.dfid.gov.uk
/  
Global Facilitation 
Network for Security 
Sector Reform 
1 UK  Research, Advocacy, 
Knowledge sharing 
http://www.ssrnet
work.net/  
Conflict, Security and 
Development Group – 
King’s College London 
1 UK  Knowledge sharing, 
Research 
http://www.securi
tyanddevelopmen
t.org/  
Geneva Centre for the 
Democratic Control of 
Armed Forces 
1, 5 Switzerland  Training, Research, 
Advocacy, Knowledge 
Sharing,  
www.dcaf.ch  
International Security 
Sector Advisory Team  
1,3  Switzerland  Training, Mentoring, 
Networking 
www.issat.dcaf.c
h  
Association for Security 
Sector Reform Education 
and Training  
1, 3 Switzerland   Training, Capacity 
Building, Networking  
http://asset-
ssr.org  
Geneva Centre for 
Security Policy  
1 Switzerland  Research, Training  www.gcsp.ch  
OECD – International 
Network on Conflict and 
Fragility (INCAF), 
previously Conflict 
Prevention and 
Development Co-
operation Network 
(CPDC) 
5 -   Advisory, Networking, 
Decision-making 
http://www.oecd.
org/dac/conflicta
ndfragility/theinte
rnationalnetwork
onconflictandfrag
ility.htm  
Zentrum für Internationale 
Friedenseinsätze  
3  Germany   Training http://www.zif-
berlin.org/en/  
German Institute for 
International and Security 
Affairs 
1 Germany  Research http://www.swp-
berlin.org/en/start
-en.html  
                                                
94 Interviews of the author with experts, Brussels, December 2011.  
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Folke Bernadotte 
Academy 
3 Sweden  Training http://www.folke
bernadotteacade
my.se/  
Crisis Management 
Centre  
3 Finland  Training http://www.cmcfi
nland.fi/  
Swedish National Defence 
College 
2 Sweden  Research and 
Development 
www.fhs.se  
Deparment of Peace and 
Conflict Research, 
Uppsala University 
1 Sweden  Research, Education http://www.pcr.u
u.se/  
Swedish International 
Development Cooperation 
Agency 
2 Sweden  Government – 
Development co-
operation  
www.sida.se  
Forum Syd  4 Sweden  International 
Development 
cooperation, research 
and advocacy  
https://www.foru
msyd.org/Default
_ForumSyd_C.as
px?id=12337  
Saferworld 4 UK  Research, Consultancy, 
Advocacy 
www.saferworld.
org.uk  
EU – Council Secretariat  
EEAS, EUSRs, EUMS, 
EUMC, CMPD, CPCC, 
CIVCOM, PMG, PSC 
5 EU  International 
Organisation 
http://eeas.europa
.eu/background/o
rganisation/index
_en.htm  
European Security and 
Defence College  
3 EU wide  Training  http://esdc.mil-
edu.be/  
EU – Member States 
Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs, Ministries of 
Defence, DGs 
Development Co-
operation, Ministries of 
Justice, Ministries of 
Interior  
2 Sweden, 
Finland, 
Denmark, 
Germany, 
Italy, 
Netherlands, 
France, 
Portugal, 
United 
Kingdom, 
Austria 
 Government N/A 
European Centre for 
Development Policy 
Management 
1 Netherlands, 
Belgium 
 International 
Development Think and 
Do Tank.  
http://www.ecdp
m.org/  
Overseas Development 
Institute 
1 UK  Research www.odi.org.uk 
 
NATO 5 -   International 
Organisation 
www.nato.int  
OSCE – Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation 
in Europe 
5 -   International 
Organisation  
 
Crisis Management 
Initiative  
4 Finland  Advocacy   
International Alert 4 UK  NGO, Advocacy  http://www.intern
ational-alert.org/  
International Crisis Group 4 -   NGO, Research, 
Advocacy  
http://www.crisis
group.org/  
Council Secretariat DG-E 
External  
5 -  IGO  
High Representative’s 
Office  
5 -  IGO  
DG RELEX 2 -  EU - Policy-making  
Downing Street  2 UK  Government  
UK Foreign Secretary’s 
Cabinet 
2 UK  Government  
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Foreign Office’s Security 
Branch 
2 UK  Government  
UK PR (PSC 
Ambassador) 
2 UK  Government  
UK Foreign Office’s 
CFSP Unit 
2 UK  Government   
UK Defence Ministry’s 
Policy Staff 
2 UK  Government - Military  
UK Defence Ministry’s 
EU /NATO Division  
2 UK  Government - Military  
 
 
6.1.2 The dynamics of SSR diffusion: does knowledge matter?  
 
This section analyses the process of SSR diffusion, and therefore constitutes 
the bulk of my empirical analysis. It explains how the EU elaborated its 
approach to SSR in the mid-2000s, showing that a set of constituencies (the 
UK and other member states; the OECD) backed it up, and that the creation of 
a policy consensus emerged from policy failure, emulation and innovation.  
The rise of SSR in the EU was expert-driven. Specifically, it relied on the DAC 
Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance (OECD, 2005), and on 
the Handbook on Security System Reform (OECD, 2007), which served as a 
vehicle for the “multilateralisation” of the EU variant of SSR (Albrecht, 
Setepputat and Andersen, 2010). It is therefore crucial to understand how the 
OECD guidelines were developed and framed and what were the flows of 
influence and networks involved in different phases of policy innovation, 
diffusion, selection, persistence and evolution. SSR conceptual foundations are 
rooted in the attempt to forge a Europe-wide policy consensus that, as the 
previous section has shown, emerged gradually among national think-tankers, 
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political actors, pressure groups, research centres and NGOs belonging to the 
security and development communities.  
 
6.1.2.1 Policy innovation, selection, diffusion and emulation 
 
Learning from policy failure, national epistemic communities from major aid 
donors provided the boost for policy innovation. The UK communities were in 
the frontline of this development, supported by the British government.95 
Actually, British policy-makers did not reinvent the wheel when launching the 
SSR agenda in 1998/1999. Tony Blair’s – and the Labour Party’s – 
internationalist agenda relabelled and reformulated concepts that had already 
been introduced in the policy arena (including the EU and the European 
Commission) but lacked a comprehensive policy framework and, most 
importantly, could get enough drive to spread transnationally. It is therefore 
important not to overemphasise the role of the UK as the pioneer of SSR, but to 
stress the fact that specific ideas and norms already circulating in the 
international system were picked up and reframed as part of a broader agenda 
heavily sustained by national resources and means. The UK advanced the SSR 
agenda first at the national level, then through the OECD DAC forum before 
SSR norms reached the EU, at a crucial stage where comprehensive and 
civilian crisis management principles were gaining ground.  
                                                
95 I thank Dylan Hendrickson and Nicole Ball for their comments on the development SSR in 
the UK.  
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The vision of SSR as a new instrument for the foreign/security policy of donor 
countries was laid out by Clare Short, the UK Secretary of State for 
International Development, through a policy statement in March 1999. Short’s 
understanding of future SSR activities reflected an emerging government-wide 
consensus on a new rationale for increasing foreign-security-development 
policies coordination, as a result of recent experiences in developing countries 
such as Cambodia or Sierra Leone.  
The Department for International Development (DFID) got that vision off the 
ground (Hendrickson, 2000).  The UK’s role as a promoter of SSR relied on a 
tight network of expert communities, who were tasked with assisting the wider 
overhaul of DFID’s humanitarian policies, procedures and organisational 
structures. This process started with the creation, in April 1998, of the Conflict 
and Humanitarian Affairs Department (CHAD). CHAD replaced the 
Emergency Aid Department and its action was aimed at monitoring and 
providing advice to DFID on conflict prevention, peacebuilding, human rights, 
migration, as well as to “liaise with government departments and conflict 
departments of other governments, NGOs and academic groups” (Gibbons, 
1998).  It was within CHAD’s institutional framework that SSR policies started 
to be addressed as a tool to increase effective implementation of the security-
development nexus. Shortly after the creation of CHAD, DFID commissioned 
a number of research projects to further develop the SSR agenda. Among these 
projects, a highly influential paper written by Nicole Ball for Saferworld and 
funded by DFID, titled Spreading Good Practices in Security Sector Reform: 
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Policy Options for the British Government (Ball, 1998) was published in 
March 1998 and hugely impacted on the definition of an UK approach to SSR.  
Another important step towards concept-building was the establishment of the 
Conflict, Security and Development Group (CSDG) at King’s College London 
in 1999, supported by a three-year grant awarded by DFID. The rationale for 
the establishment of the CSDG was to examine policy challenges associated 
with the linkage between security-development and good governance, and to 
provide support to the UK’s government policy development in the field of 
SSR and conflict prevention. Neither DFID, nor the Ministry of Defence 
(MoD) had in fact sufficient capacity/expertise to deal with the emerging 
SSR/good governance agenda and thus needed to rely on external advice to set 
up a coherent policy framework.   
In February 2000, a DFID-sponsored symposium on security sector reform and 
military expenditure constituted the first attempt to mainstream SSR across the 
development and security communities. It served also as an opportunity for 
Claire Short to announce the DFID-CSDG joint initiative to create an 
information network, in order to enhance the sharing of information and 
analysis (Short, 2000).   
As a result, in the first semester of 2000, DFID commissioned CSDG to 
produce a set of security-sector assistance guidelines identifying the ways in 
which development assistance could help countries strengthen their security 
sector governance and pointing out the ways in which DFID itself, the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the MoD could find synergies 
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(Hendrickson, 2000). By allocating considerable funds in networks such as the 
GSDG, DFID promoted knowledge-sharing and gathered expertise on SSR that 
subsequently fed back into DFID structures and triggered policy development.   
The Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR) was 
another DFID-funded initiative. Initially hosted by Cranfield University and 
subsequently managed by the University of Birmingham, the GFN occupied a 
prominent position in promoting SSR conceptualisation. The epistemic mission 
of the GFN is stated in the network’s principal aims: to “promote a better 
understanding of security and justice sector reform through the provision of 
information, advice and expertise to practitioners, academics and policy-
makers through the world”. The FCO also defined the objective of the network 
as “to provide knowledge management and network facilitation services to an 
international network of SSR practitioners”.  
As part of the broader question of the constraining conditions facilitating or 
hampering the emergence of epistemic communities, the role of the DFID in 
SSR confirms that the formation of consensual knowledge to be diffused 
transnationally depends upon national backup. As suggested by Sugden, there 
is an overwhelming agreement that the UK is a leader in the field of SSR, and 
in this regard the DFID is described as the “Godfather of SSR”, exerting a 
significant influence on fora such as the OECD DAC and the UNDP (Sugden, 
2006).  
Other member states jumped on the bandwagon. The Netherlands became 
involved in the development of SSR to enhance civil-military cooperation. In 
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the early 2000s, close cooperation between the Dutch Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the Clingendael Institute produced an intense exchange of 
information allowing decision-makers to understand how to take up and 
implement SSR-related policies. In 2004 an SSR team located in the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and composed of one expert from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and one from the Ministry of Defence was established. The team was 
tasked with identifying specific SSR activities Ministries could be involved in, 
such as training, policy support and the provision of material/infrastructures 
(Ball and Hendrickson, 2009). In January 2005, a development advisor was 
seconded to the Ministry of Defence after a pool of some 30 military SSR 
specialists was created within the same Ministry. The pool also included highly 
qualified staff in the field of policy, judicial issues, finance, logistics etc. 
Germany also started promoting a holistic approach to SSR, although more 
focused on internal security structures (Albrecht et al., 2010).  
In parallel with the creation of the Western-based networks, an African effort 
to conceptualise SSR according to the developing countries’ perspectives and 
needs cropped up, leading to the creation of the African Security Sector 
Network (ASSN), initially supported by South Africa, Ghana and Nigeria. The 
institutionalisation of a regional network on the recipients’ side promoted the 
debate among African parliamentarians, military officers, and policy analysts 
leading to SSR norm development and feeding back into the reflexion taking 
place at the donors’ level.    
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How did these norms convey into the EU security architecture? SSR policy 
diffusion and persistence within the EU institutional framework 
(CSDP/Commission) see IOs-related networks come into play in addition to 
existing national constituencies, through emulation processes. The OECD-
DAC, and in particular its Conflict Prevention and Development Co-operation 
Network (CPDC)96 constituted a leading cross-national forum for epistemic 
communities to sit around the table and share their views on SSR. As a matter 
of fact, the UK (and DFID in particular), following the conclusion to the 
February 2000 symposium on security sector reform, increased its contribution 
to the DAC in order to shape the international agenda and influence other 
member states. So did the Netherlands and other interested donors. This 
resulted in the expansion of the CPDC’s mandate and in the recruitment of new 
consultants.  
Chaired by the DFID Senior SSR adviser, the CPDC’s modus operandi was 
designed for forging a common, transnational understanding of the security-
development nexus through the adoption of standardised guidelines (OECD, 
2005).  It led the coordination of a team of consultants (by and large including 
members involved in CSDG and GFN activities) that produced a conceptual 
framework for the OECD’s initial engagement with SSR (2001), a global 
survey on SSR covering 110 developing and transition countries (2004) and a 
policy report on SSR and Governance (edited by Nicole Ball and Dylan 
                                                
96 Now the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF).  
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Hendrickson) that served as the basis for the OECD-DAC 2004 Guidelines.97 
The CPDC’s mission was not only to achieve a clearer understanding of SSR 
and provide guidelines for policy implementations, but also to coordinate and 
bring together the SSR experts from different backgrounds and organisations.  
Nonetheless, mainstreaming SSR cannot be defined as a one-way flow from 
norm setters (the UK and the OECD) to norms takers (other states and IOs, 
including the EU). It was, instead, a complex and multidimensional process, 
characterised by intense socialisation and multiple flows of influence. 
Although some countries soundly promoted norm creation by investing 
financial resources, it would be misleading to conclude that the EU were just 
passively delivered norms. On the one hand, empirical findings show that 
representatives of EU member states and Commission/Council officials 
seconded to the OECD were socialised as a result of their participation in 
CPDC meetings.98 Evidence of this influence is reflected in the European 
Commission’s 2004 annual report on development aid and external assistance, 
which promotes an “holistic approach to governance, peace, security and 
development according to the OECD guidelines” (European Commission, 
2004). This greatly promoted the creation and diffusion of human security-
related norms within the EU.  
On the other hand though, evidence from interviews also suggests that fifteen 
EU member states and the Commission actively contributed to the same 
                                                
97 Interview of the author with an expert, London, September 2011. Cf. also the 
acknowledgment page of the OECD DAC Guidelines on Security System Reform and 
Governance (2004: 5). See also OECD (2001).  
98 Interview of the author with an expert, London, September 2011.  
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debates leading to the adoption of the OECD 2004 Guidelines: that is, the very 
document the EU policy framework on SSR was modelled on.  
The conclusion to be drawn is that in the phase of policy innovation, selection 
and diffusion, the EU was both a norm taker and a norm maker. Another 
important implication is that the question of “who the SSR norm setter is” does 
not really lead anywhere, since multiple influences have arisen across different 
communities (security, development, democracy promotion) shaping the 
debate at different stages. What seems to matter is rather the construction of 
networks around centres of expertise and the consequential processes of social 
networking and knowledge-sharing that sought to achieve the creation of 
consensual knowledge. A big part of the game was to raise awareness by 
“setting up useful meetings at useful times”, as an interviewed EU official put 
it.99   
The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) was 
also in the frontline of this development and was outsourced by the EU the task 
of spurring on the conceptualisation of SSR.100  The term “outsourcing” 
implies the existence of a convergence between the EU’s need to develop a 
policy framework from scratch and other actors (such as DCAF) with the goal, 
mandate and capacity to fill such gap providing the right input at the right 
time.101  Evidence from the interviews in Brussels and Geneva confirms that 
the policy-makers who drafted the Concept for ESDP support to Security 
Sector Reform, adopted by the Council of the EU in November 2005, drew 
                                                
99 Interview of the author with an EU official, Brussels, March 2011.  
100 Interview of the author with an expert, Geneva, April 2011.  
101 See previous note.  
Chapter 6 – Case study: the EU and Security Sector Reform   
                   202 
substantially on the policy recommendations advanced in the Chaillot Paper 
no. 80 published by the EU Institute for Security Studies and DCAF in July 
2005 and co-edited by Hänggi and Tanner.102  Further conceptual development 
of SSR was also fostered by experts communities through networking and 
training activities between 2006 and 2009, promoted by the “pool” of member 
states favourable to the new approach and exploiting the rotating presidency of 
the Council of the EU to shape the security agenda. Austria and Finland, who 
held the Council presidency in the first and second semester 2006, provide a 
good example of this. Both states, traditionally committed to non-military crisis 
management, took advantage of the six months presidency to shape the SSR 
concept.103  
This policy enterprise contributed to change the perceptions and behaviour of 
some member states, who had been reluctant to implement a comprehensive 
vision of security. The Europeanisation of France’s attitude towards SSR is an 
interesting case, since it demonstrates the power of knowledge to shape the 
security agenda of a big member state. The French government were initially 
very sceptical about an approach that implied bridging the “unbridgeable” gap 
between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (namely l’Aide au développement et 
gouvernance démocratique) and the Military. The French involvement in SSR 
came directly as a result the influence of OECD DAC experts on French 
                                                
102 The paper can be downloaded from the EU ISS website: 
http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/promoting-security-sector-governance-in-
the-eus-neighbourhood/  (Accessed 23 June 2011). 
103 Interview of the author with an expert, Geneva, April 2011.  
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policy-makers.104  The French policy framework on SSR followed the OECD 
DAC guidelines and was released in August 2008, to “board the train before it 
leaves” as reported by a French official.105   
The persistence of SSR norms in the EU was made possible by two factors. 
First, the constant networking and cross-fertilisation activities operated by the 
emerging epistemic community of SSR, divided into different sub-
communities. Second, by the “presidency factor”, which allowed some EU 
member states to push forwards the SSR agenda.  
In the period between 2002 and 2006, favourable circumstances encouraged a 
prioritisation of the EU SSR agenda, as the rotating presidency was held by 
major donors such as Denmark (second semester 2002), The Netherlands 
(second semester 2004), the UK (second semester 2005) or by countries 
supporting the development of non-military crisis management tools such as 
Ireland (first semester 2004), Austria (first semester 2006) and Finland (second 
semester 2006). A conference on SSR in the Western Balkans held in Vienna 
and organised by the Austrian presidency of the EU (in association with DCAF 
and the EU Institute for Security Studies) on February 2006 took forward the 
work done by the previous British presidency to further mainstream the SSR 
conceptual basis, coherence and coordination among different institutional, 
governmental and non-governmental actors (Batt, 2006). 
   
 
                                                
104 Interview of the author with an expert, Geneva, April 2011.  
105 Interview of the author with an expert, Geneva, April 2011.  
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Table 6.3: Timeline for SSR conceptual development 
 
 
Date 
 
Main SSR-related 
initiatives / documents  
 
 
Actors concerned 
 
 
January 1994 
 
 
Partnership for peace (PfP) 
launched  
 
 
NATO 
 
 
December 1994 
 
Code of conduct on politico-
military aspects of security 
 
 
 
OSCE 
 
 
 
May 1997 
 
Policy statement: conflict, 
peace and development co-
operation on the threshold of 
the 21st century   
 
 
 
 
OECD  
 
 
 
March 1998 
 
Publication “Spreading 
Good Practices in Security 
Sector Reform: Policy 
Options for the British 
Government” (by Nicole 
Ball)    
 
 
 
 
Saferworld   
 
 
 
April 1998  
 
Conflict and Humanitarian 
Affairs Department (CHAD) 
established at UK 
Department for International 
Development (DFID)  
 
 
 
 
United Kingdom  
 
 
March 1999 
 
Conflict, Security and 
Development Group 
(CSDG) established at 
King’s College London  
 
 
 
United Kingdom  
 
 
 
March 1999 
 
Speech by Clare Short, UK 
Secretary for Development, 
at King’s College London: 
“Security Sector Reform and 
the Elimination of Poverty” 
 
 
 
 
United Kingdom  
 
June 1999 
 
Stability Pact for South 
Eastern Europe launched 
 
 
EU 
 
 
February 2000 
 
DFID-sponsored symposium 
on security sector reform and 
military expenditure  
 
 
 
United Kingdom  
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October 2002 
 
Publication “Enhancing 
Security Sector Governance: 
A Conceptual Framework 
for UNDP”  
(Paper prepared by Nicole 
Ball)  
 
 
 
 
UN 
 
 
2003  
 
Global Facilitation Network 
on Security Sector Reform 
(GFN-SSR) created  
 
 
 
United Kingdom  
 
2003  
 
African Security Sector 
Network (ASSN) created 
 
 
Africa 
 
 
2003 
 
European Security Strategy: 
“A Secure Europe in a Better 
World” released  
 
 
 
EU 
 
2005 
 
DAC guidelines on security 
system reform published 
  
 
OECD 
 
 
 
July 2005 
 
Chaillot Paper n. 80 
“Promoting security sector 
governance in the EU’s 
neighbourhood” (by 
H.Hanggi and F. Tanner) 
published  
 
 
 
 
EU ISS 
 
July ( Dec) 2005 
 
UK Presidency of the EU 
begins  
 
 
EU 
 
 
October 2005 
 
EU Concept for ESDP 
support to Security Sector 
Reform (SSR) released  
  
 
EU / Council of the 
European Union  
 
January 2006 ( June) 
  
 
Austrian Presidency of the 
EU begins 
 
 
EU 
 
 
February 2006 
 
EU Presidency seminar on 
security sector reform in the 
Western Balkans (Vienna, 
Austria)  
 
 
 
EU / Presidency 
 
 
 
May 2006 
 
Communication from the 
Commission to the Council 
and the European 
Parliament: “A Concept for 
 
 
 
EU / European Commission  
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European Community 
Support for Security Sector 
Reform” issued  
 
 
 
June 2006 
 
Council conclusions on a 
policy framework for 
security sector reform 
released 
 
 
 
EU  
 
2007 
 
DAC handbook on security 
system reform published  
  
 
OECD 
 
 
 
2008 
 
UN Secretary-General's 
report on "Securing peace 
and development: the role of 
the United Nations in 
supporting security sector 
reform” released 
 
 
 
 
UN 
 
 
2008 
 
International Security Sector 
Advisory Team (ISSAT) 
created within DCAF 
 
 
 
DCAF 
 
 
2008 
 
Association for Security 
Sector Reform Education 
and Training (ASSET) 
created 
 
 
 
Global 
 
June 2008 /  
September 2010 
 
 
EU SSR mission in Guinea-
Bissau launched/completed 
  
 
EU / CSDP 
 
 
August 2008 
 
French policy framework on 
SSR released  
  
 
 
France 
 
 
 
October 2008 
 
First pilot training session 
for practitioners on SSR in 
CSDP missions organized at 
European Security and 
Defence College (ESDC) by 
France and the Netherlands  
 
 
 
 
EU / ESDC  
 
 
2009 
 
 
EU member states’ decision 
to create a permanent pool of 
SSR experts  
 
 
 
EU 
 
 
December 2010 
 
 
Selection process for the EU 
SSR Pool completed  
 
 
 
EU 
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January 2011 
 
 
Europe’s New Training 
Initiative for Civilian Crisis 
Management established  
 
 
 
Europe 
 
 
6.2 SSR in practice 
 
SSR policy evolution as learning by doing presents a puzzle. The EU SSR 
practice has in fact displayed a gap between what is stated in the policy 
frameworks (that is, the rhetorical level of conceptualisation) and what is 
actually being achieved on the ground. Accordingly, evolution as learning 
appears as the most problematic aspect of the EU’s involvement in SSR 
policies. SSR seems to remain in the mind of the EU policy-makers a fuzzy 
concept, difficult to implement and assess, with disappointing operational 
results at best and no systematic lessons learned exercise to underpin policy 
evolution. Therefore, the question arises as to why did the EU adopt SSR, but 
fail to implement it? The next section discusses the operational experience of 
the CSDP as far as SSR missions are concerned. As operations represent the 
learning environment in which the learning by doing process should occur, it is 
important to analyse how the EU has practically implemented SSR.  
 
6.2.1 Operational experience  
 
Missions constitute the most visible output when it comes to the provision of 
security. As some authors have pointed out, the EU has positioned itself as a 
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key actor in the promotion of SSR activities within the framework of its crisis 
management operations (Sedra, 2006; Dursun-Ozkanca and Vandemoortele, 
2013). However, it has also been noted that the EU SSR strategy underlines a 
fragmentation of competences within the EU and, in operational terms, a 
cultural gap between a development-oriented and a security-oriented 
community (Weiler, 2009: 27). The empirical findings of this thesis confirm 
that the conceptual confusion and the gap existing between different 
perspectives (e.g. systemic vs sectoral, development vs security, civilian vs 
military) and responsibilities (e.g. Council Secretariat vs Commission) have 
affected the EU’s performance on SSR. As a consequence, learning has been 
poor essentially because the EU struggled to perform SSR.  
Dursun-Ozkanca and Vandemoortele (2013: 145) distinguish three aspects of 
the EU SSR policies: (1) the rebranding under SSR of a number of existing 
policies; (2) the integration of other policies to bring them in line with SSR 
principles; (3) the creation of new instruments and actions emerging from the 
SSR agenda. The authors also note that, despite some clear progress, the EU 
has not completely redone the scope of its activities in post-conflict 
reconstruction under the SSR guidelines.   
Against this backdrop, two types of EU SSR missions can be identified. The 
first type includes civilian CSDP missions addressing the transformation of one 
or more parts of the security sector, such as police reform, training and 
capacity-building in relation to police forces, border guards, and security 
forces, or development of the culture and institutions of the rule of law 
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(Dursun-Ozkanca and Vandemoortele, 2013: 140). Among the EU missions 
and operations launched between 2003 and 2011, six involve aspects of SSR, 
namely: EUPM Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), EUPOL COPPS (Palestine), 
EUPOL Afghanistan, EUTM Somalia, EUJUST-LEX Iraq, EUPOL DRC 
(Bloching, 2011: 2; Gross and Jacob, 2013: 14).  
The second type includes, instead, missions that are explicitly labelled as SSR-
support activities and build on a comprehensive and holistic approach in the 
provision of advice and assistance to the reform of the security sector in a 
given country (Derks and More, 2009: 20). There have been only two missions 
that were launched with the explicit objective to reform all the major state 
security institutions, in line with the “holistic” understanding of SSR: EUSEC 
RD Congo and EU SSR Guinea-Bissau (Derks and More, 2009: 20).   
A “knowledge-practice” gap explains the predominance of the first type of 
missions, targeting an individual agency or institution, over those 
implementing a multifaceted and integrated approach to SSR. The emergence 
of SSR in the international conflict prevention and peacebuilding agenda has 
pushed the EU to integrate the SSR knowledge into its system. However, the 
implementation has been predominantly sectoral, in spite of the fact that the 
EU policy framework defines SSR as systemic in line with the OECD-DAC 
guidelines.  
When operationalising SSR, EU officials have been confronted with a new, 
complex policy area, requiring the integration of different crisis management 
tools, without a track record of collaboration on this matter. A common 
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repertoire on SSR programme design, planning and delivery was missing in the 
Council Secretariat, and the majority of staff lacked expertise or training.106 In 
the first five years of SSR implementation (2005-2010), the Council Secretariat 
has had only three full-time SSR officials within DG E VIII and DG E IX and 
some rule of law experts (Derks and More, 2009: 20). The design of CSDP 
missions covering SSR has overlooked the core “holistic” component because 
of the lack of SSR expertise, aggravated by the high turnover of the Council 
Secretariat staff. Even when created, expertise struggled to be retained in EU 
bureaucratic units (Derks and More, 2009: 21). This has also affected 
evaluation and assessment works, which often misconstrue the SSR objectives 
in what are, in reality, civilian missions. These problems have been worsened 
by an absence of comprehensiveness in the way EU institutions deals with 
planning aspects of SSR missions. In the case of the SSR mission in DRC, 
attempts to merge the Council and Commission strategies for SSR were 
unsuccessful. Similarly, there has not been a framework bringing together First 
and Second pillar approaches to SSR in Guinea Bissau.  
Troubles in planning, resulting from bad conceptualisation, had consequences 
on the implementation of the EU SSR-support activities. Bloching points out 
that the neither EUSEC DRC, nor EUSSR Guinea-Bissau, have lived up to 
their ambitious agenda, as they focused almost exclusively on the security side 
of the security-development nexus (Bloching, 2011: 4). As a result, learning by 
doing in SSR fell short of a correct, holistic implementation on the ground, and 
                                                
106 Skype conversation with an expert, Brussels, 22 February 2014.  
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was hence hampered by the EU’s failure to set up a sufficient number of 
missions of the second type described above. 
That being said, it is worth reviewing the assessments on holistic CSDP SSR 
missions and the challenges associated with them. The latter have to do, in 
particular, with coordination, management, financial, leadership, staffing and 
training. 
 
6.2.1.1 EUSEC DRC  
 
EUSEC DRC was the first, groundbreaking EU mission addressing security 
sector reform in a post-conflict environment, through the adoption of 
comprehensive, coordinated and multilateral response. Launched in 2005, it 
was the first mission of its kind and reflected the growing importance of army 
reform in the EU’s approach to peacebuilding. Originally aimed at providing 
advice in support of army integration, compatibly with the principles of human 
right, good governance, international humanitarian law, transparency and the 
rule of law, the mandate evolved over time, according to the inclusion of other 
strands of activity in line with the evolving EU objectives in SSR (Clément, 
2009a: 245). As of August 2013, EUSEC was made of 21 military and 23 
civilian staff, not counting the 17 police officers deployed under the EUPOL 
mission.107  
                                                
107 Source: International and German Personnel in Peace Operations 2013-14, Berlin: Center 
for International Peace Operations, p. 4.  
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EUSEC’s main achievement has to do with the mission’s advice role on army 
reform, in cooperation with the United Nations, resulting in the adoption by 
President Kabila of the “Revised Plan of Army Reform” in May 2009 
(Clément, 2009b: 97). The mission also addressed the problem of the 
Congolese soldiers’ low pay – to prevent widespread corruption in the army – 
and achieved a several small initiatives in the fields of human rights training, 
IT network, and flanking measures designed to improve the life of the military 
(Bausback, 2010: 158).  
Five big challenges were associated with the mission: the EU’s internal 
organisation, the missions’ ability to engage non-military actors, the 
coordination with non-EU donors, and difficulties in implementing SSR when 
security forces were fighting a protracted conflict (Clément, 2009a: 247). The 
unclear division of labour among EU actors has certainly been a major one and 
has affected the mission from the early stage. Three separate budget lines were 
created and two different missions were set up: military activities were part of 
the EUSEC mandate, while police activities fell under the responsibility of 
EUPOL; finally, REJUSCO, under the Commission’s Directorate General for 
Development, addressed the programme for justice reform (Froitzheim and 
Soderbaum, 2013: 175). Unclear division of labour resulted in the Commission 
and the Council squabbling over their respective responsibilities, which 
ultimately has undermined the credibility of the EU vis-à-vis local authorities 
(More and Price, 2011: vii). Poor division of labour also occurred between the 
EU and external actors, in particular coordination with MONUC was difficult 
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as competition developed between the two missions, because of a fundamental 
disagreement over who and how should take a lead in promoting SSR in the 
DRC (Clément, 2009a: 251). The lack of political expertise was another 
important setback. Mission’s members were hired for their technical / military 
skills, with little consideration of their political ability to engage Congolese 
actors in devising the Strategic Plan for SSR (More and Price, 2011: 20).  
Overall, a limited amount of lessons have been learned from EUSEC. The gap 
between the EU’s ambitions in SSR and the modest means (financial, 
capabilities) available has probably been the most evident one. Internally, it 
was noted (Clément, 2009a: 253) that as the mission represented the first EU 
attempt to implement SSR under the OECD-DAC rules, it allowed member 
states with less operational involvement in the region to attract new SSR 
players, such as Germany and Italy, in addition to the early supporters 
(Benelux, France, the UK and Sweden). However, evaluations of the mission 
describe the overall EU coherence as “suboptimal”. More and Price observe 
that, beyond the general principles enunciated in the EU SSR policy 
frameworks, there has been no guiding framework or common EU objectives 
that were feasible in the Congolese context (More and Price, 2011: 23).108 
According to Bausback, tensions between member states further fragmented 
the EU’s approach to SSR. The launch of two separate missions – EUPOL and 
EUSEC - results in part from the reluctance of some member states to be 
                                                
108 In their study, More and Price (2011: 23) note that a 2006 classified document entitled “A 
Comprehensive Approach to SSR in DRC” and a 2010 “Roadmap on EU Engagement in 
DRC” actually existed, but only a handful of headquarters staff were aware of them. Field staff 
were not familiar with these documents and acted on the absence of an overarching framework 
and withouth evidence-based strategic direction on SSR support.  
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engaged in defence reform (Bausback, 2010: 159), which came at the expenses 
of an integrated approach. Furthermore, little or bad coordination existed 
between CSFP actors and the Commission, among different EU missions 
(EUPOL, EUSEC) in the field, as well as between the headquarters and the 
field.  
With the launch of EUSEC, expectations for the implementation of other 
comprehensive SSR initiatives were relatively higher, as the EU seemed able to 
carve out a niche role (Law, 2007) in stabilizing fragile post-conflict states 
through an emphasis on training, institutional reform and governance of the 
security sector. Those expectations were in fact disappointed by the lack of 
coherence and the implementation of EU SSR in Congo. Most importantly, the 
learning curve slowed down dramatically after EUSEC, as most of CSDP SSR 
missions continued focusing on specific sectors, rather than a comprehensive 
approach, with the exception of SSR Guinea-Bissau.    
 
6.2.1.2 EU SSR Guinea-Bissau 
 
Guinea-Bissau provided another example of the challenges of SSR in conflict-
affected contexts. It has been one of the smallest CSDP operations, with 21 
advisors deployed and a budget of less than €6 million. The mission had a 
relatively ambitious mandate. It was to assist the local authorities in developing 
implementation plans on the basis of the national SSR strategy; prepare 
donors’ engagement on capacity building, training and equipment for the 
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security sector; and, to achieve these two objectives, it relied on a 
comprehensive SSR approach linking with regional and international donors 
and partners (e.g. UN agencies), as well as with several long-term EC 
instruments (Helly, 2009: 371).  
Internal weakness significantly affected the mission. Staff recruitment proved 
extremely difficult due to member states’ reluctance to send civilians in a 
country with poor strategic importance and language requirements in a 
Portuguese-speaking country (Helly, 2009: 371). As a result, EU SSR in 
Guinea-Bissau ended up understaffed and overstretched, hampering the ability 
of EU officers and advisers to take the lead on key issues (Bloching, 2010). 
Growing instability in the country and political violence (Helly, 2009: 375) 
also undermined the missions’ ability to carry through its mandate and 
effectively liaising with local authorities. It also made harder for EU advisors 
to grasp the specificities of Guinea-Bissau’s state fragility and to foster local 
ownership.  
Coordination within the EU and with other international organisations proved 
loose, and envisaged synergies with EC-funded long-term programmes 
(European Development Fund and the Instruments for Stability) failed to take 
off (Bahnson, 2010: 270), although the logistical and political support provided 
by the EC delegation proved crucial to ensure the deployment and 
implementation phase.  
Several lessons learned have been identified. Matching mission’s mandate with 
adequate capabilities and human resources was widely seen as a prerequisite 
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for future SSR missions, based on the shortfalls experienced in Guinea-Bissau 
(Bahnson, 2010; Helly, 2009). This, in turn, is a function of the political will of 
Member States to supply the mission with appropriate staffing and equipment 
(Bloching, 2010). A sustainable basis for long term SSR assistance would have 
also been required – also because member states showed no willingness to 
deploy another CSDP mission in the country. Some authors have noted that the 
military mutiny of April 1, 2010, which triggered the EU’s decision to 
terminate the mission at the end of September, provided member states with a 
good opportunity to exit Guinea-Bissau without loosing face (Bloching, 2010: 
8). 
To conclude, the table 6.4, based on the report by Gross and Jacob (2013), 
overviews the common lessons learned and challenges for SSR 
implementation. The table shows that failure to implement the holistic, long-
term approach to SSR, confusion or lack of expertise among staff, and 
persisting differences among organisational cultures (civilian, military) as well 
as EU bureaucratic actors (EEAS, Commission) heavily influenced operational 
performance and constituted an obstacle to lessons drawing.  
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Table 6.4: SSR operational experience, main lessons and challenges109 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LESSONS 
- A holistic and comprehensive approach to SSR is needed to 
engage with institution-building in the long-term; 
- mission planning revolves around the identification of 
appropriate mission mandates and civil-military coordination 
where both aspects of crisis management are present;  
- staffing should be improved in selection aspects as well as 
training standards, especially in the pre-deployment phase;  
- common training standards should also facilitate the 
dissemination of a common understanding of SSR activities 
(currently missing);  
- civil-military coordination structures have been insufficient and 
underutilized; planning and oversight mechanisms continue to 
function separately (CPCC vs EUMS) also after the creation of 
CMPD;  
- civilian and military planners should share lessons learned and 
the contacts between them should be intensified.  
- cooperation with partner (UN, NATO) should go beyond 
framework agreements and involve strategic discussions on the 
entire conflict cycle to develop joint guidance;  
 
 
 
 
KEY 
HINDERING 
FACTORS  
- inter-institutional competition between EU actors with SSR-
related competences has negatively affected the implementation;  
- budgetary procedures and financial instruments are insufficient 
and inflexible, which explains delays in the implementation of 
missions or the achievement of their mandates;  
- working approaches and culture remain distinct as coordination 
between EEAS and Commission (entailing diverging planning 
and funding cycles) is problematic.  
 
 
 
 
6.2.2 Why has the EU failed to implement holistic SSR?  
 
To summarise, three factors explain the EU’s poor performance in SSR and 
consequent lack of learning by doing: 1) the absence of a consensus among 
expert communities scattered across the development cooperation and the 
security areas; 2) the complexity of the EU bureaucratic politics and the 
                                                
109 Source: Gross and Jacob (2013: 23-26).  
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cleavage between supranational and intergovernmental governance, involving 
confrontation between the Commission and the Council Secretariat and 
member states, which has not been solved by the creation of the European 
External Action Service; 3) shortfalls in terms of capacity building, training 
and recruitment. These three aspects are intertwined.  
The failure to create an overarching epistemic community, who would mingle 
the security and development discourses, is paramount. SSR is by its nature a 
bridging concept: the success of diffusion, persistence and evolution of holistic 
norms hinges on the degree of consensus among experts on how concepts shall 
be interpreted and implemented. Challenges arising from SSR implementation 
relate to the failure to forge a single community, despite some stimuli in this 
direction. As experts hold different meanings, values and beliefs about SSR, 
according to the lenses they use, a strong normative force could not fully drive 
forward. The most notable division arises across systemic and sectoral 
approaches to SSR. But language also matters in restricting access to the 
community, namely as far as the gap between English speaking and non-
English-speaking individuals is concerned. As a result, expertise has been 
translated into policy framework, but failed overall – the EU is a case in point – 
to be turned into something governments and organisations can use at the 
practical, operational level.  
The intricacy of EU decision-making, characterised by multi-level governance 
and the confrontation between supranational and intergovernmental 
institutions, did not help. Although it provided epistemic communities with 
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multiple access points to influence decision-making, EU bureaucratic politics 
has overall proceeded to the detriment of SSR policy implementation. This 
triggered further conceptual confusion, as well as coordination and 
organisational problems arising between the Commission and the CSDP-led 
activities. It also exacerbated critical cultural gaps, such as divergent national 
approaches towards areas of intervention (i.e. police reform), not to mention 
the broader issue of civilian vs. military structures and expertise within the 
Council Secretariat.  
Finally, the training-recruitment-deployment gap has been a substantial 
practical problem. Challenges can be divided into four categories: finance, 
procurement, staffing and training.110  Lack of sufficient financial support to 
SSR-related missions has been a major hindrance for effective implementation, 
together with the shortage of or the inadequacy of the equipment for civilian 
personnel. Procurement has thus far been cumbersome, slow and ineffective, 
for both regulatory and financial reasons, hence reducing freedom of 
movement, operational flexibility and increasing reliance on external actors 
(UN, NATO) for protection in dangerous places such as Afghanistan or Iraq.  
Understaffing and a general lack of training and knowledge of the areas of 
intervention are other important shortcomings. Despite the launch of initiatives 
aimed at developing international SSR training standards111, EU member states 
                                                
110 For a more detailed account of operational and implementation challenges to EU SSR, cf. 
Bloching (2011).  
111 Organisations such as the Geneva-based International Security Sector Advisory Team 
(ISSAT) and the Association for Security Sector Reform Education and Training (ASSET), 
established in 2008 within DCAF, were in the frontline in promoting training, education and 
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have struggled to recruit or second deployable personnel and, when they 
managed to, officers were not sufficiently prepared for the task or do not have 
a cultural understanding of the context in which the mission takes place 
(Bloching, 2011).  
To fill these gaps, recent initiatives have attempted to enhance strategic 
training, pre-deployment specialisation and permanent expertise for EU SSR 
civilian and defence missions. The establishment of the European Security and 
Defence College (ESDC), the launch of Europe’s New Training Initiative for 
Civilian Crisis Management (ENTRi) and the setting up of the permanent pool 
of SSR experts (or Deployable European Expert Teams) are three significant 
examples. These initiatives are expected to promote shared expertise and 
contribute to the reflection on the development of SSR theory and related 
matters within the EU, by submitting analyses and reports to the Council and 
Commission.  
 
6.2.3 Appraising SSR’s robustness 
 
Let us finally turn to the robustness of SSR, on the basis of Legro’s (1997) 
criteria of specificity, durability and concordance.  
First, how well are SSR guidelines grasped by EU actors? A major lesson 
learned from the institutionalisation of SSR into the EU is that mainstreaming 
does not necessarily mean “understanding”. And even if there is understanding, 
                                                
networking activities to foster a transnational understanding of the issue and facilitate 
coordination among different actors on the ground.  
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it does not necessarily mean “being able to do”. Although SSR has been 
mainstreamed in the EU through the creation of three policy frameworks, the 
process has been anonymous and bureaucratic, with no specific institutions or 
individual that can be recognised as truly responsible and accountable. When 
the EU approach to SSR was carved out in 2005, under the UK Presidency’s 
push, the questions of who in Europe was to deal with SSR, how and with what 
instruments was left open. EU policy-makers were not in the position to do 
much about it due to their lack of expertise in this area. More than five years 
after the adoption of the EU concept, interviews still reveal a deficit of 
understanding, worsened by the fact that governments and institutions prefer to 
hire external consultants to outsource studies and evaluations for SSR 
activities. Outsourcing obstacles the development of “in house” expertise and 
know-how. An exception in this regard is the Swedish guidance document for 
Security Sector Reform (2007), outlining the overall approach and assessment 
framework for Swedish actors’ engagement in SSR processes. The document 
was produced by the Contact Group of the national SSR Steering Committee 
composed of representatives from the Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency, the National Defence College, The National Police, the 
Armed Forces and the Folke Bernadotte Academy. Unfortunately, this best 
practice developed at the national level to create synergies and convergence 
among agencies has not yet been replicated at the EU level.  
Second, is the legitimacy of SSR long-standing? The young age and the 
confusion over its exact meaning, coupled with the fact that many policy-
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makers see it as a slogan rather than a credible – and implementable – policy 
agenda have an obvious effect on the durability of SSR. Many interviewees 
raised serious doubts about the development of the EU as an actor in SSR in 
the near future. Missing opportunities – such as the post-conflict Libya – seem 
to confirm these feelings. Poor durability results from the fact that the EU is far 
away from a true implementation of SSR as a whole of government approach.  
Poor durability essentially originates in low concordance. SSR ideas in the EU 
could flow within a limited time frame (2005-2009), after which information 
exchange and constructive debate stopped, blocking further conceptualisation 
(and consequently, evolution as learning) of SSR: a normative downturn 
occurred. All in all, the norm development behind the EU SSR framework fails 
to meet the Legro’s criteria of robustness.  
  
6.3 Conclusion  
 
It can be concluded that EU and national decision-makers sought the support of 
experts to develop a framework for SSR. At the same time, the presence of 
multiple flows of influence and the multi-dimensional nature of SSR rule out 
the existence of a single norm setter: norms were set and diffused out of a 
complex interplay between knowledge and power nested in epistemic 
communities. This chapter outlines a co-constitutive relation between 
ideational factors and state interests in accounting for the choices made by the 
EU and its member states in the security domain. Policy convergence and 
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European cooperation in the field of SSR was driven by epistemic communities 
conveying new ideas and operating in the grey area between changing 
structural conditions of the post-Cold War era and domestic/EU political 
processes. Support from national constituencies (the UK in particular) and the 
presence of a guiding model or template for implementation (the OECD 
handbook) contributed the persuasiveness of epistemic communities.  
However, policy consensus on the SSR framework failed to turn into a real 
convergence in the outcomes and into policy evolution. SSR remained 
embroiled in conceptualisation: confusion among experts created confusion 
among policy-makers, ultimately resulting in confusion in policy. Different 
lenses, through which SSR policies are visualised, persist as epistemes are 
neither coherent, nor truly dominant and consensual. As a result, 
notwithstanding strong backing from constituencies (the “interest” factor), 
wobbly cognitive cohesion hampered effective persistence and policy 
evolution. This reinforces the view that ideas, interests and power are deeply 
inter-related in a co-constitutive relationship when it comes to shaping security 
policies.  
The question hence arises as to why the SSR community lacked cohesiveness, 
especially since, as it was argued in the previous chapter, learning communities 
tend to be congenitally heterogeneous. A first explanation has to do with 
inconsistencies in the SSR debate itself. Neither the expert communities nor the 
policy communities have made enough efforts to sort out the disagreement 
between different approaches over security. The divide between sectoral and 
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systemic SSR is a case in point. EU bureaucratic politics has triggered further 
confusion, for instance by exacerbating critical cultural divides. Shortfalls in 
capacity and standardised training could only make the situation worse by 
clogging up implementation and assessment. Obvious as it may seem, ideas are 
powerful yet fragile drivers of change: like interests, their impact on the social 
reality heavily relies on context, timing and, most importantly, on the actors’ 
ability to consolidate consensus underlying action. The institutionalisation of 
SSR diffusion shows that the EU policy environment is open for norm 
entrepreneurship – in fact, the EU did grab SSR shortly after the OECD 
guidelines came out. However, it also indicates that implementation can 
become problematic if concepts are not pinned down in clear targets 
compatible with states’ capabilities and interests.    
 
 
 
 
 Chapter 7 
 
Learning communities and the CSDP: Civilian Crisis 
Management 
 
 
 
 
I never fully understood why we had to drive a Citroën.  
My father’s ideological position on the matter was that Citroëns 
 were the most technologically advanced cars on the road. 
 In retrospect, I wonder whether my father’s insistence upon buying Citroëns (…)  
had something to do with his early life. He was, after all, an immigrant –  
born in Belgium, raised there and in Ireland – who only arrived in England in 1935.  
In time he learned to speak impeccable English, but underneath he remained a 
continental. 
 I like to think that there was some subliminal ethnic motive at work.  
German cars were of course out of the question.  
The reputation of Italian cars (at any rate those we could afford) was at its lowest 
point:  
Italians, it was widely felt, could design anything – they just couldn’t build it.  
Renault was disgraced by its founders’ active collaboration with the Nazis.  
Peugeot was a respectable outfit but better known in those years for their bikes (…).  
And, perhaps the decisive if undeclared consideration, the eponymous founder  
of the Citroën dynasty had been a Jew.  
 
(Tony Judt, The Memory Chalet)  
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter grapples with two questions. The first one arises as to how a 
policy consensus on CCM emerged, which factors influenced the choices made 
by policy-makers, and how this understanding about the conduct of crisis 
management operations turned into established institutional structures, policies, 
procedures and capabilities. The second, comparative question concerns policy 
evolution. Contrary to security sector reform, CCM missions have led to a 
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significant amount of policy evolution through learning by doing. As noted by 
several scholars, the number of CCM missions made paramount the 
implementation of a lessons-learned process to improve capacity development 
and human resources, which had suffered from the absence of systematic 
procedures (Emerson and Gross, 2007: 14). This is especially true in the 
Western Balkans, where the EU experience with crisis management, catalysed 
by the policy failure in the 1990s, produced a sort of “laboratory for learning” 
(Gross, 2008: 311). The literature describes learning by doing as instrumental 
to advance the EU’s engagement in CCM, for instance in terms of command 
and control structures (cf. through the creation of the Civilian Planning and 
Conduct Capability) or internal/external coherence and coordination with the 
military through the implementation of civil-military coordination and 
cooperation (CIMIC-CMCO). Therefore, by showing a clear evolutionary 
pattern, norm diffusion in the case of CCM has led to very different outcomes 
in comparison with SSR. Why has this policy area persisted and evolved?     
This chapter challenges current explanations of the EU as a civilian crisis 
manager by investigating the role of transnational expertise (epicoms) and 
practice-based (CoPs) communities in pushing forward a new security 
thinking, which changed the traditional understanding of crisis management. I 
argue that processes of policy failure, policy paradigm innovation, emulation 
and evolution as learning by doing (McNamara, 1998; Adler and Haas, 1992) 
changed EU policy-makers’ understanding of security in the post-Cold War 
international system and shaped their interests and preferences at the domestic 
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(member states) and international (CSDP institutional setting) levels. The 
chapter tests the argument that such policy consensus lays at the core of the 
institutionalisation of CCM in the EU, and produced profound implications on 
the EU role as a global security provider during the first decade of the 2000s. 
This chapter also tries to clear up the conceptual confusion over learning 
communities, by showing the extent to which practice is located behind and 
within knowledge. It does so through the mapping of the universe of experts 
and practitioners involved in CCM.        
The empirical analysis is based on experts and élites interviews carried out 
between March 2011 and April 2012, with officers from the Council 
Secretariat, the European Commission, and member states as well as experts 
from leading European think tanks and NGOs and at the UN.  
 
7.1 Bridging practice, knowledge and power: learning communities and 
the EU way to civilian crisis management  
 
Is there such a thing as a “learning community” that boosted the 
institutionalisation of CCM in the EU? If so, what are its boundaries, who are 
the key players or actors involved in it and how can their influence be traced? 
To what extent were learning from others (by emulation) and from experience 
(by doing) facilitated by transnational networks of experts and practitioners? 
Finally, how did ideas translate into institution-building, leading to the 
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establishment of new civilian and civil-military structures such as Civcom or 
the CPCC? 
By providing an answer to these questions, this section draws on the empirical 
research – more than 25 semi-structured interviews and the consultation of 
primary/secondary sources – carried out between March 2011 and May 2012 in 
Brussels and Stockholm. Mirroring the structure of the previous chapter to 
facilitate the comparative analysis, it investigates how learning communities 
shaped CSDP civilian outcomes by looking at three factors:  
 
(1) the type of CCM communities, namely their structure, boundaries 
and cohesiveness, and the overall cognitive architecture of CCM; 
(2) the diffusion of CCM in the CSDP; 
(3) the policy outcomes and the expansion of CCM practices by 
experiential learning;  
 
The analysis of CCM diffusion focuses, in particular, on the contribution of the 
Nordic countries, and namely Sweden and Finland, in shaping the crisis 
management agenda. It argues that the “Nordic constituency” allowed 
transnational communities to become persuasive and influence the EU policy-
making. Out of Nordic initiative, ideas spread across the EU decision-making, 
facilitated by multiple points of access within the EU institutional structure and 
by the presence of networks of practitioners, who had experienced the 
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importance of a new approach to crisis management during previous field 
operations.  
The conclusion accounts for the structure and outreach of learning 
communities in civilian crisis management, with special emphasis on the 
mechanisms of policy evolution by learning and the impact of EU policies in 
conflict and post-conflict situations.  
 
7.1.1 Learning communities civilian crisis management 
 
What are the building blocks and who exactly partakes in the learning 
community of CCM? The EU’s move towards developing a civilian crisis 
management capacity has been heavily shaped by member states’ domestic 
politics (Dwan 2002: 2), with the CCM agenda being supported by three 
overlapping constituencies: neutral, small and anti-federalist states. Major 
donor countries (the Nordics, The Netherlands and the UK) can be considered 
another constituency in support of CCM, motivated by their need to reframe 
aid strategies in a changing international system.  
Springing from the international debate on the new dimensions of 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding (cf. chapter 3), national and transnational 
communities of practitioners and experts, supported by these four 
constituencies, started prioritising CCM in the debate on the future of European 
security, bolstered by the Cologne European Council’s decision (June 1999) to 
mandate the Finnish Presidency to address non-military crisis management. 
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The rotating presidency of the European Council between 1999 and 2003 was 
particularly favourable to CCM conceptual development (cf. table 7.1), 
allowing expert in national capitals to become key players in the debate.   
 
Table 7.1: List of member states holding the rotating Presidency of the 
European Council (1999-2003) 
 
 
YEAR 
 
 
PRESIDENCY 
 
 
 
1999 
 
 
Germany 
--------------------------
--- 
Finland*  
 
 
 
2000 
 
 
Portugal 
--------------------------
--- 
France 
 
 
 
2001 
 
 
Sweden 
--------------------------
--- 
Belgium  
 
 
 
2002 
 
 
Spain  
--------------------------
--- 
Denmark  
 
 
 
2003 
 
 
Greece 
--------------------------
--- 
Italy 
 
*In bold: member states openly supportive of CCM development 
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Locating the boundaries of learning communities, however, is not an easy task,  
because of two peculiarities of the CCM communities: their shape and 
extension.  
First, contrary to previous studies (Verdun, 1999; Kriesi and Jegen, 2001), 
there is not a single and formal institutional structure or body whose shape or 
boundaries coincide with the learning community of CCM. On the one hand, 
no single group or committee of experts was formally appointed and tasked 
with advancing the agenda on behalf or support of policy-making. Similarly, 
the community of practice cannot be visualised as a well-defined organisational 
structure (i.e., the PSC) due to the blended nature of peace operations and the 
secondment of member states diplomats or officials to international 
organisations other than the EU during the 1990s. Civcom, for instance, could 
certainly be defined as a community of practice. However, not all the 
individuals who were deployed in NATO and UN operations in the Western 
Balkans and who have influenced CCM conceptual development became part 
of that Committee. In other words, the logic of habitus characterising 
communities of practice must be conceived as scattered across different 
institutions, governments or NGOs. What matters is not the institutional body 
(for instance, the PSC, Civcom or the CMPD), but the nature of the linkages 
and the flow of influence enabling new ideas or knowledge to become policy 
relevant. What defines the shape of learning communities is not an institutional 
affiliation, but their members’ “exposure” to multiple flows of influence 
making the congregation of knowledge fluid and evolutionary.  
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Another important aspect of the learning communities of CCM has to do with 
their extension. The relationship between expertise and practice overlaps across 
institutions and takes place mostly through private channels out of the radar 
screen of formal decision-making. While some individuals are identified as 
experts only – e.g. think-tankers loosely connected to EU institutions but 
somewhat influent vis-à-vis national governments through their research output 
– with no affiliation to a community of practice, others act as practitioners 
whose set of beliefs progress in time throughout professionalism. However, 
several actors, individuals and institutions alike, fall in-between as they career 
path slid across or amid the two types of learning communities.  
To reduce such complexity, we shall again clear up the distinction between the 
epicoms and the CoPs that moulded the EU approach to civilian crisis 
management. Following Peter Haas’ (1992) definition, epicoms are 
knowledge-based networks of individual and institutions clustering around the 
idea (or the goal) of the importance of non-military crisis management as a 
mean to conduct of peace operations and support the EU foreign and security 
policy activities. Regardless of the association to a specific group (i.e. a 
particular committee in the Council Secretariat) or discipline (police or military 
officials, judges), what brings these individuals together is a set of shared 
principled normative and causal beliefs. By contrast, CoPs are composed of 
those individuals and institutions sharing a set of experiences, within the same 
or contiguous organisational structures (i.e. the EU institutional setting, or 
bodies within the EU-UN inter-institutional complex, such as the EU-UN 
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steering committee), which ultimately are responsible for shaping their beliefs 
and understanding of crisis management in the sense of a non-military 
development. Both communities serve as the “layers” where norm diffusion 
and exchange processes take place, thus creating a pattern of influence that 
significantly affects security decisions taken by governments. Epicoms and 
CoPs provide a decisive interpretation of facts that contribute to the way 
policy-makers formulate their interests.  
On that account, the population of CSDP expertise and practice-based 
communities can be identified on the basis of the three criteria already used by 
Mérand et al. (2011: 126) to delineate the boundaries of the CSDP networks: 
position, participation and reputation. The first criterion (position) permits to 
scan government departments, decision-making units or interest groups having 
a stake in security policies and CSDP issues, namely those who are related to 
civilian crisis management; the second criterion (participation) pinpoints the 
actors who took a major stand on CCM issues on the basis of their attendance 
to conferences, seminars or summits; finally, through the third criterion 
(reputation) members of the learning communities were invited to cross-check 
the list of key CCM actors and add/subtract other individuals or institutions 
they considered important/marginal in the CSDP debate.  
Based on the data gathered from standardised questions asked during 
interviews and a careful scrutiny of secondary sources, the table 7.2 provides a 
list of actors divided into five areas: (1) Education/Research (University 
departments, think-tanks, research institutes); (2) Government (Ministries, 
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Agencies, national defence colleges); (3) Training centers; (4) NGOs; (5) 
International Organisations (and related bodies). 
To operationalise the three criteria, interviewees were asked to list at least five 
individuals and organisations that they considered as being most influential in 
shaping the CCM agenda (reputation); to list the main CCM-related 
conferences, workshops and meetings they had attended since 2000 
(participation); and to define their role and influence in policy and decision-
making (supported by concrete examples) in the field of CCM, complemented 
by a description (where possible) of the sources of funding and the type of 
professional output (position).112 The interviewees were also asked to provide 
definitions and answer content-related questions (for instance, how they would 
define CCM and what they thought were the main challenges to 
implementation in the EU framework), in order to evaluate their understanding 
and knowledge of the subject, and also the extent to which their ideas fit into 
the community’s shared beliefs. In some cases, further evidence in support of 
the answers was provided, such as resumes, working papers and non-classified 
documents. To respect as much as possible the privacy of the interviewees, I 
have decided not to include a list of their names in the form of a list or table. 
As a result, table 7.2 figures relevant institutions and organisations only. 
However, the membership of the CCM community and some of the individuals 
who are part of it can be extrapolated by cross-checking the institutions listed 
in the table, with their affiliates, as well as the list of the interviewees in annex.  
                                                
112 See questionnaire in Annex.  
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Table 7.2: Learning Communities (expertise and practice-based) of EU CCM, 
overview of the main national and transnational actors involved (1999-2002)* 
 
 
Institution Sector Country Function Website 
Istituto Affari Internazionali 1 Italy Research, 
Consultancy 
www.iai.it  
Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna 1, 3 Italy Training http://www.sssup.
it/  
Netherlands Institute of 
International Relations - 
Clingendael  
1 The 
Netherlands  
Research, 
Consultancy, 
Training 
http://www.clinge
ndael.nl/  
European Union Institute for 
Security Studies  
5 -  Research www.iss.europa.e
u  
European Peacebuilding 
Liaison Office 
4 -  Advocacy 
network 
www.eplo.org  
Austrian Study Center for 
Peace and Conflict Resolution 
1 Austria Research, 
Training 
http://www.aspr.a
c.at/aspr/  
Institute for Peace Support and 
Conflict Management – 
National Defence Academy  
2 Austria Research, 
Training, 
Political Advice 
http://www.bunde
sheer.at/organisat
ion/beitraege/lvak
/eifk/eifk.shtml  
British American Security 
Information Council  
1 UK/USA Research, 
Advocacy  
http://www.basici
nt.org/  
UK Department for 
International Development 
(DFID) 
2 UK Government www.dfid.gov.uk
/  
Global Facilitation Network 
for Security Sector Reform 
1 UK Research, 
Advocacy, 
Knowledge 
sharing 
http://www.ssrnet
work.net/  
Conflict, Security and 
Development Group – King’s 
College London 
1 UK Knowledge 
sharing, 
Research 
http://www.securi
tyanddevelopmen
t.org/  
Geneva Centre for the 
Democratic Control of Armed 
Forces 
1, 5 Switzerland Training, 
Research, 
Advocacy, 
Knowledge 
Sharing,  
www.dcaf.ch  
International Security Sector 
Advisory Team  
1,3  Switzerland Training, 
Mentoring, 
Networking 
www.issat.dcaf.c
h  
Association for Security Sector 
Reform Education and 
Training  
1, 3 Switzerland  Training, 
Capacity 
Building, 
Networking  
http://asset-
ssr.org  
Geneva Centre for Security 
Policy  
1 Switzerland Research, 
Training  
www.gcsp.ch  
OECD – International 
Network on Conflict and 
Fragility (INCAF), previously 
Conflict Prevention and 
Development Co-operation 
Network (CPDC) 
5 -  Advisory, 
Networking, 
Decision-
making 
http://www.oecd.
org/dac/conflicta
ndfragility/theinte
rnationalnetwork
onconflictandfrag
ility.htm  
Zentrum für Internationale 
Friedenseinsätze  
3  Germany  Training http://www.zif-
berlin.org/en/  
German Institute for 
International and Security 
Affairs 
1 Germany Research http://www.swp-
berlin.org/en/start
-en.html  
Folke Bernadotte Academy 3 Sweden Training http://www.folke
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bernadotteacade
my.se/  
Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute  
1 Sweden Research www.sipri.org  
Swedish Institute of 
International Affairs 
1 Sweden Research  http://www.ui.se/  
Crisis Management Centre  3 Finland Training http://www.cmcfi
nland.fi/  
Finnish Institute of 
International Affairs 
1 Finland Research  http://www.fiia.fi
/en/home/#tab1  
Institut français de relations 
internationales 
1 France Research  www.ifri.org  
Swedish National Defence 
College 
2 Sweden Research and 
Development 
www.fhs.se  
Deparment of Peace and 
Conflict Research, Uppsala 
University 
1 Sweden Research, 
Education 
http://www.pcr.u
u.se/  
Swedish International 
Development Cooperation 
Agency 
2 Sweden Government – 
Development 
co-operation  
www.sida.se  
Forum Syd  4 Sweden International 
Development 
cooperation, 
research and 
advocacy  
https://www.foru
msyd.org/Default
_ForumSyd_C.as
px?id=12337  
Royal United Services Institute 1 UK Think-Tank, 
Research 
www.rusi.org  
Centre for European Reform 1 UK Think-Tank, 
Research 
www.cer.org.uk  
Saferworld 4 UK Research, 
Consultancy, 
Advocacy 
www.saferworld.
org.uk  
EU – Council Secretariat  
EEAS, EUSRs, EUMS, 
EUMC, CMPD, CPCC, 
CIVCOM, PMG, PSC 
 
 
5 EU International 
Organisation 
http://eeas.europa
.eu/background/o
rganisation/index
_en.htm  
European Security and 
Defence College  
3 EU wide Training  http://esdc.mil-
edu.be/  
EU – Member States 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, 
Ministries of Defence, DGs 
Development Co-operation, 
Ministries of Justice, 
Ministries of Interior  
2 Sweden, 
Finland, 
Denmark, 
Germany, 
Italy, 
Netherlands, 
France, 
Portugal, 
United 
Kingdom, 
Austria 
Government N/A 
European Centre for 
Development Policy 
Management 
1 Netherlands, 
Belgium 
International 
Development 
Think and Do 
Tank.  
http://www.ecdp
m.org/  
Overseas Development 
Institute 
1 UK Research www.odi.org.uk 
 
Egmont Institute, Royal 
Institute for International 
Relations  
1 Belgium Research, Think 
Tank 
www.egmontinsti
tute.be  
Security & Defence Agenda 1 Belgium Think-Tank www.securityand
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defenceagenda.or
g  
European Policy Centre  1 Belgium Think Tank www.epc.eu  
Centre for European Policy 
Studies 
1 Belgium Think Tank www.ceps.eu  
International Relations and 
Security Network -  Swiss 
Federal Institute of 
Technology Zurich  
1 Switzerland Research, 
Think-Tank 
http://www.isn.et
hz.ch/  
RAND Europe 1 UK Consultancy http://www.rand.
org/randeurope.ht
ml  
NATO 5 -  International 
Organisation 
www.nato.int  
OSCE – Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in 
Europe 
5 -  International 
Organisation  
 
Crisis Management Initiative  4 Finland Advocacy   
International Alert 4 UK NGO, Advocacy  http://www.intern
ational-alert.org/  
International Crisis Group 4 -  NGO, Research, 
Advocacy  
http://www.crisis
group.org/  
Council Secretariat DG-E 
External  
5 - IGO  
High Representative’s Office  5 - IGO  
European Defence Agency 5  IGO  
German PR (PSC 
Ambassador) 
2 Germany Diplomacy  
DG RELEX 2 - EU - Policy-
making 
 
Downing Street  2 UK Government  
UK Foreign Secretary’s 
Cabinet 
2 UK Government  
French Defence Ministry DAS 2 France Government - 
Military 
 
German Chancellery 2 Germany Government  
German Defence Ministry 2 Germany Government - 
Military 
 
German Foreign Ministry’s 
Policy Staff 
2 Germany Government  
European Parliament SEDE 5 - EU  
Foreign Office’s Security 
Branch 
2 UK Government  
French PR (PSC Ambassador) 2 France Government  
UK PR (PSC Ambassador) 2 UK Government  
German PerRep NATO 2 Germany Government  
French Defence Minister’s 
Cabinet 
2 France Government - 
Military 
 
French Defence Staff’s 
Euroatlantic Division 
2 France Government - 
Military 
 
UK Foreign Office’s CFSP 
Unit 
2 UK Government   
UK Defence Ministry’s Policy 
Staff 
2 UK Government - 
Military 
 
German Defence Ministry’s 2 Germany Government -  
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Policy Staff Military 
German Foreign Ministry’s 
Political Directorate 
2 Germany Government  
French Foreign MInistry’s 
Political Directorate 
2 France Government  
French Defence Staff 2 France Government - 
Military 
 
UK Defence Ministry’s EU 
/NATO Division  
2 UK Government - 
Military 
 
NATO Secretary General 5 - IGO  
NATO International Staff 5 - IGO  
German Foreign Ministry’s 
EU Correspondent 
2 Germany Government  
German Foreign Minister’s 
Cabinet 
2 Germany Government  
 
* In Italic: actors in the CSDP network according to the list produced by the “ESDP network 
project” (Mérand, et al., 2011: 130). The table shows that the “traditional” CSDP actors and the 
communities of CCM do not fully correspond.    
 
 
Interviews revealed that the universe of CCM learning communities appeared, 
at its early stage (late-1990s, early-2000s) heterogeneous and somewhat 
mutable. Relations between experts, practitioners and decision-makers mostly 
occurred through private or informal channels and were dominated by a few 
key, influential individuals closely connected to governments or international 
institutions. A large, cohesive transnational community of civilian crisis 
management was hence missing and it would be more correct to speak about a 
patchy and evolutionary morphology, or “islands” of knowledge and practices 
loosely linked (but nonetheless interconnected) to each other.113  
There are two possible explanations for this specific configuration. First, in a 
similar way to the lag that exists between policy actions and policy outcomes, 
as a result of which agreed policies take time to pay off (McNamara, 1998: 63), 
                                                
113 Assessment based on the interpretation of the empirical data gathered from semi-structured 
interviews (cf. survey in annex), 2011-2012.  
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another time lag exists between systemic change and paradigmatic shift, that is 
between the transformations brought forth by the end of the Cold War and the 
change of mindset (and the international awareness of it) underlying the 
formation of the new security thinking. In other words, at the macro-level, 
collective systems of beliefs (epistemes) and practices (habitus) react relatively 
slowly to changed structural conditions. Second, and consequently, 
terminological confusion and inflation, through the blossoming of several new, 
ill-defined terms (Blockmans, 2008: 8), characterised the re-conceptualisation 
of security and defence in the new international system.114 
At the same time, an analysis of the empirical evidence collected through the 
survey shows that previous collaborations in non-military crisis management 
occurred and individuals had a record of working relationship with colleagues 
from other ministries, or international organisations.115 In the table 7.2, 
individuals belonging to the institutions coloured in blue are those who can be 
defined as forming an embryonic community of practice, by a match of the 
position and participation criteria. They did not perform collaborative work 
within the same office or unit, but reported to be frequently confronted with the 
same operational challenges and to collaborate during multi-national missions 
in the field (e.g. United Nations peacekeeping missions). As the next section 
will show, it was the expansion of these practices that led to the formation of a 
fully-fledged CoP of civilian crisis management.  
                                                
114   See chapter 3.  
115 Source: answers to standardised questions during fieldwork research in Brussels, 
Stockholm, New York and Rome, 2011-2012.    
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On that basis, the next section discusses the processes of CCM diffusion 
according to the four pathways of influence. It presents the bulk of the 
empirical analysis and makes the case of the Nordic countries’ (Sweden and 
Finland) role in sustaining the conceptual development (norm diffusion) of 
civilian crisis management, in much similar way the United Kingdom acted as 
the “godfather” of security sector reform. However, drawing from McNamara 
(1998), it contends that the creation of a policy consensus was inspired by three 
ideational sources: policy failure, policy paradigm innovation and emulation.  
The following section also identifies the communities of practice that have 
been more influent in shaping the CCM agenda.  
 
 
7.1.2 The dynamics of CCM diffusion 
 
By analysing the mechanisms and flows of norm diffusion, this section argues 
that knowledge rooted in practice, backed by a strong support provided by the 
Nordic member states, prompted capability generation and institution-building 
for EU civilian crisis management, since its inception at Cologne in 1999. It 
also demonstrates that the linkage between episteme and habitus propped up 
policy evolution, facilitating patterns of learning from experience and from 
emulation. As a result, the evolution of consensual and background knowledge 
on crisis management fostered what the literature erroneously conceived as a 
sole matter of capabilities. Quite the contrary, the very act of instilling non-
military tools, resources and procedures in the EU crisis management 
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mechanisms denotes a deeper process of conceptual evolution and policy 
consensus aimed at changing the EU and its member states’ role as providers 
of regional and global security. The process arose in response to changed 
structural conditions that tailed off the effectiveness of pure military 
interventions. It involved the creation of a Europe-wide consensus based on 
intense knowledge sharing and socialisation, both inside and outside the EU 
institutional setting.   
 
7.1.2.1 Policy failure, innovation, diffusion, selection  
 
The rapid build-up of the CFSP/CSDP, the envisaged use of civilian means in 
the conduct of the Petersberg tasks, as well as the new posture of European 
security institutions (EU, NATO, OSCE), all these initiatives originate in a 
systemic fracture - the end of the Cold War – as a result of which Europe was 
confronted with a number of important political developments (De Zwaan, 
2008: 23): the fall of the Berlin wall and the unification of Germany; the 
demise of the Soviet Union; the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern 
Europe and the rise of new fully independent states; finally, a high-risk and 
unstable area in its south-eastern neighbourhood (the Balkans). Other factors 
gradually contributed to transform the international security discourse towards 
a rising role of humanitarian and peacekeeping tasks beyond classic defence 
and security doctrines (cf. chapter 3).  
Civilian crisis management is, against this backdrop, a tricky concept. On the 
one hand, the implementation of a “CCM” doctrine is an exclusively EU 
Chapter 7 – Case study: the EU and Civilian Crisis Management   
                   242 
prerogative, as no other international organisation has formally adopted a 
similar concept (with the exception of the UN’s executive policing). On the 
other hand, however, its genesis is closely linked to the debate arising in the 
1990s at the international level on the future of military expenditures; on how 
to improve civil-military operations on the ground; and the increasingly 
relevant linkage between governance, development and security in a 
developing world whose political and economic destiny was unshackled from 
the constraining forces of a bipolar system. At the time, the EU could be 
visualised as yet another international organisation engaged in soul-searching 
in a transforming world. Furthermore, security and defence issues were 
addressed in a very modest manner by the article J.4 TEU, stating that CFSP 
included “all questions related to the security of the Union, including the 
eventual framing of a common defence policy which might in time lead to a 
common defence”. The security landscape was still dominated by NATO, with 
the Western European Union (WEU) and the OSCE as important players. This 
is to say that policy innovation for civilian crisis management eventually came 
about in a period when EU security institutions, procedures and policies were 
not yet in place.  
Accordingly, policy innovation processes stem out of the need by member 
states to address two fundamental questions: a broader one concerning the 
future trajectories of global security and the looming need to integrate civilian 
and military means of intervention; and a narrower one concerned with the 
shape and the room for manoeuvre of the security/defence dimension of the 
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CFSP. With the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999), a 
consensus developed between the three constituencies composed of neutral, 
small and anti-federalist on the fact that civilian crisis management could yield 
a weighty value-added for the EU. Transnational communities of experts and 
practitioners played a pivotal role in forging this consensus.  
A significant amount of work have accounted for the role of Nordic countries 
(in particular, Sweden and Finland) in influencing the development of CSDP 
towards a civilian crisis manager (Rieker, 2004; Bailes, 2006; Jorgensen, 
1999). It is true that a number of factors justify the active stance of the Nordic 
countries’ in this domain. For instance, Sweden’s commitment to the civilian 
dimension of EU crisis management can be justified on the ground of at least 
six explanations: 1) the peculiarities of Swedish society, that is an inclination 
to look at conflict through “civilian” lenses rooted in the fact that the country 
has not been at war for more than 200 years; 2) political and ideological 
proximity of the ruling social democratic government with a non-military (or 
not just military) development of EU security cooperation; 3) the imperative to 
demonstrate, domestically, that EU was well suited to fulfil civilian tasks and 
was hence different from NATO; 4) the élites’ awareness of new patterns of 
conflicts that arose at the end of the cold war; 5) the Ministry of foreign 
Affairs’ conflict prevention agenda driving the debate on Sweden’s 
international role, particularly considering Sweden’s allegiance to the UN; 6) 
most, importantly, the strong concern that CSDP could lead to a mutual 
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defence agreement (unacceptable for a non-aligned country) and that CSDP 
development could go to the detriment of NATO’s role in Europe’s defence.  
Finland shared many of these points. All the way through the Cold War, the 
idea of neutrality was deep rooted in the Finnish strategic culture, a 
characteristic labelled as “Finlandisation”. Finland’s decision-makers were also 
aware that with the end of the Cold War and the new emphasis on the 
comprehensive approach to security which gradually spread in the 1990s would 
entail a reformulation of the country’s strategic posture, pretty much as any 
other Western nation. This triggered a momentous change of mindset that 
Ojanen correctly describes as the switch from a broad notion of neutrality to a 
narrow notion of military non-alignment (Ojanen, 2008: 56). The end of the 
Cold War and the accession to the EU have pushed Finnish decision-makers to 
adopt a more “flexible” strategic doctrine, adapt to “constantly re-assessing its 
military non alliance and the functioning of crisis management and security 
cooperation in Europe, taking into consideration changes in the regional 
security environment and developments in the European Union”.116 Ideology, 
leadership and party politics counted. Martti Athisaari, previously a diplomat 
and UN mediator, was elected President of Finland in March 1994, remaining 
in office until March 2000. His personal engagement with crisis management, 
mediation and human rights undoubtedly contributed to shape Finland’s 
security policy preferences.  
                                                
116 Council of State, 2001. The Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2001, Report to parliament 
13 june 2001. Helsinki: Edita, p. 7, 39. Aka the White Book (2001). Cf. also Ojanen (2002: 
162).  
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Against this backdrop, the paradigmatic shift in security turned into policy 
consensus quite easily and in a relatively short period of time in Sweden and 
Finland compared to other states. Two factors facilitated the emergence of this 
policy consensus.  First, previous experience with crisis management arising 
from Swedish and Finnish involvement in UN peacekeeping, which contained 
a “civilian” element although it could not be labelled as CCM; second, a strong 
presence of non state actors, knowledge-based community in these two 
countries, exerting a substantial influence in policy-making through 
institutional and informal channels. The former constitutes a community of 
practice; the latter is an epistemic community, clustered around the idea that 
addressing the roots of conflict should involve the use and development of 
civilian instruments. Overlapping communities of practice and epistemic 
communities shaped the Swedish and Finnish approach to crisis management. 
These, in turn, impacted on the conceptualisation and capacity-building at the 
EU level.  
The resulting policy innovation and diffusion were accompanied by patterns of 
Europeanisation, causing the Nordics to move away from the strategic Cold 
War thinking. In the Nordic region, as in other states, the 1990s came as an 
opportunity to rethink their strategic choices and posture, in particular the 
choice of “neutrality” (Bailes, 2006). From a theoretical standpoint, the 
influence of Europeanisation processes is perfectly compatible with 
transnational learning communities, which are understood as flexible entities 
that produce institutional change, and do not oppose it. While the wind of 
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change was blowing from outside the EU (the demise of the Soviet Union led 
to a reconsideration of the “Nordic balance” and opened a new course in 
defence policy), the accession to the EU and the progress towards a common 
security policy in the late 1990s accelerated these transformations, out of the 
necessity to adapt security policies in view of EU membership.  
In Finland, due to geopolitical (e.g. the proximity with Russia) and historical 
considerations, the traditional need to maintain a strong territorial defence 
capacity merged with an increased commitment to international crisis 
management (Ojanen, 2008). From the late 1990s, civilian crisis management 
and civilian military integration and coordination enter the security discourse. 
The debate involved Ministers and Government officials, but most importantly 
relied on communities of experts as well as practitioners that had been 
previously involved in the UN system and in peace operations. The White 
Book on Finnish national defence (2001) has an entire section on the issue of 
civilian crisis management, as opposed to the previous documents of 1995 and 
1997. Phone interviews with high-rank officials and experts reveal that before 
and during the drafting phase of the White Book, multiple flows of influence 
were at play, spurred by key individuals (e.g. the Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
Paavo Väyrynen and Erkki Tuomioja) as well as external institutions (e.g. the 
Finnish Institute for International Affairs). In the years preceding the adoption 
of the White Book, open seminars and regular meetings were held between 
representative of the Government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
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“knowledge” community of experts in the security and strategic field.117 
Finland’s previous engagement within the UN in support of the Agenda for 
Peace and the Brahimi report was beneficial to forge this consensus.  
In Sweden, the modernisation of the national defence forces begun in 1992, 
although more concrete steps were taken in 1995 through the establishment of 
a permanent Defence Commission (Forsvarsberedningen). The Commission’s 
proposals gave high priority to an increased role of Sweden in international 
crisis management, which would entail changing the country’s strategic 
doctrine from territorial defence to flexible forces well equipped to be 
deployed in multilateral operations (Rieker, 2004). The Swedish Parliament 
ratified these measures on March 2000.  
In substance, the debate set off in 1995 had mostly to do with enhancing the 
comprehensive approach to conflict through new training facilities for 
peacekeepers, taking care of those aspects such as logistics, division of tasks, 
effective recruitment etc. As noted by a Swedish Ambassador, it became clear 
very soon that a crucial aspect of civilian crisis management has to do with 
“individuals”, a “pretty rare and pricey resource” in this field.118 Accordingly, 
the key lesson ensuing from the debate was that effective civilian crisis 
management missions would depend on the states and international 
organisations’ capacity to recruit, train and raise funds for deployment.119 In 
parallel with the reorientation of Swedish defence forces, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA) was also developing a doctrine for conflict prevention 
                                                
117 Interview of the author with Finnish expert, March 2012. 
118 Interview of the author with a Swedish Ambasssador, March 2012.  
119 Interview of the author with a Swedish Ambassador, March 2012.  
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in the attempt to increase the commitment to civilian police within UN 
missions, therefore with a strong emphasis on non military crisis management. 
To this purpose, the Council for Peace and Security Initiatives (RFSI) was 
created within the MFA and remained operational between 1995 and 2002. 
This body was composed of individuals from several backgrounds, including 
national and transnational NGOs and think-tanks, scholars, and representatives 
of the Swedish MFA, MoD, and the Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency (SIDA). The Council was tasked with three aims: 1) 
informing the Government about crisis management, sharing knowledge and 
fostering cross-fertilisation; 2) from a Government perspective, it was also a 
way to inform (and get feedback from) non-governmental actors on a wide 
range of policies regarding security; 3) the body also gathered and produced a 
significant amount of policy recommendations, acting as an informal think-
tank120. It led to the publication of a number of papers on the subject of the new 
dimensions of security and crisis management, ultimately resulting in the 
Government’s White Paper for defence reform in 2004. The latter document 
stresses the importance of Sweden’s role in civilian crisis management, as a 
way to support international security. It also points out how national capability 
will greatly benefit from participation in international civilian crisis 
management, particularly at the EU and UN levels (Wedin, 2008). According 
to several diplomats and scholars involved, members of the Council were 
exposed to a significant amount of internal and external influences, through 
                                                
120 Interview of the author with a Swedish diplomat, March 2012.  
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interactions with key experts and practitioners who influenced the way conflict 
prevention was conceptualized and, as a consequence, would be 
institutionalised.121    
The creation of the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA), the first international 
centre dedicated to training aspects of crisis management provides another 
good example of the role of learning communities in shaping institution-
building and the conceptualisation of crisis management at the national, then 
international level. Mandated by the Swedish MFA and the MoD, a training 
coordinator for international missions was appointed in 1997 with the aim of 
conducting an inquiry and developing an integrated civilian and military 
training system for international conflict management.122 The task involved 
both civilian and military aspects of training for humanitarian or peace support 
mission, which corroborates the centrality of expertise and “human resources” 
in the civilian crisis management capacity building. The inquiry was explicitly 
set to be “open both to broad international participation and the NGO 
community”.123 The report’s conclusion point out that the training platform for 
civilian and military crisis management shall be a reference point where all the 
actors in international conflict management can meet, whether they be military 
and police officers, representatives of humanitarian agencies, diplomats etc.124 
Integrated and multidisciplinary approach, dialogue between different sectors 
                                                
121 Interview of the author with Swedish experts and practitioners, March 2012.  
122 Statens offentliga utredningar, 1999. Internationell konflikthantering – att forbereda sig 
tillsammans, Stockholm: SOU, p. 15 (Summary in English). This document contains the final 
report of the commission of inquiry.    
123 Ibid.  
124 Ibid., p. 17.  
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and close contacts with international and regional actors were set as key items 
of the Institute agenda. The design of the new institution was explicitly 
inspired by the Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Centre in Nova 
Scotia. An interview with the training coordinator who drafted the study 
revealed a number of institutions and individuals external to the Swedish 
government were consulted to produce the report (and hence, the design of the 
new institution). The last section of this chapter will discuss more in depth the 
question of training and its impact on policy evolution.  
The launch of the FBA, as well as the process leading to its creation, also 
affected the definition of crisis management and Sweden’s policy preferences 
in this domain. At the time (1997-1999) there was in fact no “finished” notion 
of what civilian crisis management meant. Here lies the importance of learning 
communities as opposed to competing explanations of the rise of civilian crisis 
management. Although it is true that some factors – Nordic’s concern about 
NATO’s role after the creation of the CSDP and potential militarization of the 
latter, last but not least their concern of becoming “second-class powers” in the 
security domain – stimulated Sweden’s quest for non-military evolution of 
CSDP, the way experts, practitioners and policy-makers responded to changing 
structural conditions are at the basis of the evolving policy consensus on 
civilian crisis management. Using a famous expression by Antonio Machado, 
“by walking one makes the road”: this is what really drove the rise of civilian 
crisis management. 
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Evidence from interviews in Brussels and Stockholm shows that a quite intense 
lobbying activity was done by Swedish diplomats and officials between 1997 
and 2003, supported by the diffusion of a number of reports and working 
papers produced by experts and academics affiliated to research centres. The 
table below (7.3) lists the institutions in Sweden:  
 
Table 7.3: CCM, the knowledge community in Sweden 
 
Institute Sector Country 
Swedish International Development Cooperation 
Agency (SIDA)  
Governmental SE 
University of Lund Academia SE 
Uppsala University – Department of Peace and 
Conflict Research 
Academia SE 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI) 
Think Tank 
 
SE 
Forum Syd  NGO SE 
Swedish Red Cross NGO SE 
Swedish Fellowship of Reconciliation (SweFOR) NGO SE 
National Defence College (FHS) Military (Civilian management) SE 
Folke Bernadotte Academy  Training SE 
Minstry of Foreign Affairs Governmental SE 
Ministry of Defence Governmental SE 
Swedish Armed Forces iNternational Center 
(SWEDINT) 
Military SE 
Swedish EOD and Demining Center (SWEDEC)  Military/Civilian SE 
National Board of Health and Welfare 
(Socialstyrelsen) 
Governmental SE 
Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI) Think Tank SE 
  
 
 
Lobbying and exchange of knowledge was also facilitated by the fact that 
many of these practitioners shared the same field experiences – and failures – 
in the Balkans (Kosovo, Bosnia, Timor Este) in the framework of UN or 
NATO missions. According to one interviewed diplomat, a “loose and informal 
network” composed of officials previously seconded to multilateral missions 
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helped diffusion of ideas and proposals.125 Back from the field, those officials 
would keep in touch and meet up in Brussels, when working for EU institutions 
or for their respective MFAs.126 Bonds of friendship and acquaintances, 
developed through shared practices, mattered a great deal in assessing policy 
failure (what lessons to be drawn?), set paradigm innovation (how to 
design/change institutions resolved to deal with crisis management?) and 
influence decision-making.127  
In this regard, and despite divergent views stemming from different 
institutional perspectives, members of the CCM learning community agreed on 
two fundamental priorities for the EU agenda: first, that more than the policy or 
strategic aspects, recruitment could be seen as the main challenge to future 
CCM initiatives; second, that implementing the comprehensive approach was 
functional to reduce the gap between different organisational cultures and 
improve inter-institutional collaboration.  
Policy selection was positively influenced by three factors: timing, national 
cultures and EU governance structures, all compatible with a high degree of 
persuasiveness of learning communities. Undoubtedly, the support provided by 
shared practices to the development of a consensual knowledge (that is, the 
overlapping of epistemic communities and communities of practice) made it 
possible to crystallise ideas and turn them into institutions. So did the backing 
of countries such as Sweden and Finland, in terms of political and financial 
                                                
125 Interview of the author with a Swedish diplomat, March 2012.  
126 Interview of the author with a Swedish diplomat, March 2012.  
127 Conclusions based on diplomats’ and EU officials’ answers to semi-structured questions 
based on survey (annex 2).  
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investment. At the same time, ideas were heard and promoted because they 
arose in a period of momentous international change and reconfiguration of 
European security cooperation. Activists and NGOs have been championing 
greater civil-military cooperation for at least a decade in the late-1970s to late-
1980s, without producing any significant change in policy cooperation. 
Conversely, a stronger demand for a new paradigm existed in the mid to late 
1990s.     
National cultures and the some institutional practices of the Nordic countries 
political systems were also conducive to letting ideas circulate freely. In 
Sweden, for instance, consultation between governmental agencies, research 
centres and other actors is an institutionalised practice, partly because of the 
reduced size of the Ministries. External ideas can therefore easily shape policy-
making. Gemensam beredning or “joint drafting procedure/joint preparation” is 
a system of inter-governmental coordination that occurs “when a government 
matter impinges on another ministry’s area of responsibility or involves 
another minister within the same ministry, the matter is dealt with in 
consultation with the other ministers concerned”.128 Interestingly, a similar 
openness to the circulation of ideas exists in the EU multi-level governance 
structure. In the EU decision-making, in fact, the presence of multiple access 
point due to the intergovernmental/supranational divide and the multi-level 
governance seemed to “magnify” the impact of expert communities and 
communities of practice. The EU’s “field”, in the Bourdieu’s understanding of 
                                                
128 Cf. Swedish Government, Glossary of Government’s terms: 
http://www.svet.lu.se/links/Svenska_sidor/ord/wordlistgov.pdf (Accessed 13 March 2012).  
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the term, prompts learning since ideas, particularly those ones that are not or 
less politicised, are allowed to blossom and influence policy-making. The 
presence of the Commission as a supranational architect in shaping policies129 
has been decisive in mitigating the impact of the intergovernmental method of 
negotiation, which tends to be constrained by member states politics. 
 
7.1.2.2. Policy emulation 
 
A key factor paving the way for norm persistence and evolution was the 
presence of successful models and experiences, which smoothed the delivery 
of a blueprint for the organisational, conceptual and procedural aspects of the 
newborn civilian crisis management. Emulation from EU military crisis 
management, as well as from other international organisations (UN, OSCE) 
and NGOs fulfilled this important task.  
The military certainly occupied a prominent position. By looking at how EU 
military structures and procedures worked, civilians tried to learn from and, in 
some cases, effectively replicated what they considered as a successful 
organisational model. Indirectly, this meant copying from NATO: EU military 
crisis management, in fact, largely reproduced NATO’s structures130 and 
procedures to set up its configuration, through institutional isomorphism.131 
Accordingly, the decision-making procedures (planning, implementation and 
                                                
129 On this point, cf. Rhinard (2010) and Lavallée (2011).  
130 Previous studies have shown that EU member states took NATO’s decision-making 
structures into account when creating a politico-military body at the ambassadorial level (PSC), 
assisted by a military committee composed by the representatives of the Chief of Defence 
(EUMC) and supported by a military staff (EUMS). Cf. Koops (2012: 68) and Juncos (2010).  
131 Institutional isomorphism posits that organisations within the same field tend to look alike. 
Cf. Powell and DiMaggio (1983).  
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evaluation) to launch civilian missions were designed on the basis of the Crisis 
Management Procedures for military crisis management, which in turn were 
modelled on NATO’s ones (Juncos, 2010: 88). The Civilian Headline Goal 
2008 followed the same planning methodology used under the Military 
Headline Goal 2010, based on virtual planning scenarios (the “illustrative 
scenarios”), listing of available personnel required for mission deployments 
and comparison between member states’ indications and capabilities required 
to achieve operational preparedness (Schuyer, 2008: 136). As far as 
institutional structures are concerned, the CPCC reproduced substantially the 
organisational logic and template of the EUMS (adapted to its civilian tasks); 
similarly, the creation of Civcom arose in the course of the negotiations for the 
establishment of new military CSDP structures (early 2000), namely the 
EUMC, and out of the need to find similar institutional solutions for the 
civilian track (Rieker, 2004). From a procedural standpoint, the debate about 
the establishment of a formal lessons-learned management process, particularly 
within the CPCC, followed a similar emulation pattern. The current conceptual 
framework aimed at setting the standards for knowledge management and 
lessons learned procedures132 builds on existing practices for military 
operations of the EUMS (European Parliament, 2012: 20), such as the Lessons 
Learned Cell. Although the CPCC has currently no official repository for the 
lessons learned that are gathered from missions. However, the Civilian Lessons 
Management Application (CiLMA) is being developed following the model of 
                                                
132 The Guidelines for identification and implementation of lessons and best practices in 
civilian ESDP missions (Council of the European Union, 2008b) and the document Towards an 
architecture for evaluation of civilian ESDP missions (Council of the European Union, 2008a).  
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the European Lessons Management Application (ELMA), the database for 
military lessons learned created within the EUMS. It is worth reminding that 
these EUMS tools were established in emulation of the NATO practice Joint 
Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (Council of the European Union, 2007c).  
However, it has been noted that the standard military approaches, which 
assume strictly separated crisis management phases, failed to reflect the more 
long-term ambitions of civilian interventions (Bossong, 2011). Therefore, the 
EU drew on other examples of civilian intervention or administration to 
consolidate its framework for CCM. The UN and OSCE’s experiences with 
international civilian administration, particularly those ones in the Balkans 
such as UNMIK, served as a reference for the first wave of civilian missions.133 
The Civilian Response Teams (CRTs) were inspired by the United Nations 
Disaster Assessment and Coordiation capacity (UNDAC) (Schuyer, 2008: 
138).  
Finally, cooperation with NGOs proved to be a useful exchange to enhance 
capacity building based on the experiences of these actors on the ground. The 
role of the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) in advising EU 
policy-makers on sustainable peacebuilding policies during the formulation of 
the CHG 2008 can be cited as example in this regard.  
The table 7.4 displays some examples of policy emulation that helped 
designing EU civilian crisis management. It also highlights the nexus between 
the EU civilian/military structures and the organisations that provided the 
                                                
133 Cf. Council of the European Union (2008a).  
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model inspiring EU structures, procedures and frameworks, namely the 
emulation curve of NATO - EU (military) – EU (civilian).  
 
Table 7.4: EU civilian crisis management, learning from others 
 
ORGANISATION 
 
STRUCTURE / PROCEDURE / 
FRAMEWORK 
EU (military) EU (civilian) 
 
NATO 
 
Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned 
Center 
 
European Lessons 
Management 
Application (ELMA) 
 
 
Civilian 
Lessons 
Management 
Application 
(CiLMA) 
 
 
 
NATO 
 
 
 
 
NATO Crisis Management Process 
(NCMP) /  
NATO Crisis Response System 
(NCRS) 
 
 
 
 
EU Crisis Management 
Procedure 
 
 
EU Crisis 
Management 
Procedure 
 
 
NATO 
 
Military Committee (MC) 
 
 
EUMC 
 
CIVCOM 
 
NATO 
 
 
International Military Staff 
 
EUMS 
 
CPCC 
 
UN 
 
UNDAC 
 
 
-  
 
CRTs 
 
UN 
 
UNMIK 
 
 
-  
 
EULEX 
 
 
 
7.2 CCM in practice  
 
This section discusses the operational experience of CCM and the ensuing 
process of learning by doing. It shows the extent to which implementation 
through operations lead to lessons gathering, and lessons gathering to further 
Chapter 7 – Case study: the EU and Civilian Crisis Management   
                   258 
policy expansion. For the purpose of this research, I decided not to review all 
the civilian missions, but to identify key areas within the experiential learning 
process that demonstrate the evolution of the CCM practice.134 This choice 
does not mean that “big” lessons deserve more analytical consideration than 
small ones. To avoid going off topic, I zoomed in on the lessons, which I 
considered as most relevant to link the theoretical ambitions and the empirical 
outcomes of this work. Therefore, the main contribution of this section is to 
show that a considerable amount of CCM missions have been launched since 
2003, covering a wide range of activities in several operational theatres. 
Contrary to SSR, those operational environments generated a learning 
dynamic, which included an expansion of the professionals and experts within 
EU institutions; a progressive standardisation and formalisation of the learning 
process; and the implementation of the lessons, creating evolution in areas such 
as capabilities and training.  The section concludes by appraising the 
robustness of CCM in light of its evolution in and within practice.  
 
7.2.1 Professionalism and the policy consensus on CCM 
 
An important side effect resulting from the creation of a policy consensus and 
subsequent institutionalisation of civilian crisis management was the expansion 
of the learning communities of EU CCM, particularly the practice-based ones. 
                                                
134 There is a growing body of secondary literature dealing with the nitty-gritty of individual 
CCM missions, both in terms of evaluation and lessons learned. A comprehensive review is 
provided by the European Parliament’s report on CSDP missions and operations (European 
Parliament, 2012: 34-101).  
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The emerging policy framework, in fact, created the need for new experts to 
join newly created crisis management structures, both in national capitals and 
in Brussels, to sustain the extended set of security policies – which had been 
built from scratch – and contribute to their improvement through providing 
input for experiential learning.  
Therefore, as a result of the process of institution building (from 2001/2002 
onward), new seconded and contracted officers, experts and consultants joined 
the Directorate for civilian crisis management (DG E IX) of the General 
Secretariat of the Council as well as other new born structures such as 
CIVCOM or the CivMil Cell.135 This wave of recruitment was magnified by 
the consequences of the 2004 enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe. The 
enlargement made new expertise available. The latter was welcomed in 
Brussels as new member states that had direct experience of the Post-Cold war 
systemic shift. Their experts offered the know-how acquired during a decade-
long period of institutional reform covering critical aspects of CCM such as the 
reform of the police sector, the rule of law and the transition towards 
transparent and accountable armed forces. New expertise also mushroomed in 
non-institutional settings, as the new policy area magnetised the attention of 
Brussels and member states-based think-tankers, academics, NGOs etc. 
Accordingly, policy persistence was characterised by an attempt to enlarge the 
communities through new recruitment inside and outside EU institutions.  
                                                
135 The creation of the Civilian Response Teams (CRT) as a “pool of experts” rapidly 
deployable to conduct a wide range of missions is a particularly interesting development in this 
respect.   
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The unclear scope of civilian peacekeeping and peacebuilding at the 
international level (Nowak, 2006: 16) did not affect the emerging consensus on 
the definition of civilian crisis management within the EU. Evidence from the 
interviews confirms that, despite some degree of terminological confusion, a 
broad convergence exists between experts and practitioners on the definition 
and purposes of the EU way to CCM.136 Nowak herself (p. 17) reckons that the 
Security Working Group established after Cologne settled on the broad 
definition of EU CCM as all non-military instruments and policies of the EU 
dedicated to Crisis Management. The identification of the four priority areas 
agreed upon at Feira (2000) allowed to narrow down further the definition. 
Specifically, it provided the Union with a sort of “niche” differentiating the 
EU’s activities in the four areas from other international actors.  At the same 
time, the EU also acquired its own way to design and operationalise crisis 
management missions, placing the emphasis on the cooperation (CIMIC) and 
coordination (CMCO) between civilian and military aspects also known as 
comprehensive approach. This too contributed to consolidate a common view 
of CCM.  
In sum, the analysis of learning communities in this field displays a reasonable 
degree of cohesiveness. Civilian crisis management in the EU is consensually 
understood as: 1) non-military crisis management activities, instruments, 
resources and policies; 2) covering the four priority areas established at Feira; 
                                                
136 Asked about how they would define CCM, and what they saw as the main challenges of 
implementation, interviewees’ answers revealed a shared understanding of the subject matter, 
detectable from the language and example used, and references to the same keywords – namely 
in terms of policy documents, frameworks and initiatives (Feira, CHG, main missions such as 
EULEX Kosovo). Shared lessons also emerged – cf. section 7.2.2.   
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3) complying with the logic of a comprehensive approach to security provision 
integrating civilian and military means; and 4) firmly entrenched in the process 
of institutional reform (e.g. the creation of integrated institutional structures 
such as the EEAS or the CMPD) and the build-up of capabilities.  
 
7.2.2 Main lessons from operational experience 
 
The consensus on the four aforementioned points laid the foundations of policy 
evolution and learning by doing. It allowed EU policy-makers to identify 
common lessons, adopt new procedures to manage the feedback flowing from 
the missions and improve the effectiveness of the crisis management 
machinery.  
As of the Summer 2012, out of 28 CSDP missions, 22 have been civilian ones. 
CCM operational activities encompassed monitoring, substitution, mentoring, 
training and assistance in the following areas: policing, rule of law, human 
rights, gender, civil administration, mediation and border support (Blair and 
Gya, 2010: 118). These field operations have provided the Union with a large 
amount of lessons learned, to improve its institutional structures, procedures 
and capacities. To date, police missions have been the largest deployment. 
Police advisers deployed outnumber any other type of personnel.137 The initial 
orientation was towards executive policing, defined as missions that “include 
the responsibilities for law enforcement in unstable situations” (Dwan, 2002: 
                                                
137 Cf. CSDP missions’ personnel breakdown (updated 1/2012) on the CSDP MAP website: 
http://www.csdpmap.eu/mission-personnel (Accessed 3 May 2012).  
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9). Subsequently, the focus of EU police missions has moved to include 
training and advisory tasks. The EU has helped host nations to improve the 
quality and professionalism of their forces, fighting organised crime, develop 
confidence building between clashing ethnic groups. The key geographical 
focus has been in the Balkans (Bosnia, Macedonia, Kosovo), but major 
missions were deployed also in Afghanistan and in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC). In the rule of law field, the EU missions in Iraq, Georgia and 
Kosovo has focused on training for judicial and prison officials, support to the 
democratisation processes.  
As a result of the early assessments, specific recommendations were made to 
improve strategies and capacities for civilian and civilian – military crisis 
management. Bossong (2012) distinguishes between four phases of learning: 
(1) learning from others (2000-2002), when officials and international experts 
developed a first wave of planning documents for civilian missions following 
previous examples of civilian administrations under the UN and OSCE 
(Bossong, 2012: 14); (2) early learning by doing (2003-2004), resulting from 
the police missions in Bosnia and Macedonia and characterised by 
experimentation and improvisation, at least if compared with the long-standing 
templates for planning, conduct and assessment of the military staff; (3) 
proliferation of missions (2005-2005), with operational (i.e. lack of human 
resources), bureaucratic (i.e. turf wars between the Council and the 
Commission) and political (lack of agreement on the creation of an EU 
operational headquarters) shortfalls hampering learning; (4) build-up of 
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infrastructures and processes for regular organisational learning (2007-2009), 
which followed the formal lessons-learned process established by the EUMS 
and was characterised by the establishment of the Civilian Planning and 
Conduct Capability (CPCC), operational since 2008.138  
The lessons learned matrix below (table 7.5) provides a list of the main lessons 
that have been identified over a decade of operational experience, based on 
content analysis of official documents, reports, policy briefs and other 
secondary sources produced by institutions and individuals working on CCM 
matters.  
 
 
Table 7.5: Overview of the main lessons learned in civilian crisis management 
 
LESSONS 
 
TYPE DETAILS MISSIONS AFFECTED* 
 
Inter-pillar Coherence and 
institutional coordination  
O/P Institutional disconnect 
between First and Second 
Pillar, hampering 
effectiveness on the 
ground (e.g. difficult 
transition between short 
and long term 
programmes). 
EUPM BiH, EUPAT-
EUPOL PROXIMA, 
EUSEC-EUPOL RD 
Congo, EUBAM Moldova, 
EUPOL COPPS, EUPOL 
Afghanistan, EU SSR 
Guinea Bissau, EULEX 
Kosovo, EUMM Georgia 
International coordination O/P Lack of “effective 
multilateralism”: 
challenges of coordination 
with international 
partners, namely IOs (UN, 
OSCE, NATO), affecting 
the implementation of the 
comprehensive approach.  
EUSEC-EUPOL RD 
Congo, AMM Aceh, 
EUPOL COPPS, EUPOL 
Afghanistan, EUMM 
Georgia, EUTM Somalia 
Capability: Training and 
Deployment 
O/P Deficiencies in mission 
leadership and in the 
delivery of adequate or 
standardized training to 
seconded staff during the 
pre-deployment phase.  
EUPM BiH, EUPAT-
EUPOL PROXIMA, 
EUSEC-EUPOL RD 
Congo, AMM Aceh, 
EUPOL COPPS, EUPOL 
Afghanistan, EU SSR 
Guinea Bissau, EULEX 
Kosovo, EUMM Georgia 
Capability: Recruitment 
and Staffing 
O/P Reluctance of MS to meet 
promised personnel 
contributions. Deficiencies 
of seconded civilian 
experts, judicial staff and 
EUPM BiH, EUPAT-
EUPOL PROXIMA, 
EUSEC-EUPOL RD 
Congo, AMM Aceh, 
EUPOL COPPS, EUPOL 
                                                
138 Cf. Bossong (2012).  
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police officers. EU 
positions often not 
attractive to qualified 
national staff.  
Afghanistan, EU SSR 
Guinea Bissau, EULEX 
Kosovo, EUMM Georgia 
Budget and Finance O/P Need to increase the speed 
and flexibility of finance 
mechanisms (e.g. 
ATHENA)139 for crisis 
management missions.  
AMM Aceh, EUBAM 
Moldova-Ukraine, EULEX 
Kosovo,  
Mandate, Planning, 
Command and Control 
O/P Insufficient planning and 
conceptualisation of 
missions, lack of proper 
command and control 
structures resulting in 
missions’ design not being 
appropriate for the task, 
both at the operational and 
political level.  
EUPM BiH, EUSEC-
EUPOL RD Congo, 
EUJUS-LEX Iraq, AMM 
Aceh, EUBAM Rafah, 
EUBAM Moldova-
Ukraine, EUPOL COPPS, 
EUPOL Afghanistan, 
EULEX Kosovo, EUMM 
Georgia, EUTM Somalia 
Comprehensive approach 
CIV-MIL 
S/P Absence of predefined 
procedures to harmonise 
CIV and MIL planning. 
Gaps in planning 
capabilities, with overly 
complicated procedures 
scattered over different 
political and military 
actors not willing to 
cooperate intensively. 
Insufficient national 
efforts to increase 
coordination.  
EUTM Somalia 
Scale  S/P Small scale of operations 
with limited impact on 
country context.  
All missions except 
EULEX Kosovo and 
EUPM BiH 
Strategic Vision S/P Lack of an overarching 
strategy and common 
vision as to what missions 
should achieve. De-link 
with European Security 
Strategy.  
All missions 
 
O/P = Operational and procedural lessons 
S/P = Strategic and political lessons 
 
* Source: Lessons Overview Matrix (European Parliament, 2012: 113-114). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
139 It is worthwhile noting that ATHENA has itself an internal lessons learning cycle. Because 
of the small size of the mechanism (10 staff), the learning process is considered fairly agile, 
informal and direct (European Parliament, 2012: 25).  
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7.2.3 Formal and informal mechanisms for lessons drawing  
 
The CPCC structure was conceived as an upgraded version of the 
Civilian/Military Cell (Civ/Mil Cell). The latter was created in 2005140 within 
the EUMS. It served as a planning body to enhance the capacity to deliver 
early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for conflict 
prevention and post-conflict stabilisation, with particular emphasis on 
management of the civilian/military interface.141 With a 70+ civilian experts 
staffed structure, the CPCC was to serve as a formal chain of command (a 
headquarters) for EU civilian mission by providing planning and operational 
support (Chivvis, 2010).   
Further institutionalisation of the lessons learned process for civilian crisis 
management was possible thanks to the creation of new structures and 
procedures, such as the IT-based system “Crisis Management 
GOALKEEPER”142 to ensure more effective knowledge and resource 
management; or the institution of best practice units across missions and the 
revision of the methodology for lessons learned reports so as to make 
recommendations less mission than thematic-specific (Bossong, 2012: 24).  
                                                
140 Before the Civil-Military Cell was launched, two concepts had been instated to deal with 
coordination during the actual crisis management: an ad hoc Crisis Response Co-ordination 
Team (CRTC) responsible for a draft of the crisis management concept at the political-strategic 
level and a Crisis Action Team within the EUMS (operational-tactical level).  
141 A reference document on the creation of the Civ/Mil Cell is the Italian Presidency Paper 
“European Defence: NATO/EU consultation, planning, operations” (2003).   
142 The Goalkeeper system is composed of the “Governor” and “Schoolmaster” databases and 
it is available online at: https://esdp.consilium.europa.eu/StartApp.aspx (Accessed 11 
September 2012).  
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Since 2009, in line with the recommendations of the 2008 Guidelines on 
lessons learned (Council of the European Union: 2008b), a comprehensive 
annual report is produced to review ongoing CSDP missions and identify the 
key lessons. Although the report is still classified, it appears in secondary 
sources available that the first edition (2009) focused mostly on the strategic 
and operational planning levels, namely on the type of mission (with a special 
emphasis on rapid deployment), mandates (police, rule of law, monitoring) and 
mission support issues (European Parliament, 2012: 20). The report also 
highlighted the need to pay more attention to identifying and implementing 
lessons in the following areas: chain of command, co-operation between actors, 
training, rapid deployment, operational planning phase, conduct, finance and 
procurement, training and recruitment, press and public information, logistics 
and communication, and security (European Parliament, 2012: 21). The second 
annual report (2010) shifted instead its attention towards broadening and 
improving the system of learning, through the introduction of benchmarking at 
the operational level and the conduct of impact assessment for each mission 
(European Parliament, 2012: 21).  
In addition to the establishment of formal and standardised processes, the 
literature on the CSDP lessons management and procedures (Bossong, 2012; 
Smith, 2011; Raemmler, 2010, Bloching, 2011; Keohane, 2011) has shown that 
informal practices (including personal relationships, corridor talks) have been a 
pragmatic if not essential way to disseminate and integrate new knowledge into 
the system. This is due to the wide use, confirmed by interviewees, of informal 
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mechanisms – such as information sharing through personal or professional 
networks and knowledge exchange with external experts – to capture and 
report lessons (European Parliament, 2012: 21). Trough informal channels, 
communities of knowledge and practice have helped conveying lessons to 
foster policy evolution.  
The process aimed at strengthening CMCO in EU crisis management occurred 
ad hoc, before systematic structures for learning were established. As Ioannides 
noted, much of the EU operational lessons in the first deployments was based 
on the cross-fertilisation of expertise of individual officials and the rotation of 
key experts from one EU missions to the next. These individual initiatives have 
lead to institutional learning at the operational level (Ioannides, 2010: 45). 
Examples of lessons gathered through those ad hoc mechanisms include the 
need to strengthen evaluation mechanisms (EULEX Kosovo); the problem of 
the apolitical character of missions, hampering the development of long-term 
strategies linking CSDP operational results to CFSP goals (also EULEX 
Kosovo); the importance of engaging the entire spectrum of the rule of law – 
including police, justice and customs – rather than individual components 
(EUPOL Proxima, EUPAT Macedonia, EUPM Bosnia-Herzegovina). In 
particular, the operational experience in Bosnia143 (EUPM, EUFOR) revealed 
the need for increased internal coordination between the civilian and military 
aspects of CSDP. Building on the work of the Danish (2002) and Greek (2003) 
EU presidencies, the comprehensive approach of all EU actors in the planning 
                                                
143 Here, in fact, a police mission (EUPM) and a military operation (EUFOR) were operating 
simultaneously.  
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of crisis management missions was adopted144, and the concept of CMCO 
created, thus leading to a new template for the EU Crisis Management 
Concept145. The CMCO’s culture of coordination “built into the EU’s response 
to a crisis at the earliest possible stage and for the whole duration of the 
operation”, relying on “continued co-operation and shared political objectives” 
as well as on “detailed preparations at working level involving relevant 
Council General Secretariat/Commission services”.146  
Further operational experience, particularly in Bosnia, was critical to 
consolidate CMCO. In line with the CHG 2008147, the UK, Austria and Finland 
produced a non-paper on enhancing the EU CMCO, based on the conclusions 
of a seminar organised by the UK Presidency on the 17th of October 2005. The 
non-paper stressed the need to improve comprehensive planning and 
management of capabilities, with special emphasis on three key issues: 
comprehensive analysis (shared understanding of the causes of a crisis); 
comprehensive planning (to refocus the Civ/Mil Cell on new procedures and 
methods, in order to ensure the participation of all relevant EU actors in the 
mission planning phase, and encourage a joined-up vision of strategic aims); 
joint review and lessons learned process (to provide continuous evaluation of 
individual missions according to the strategic objectives of the EU).148   
 
                                                
144 Cf. Council of the European Union (2002b).  
145 Cf. Council of the European Union (2002c).  
146 Council of the European Union (2003: 2-3). 
147 CHG 2008 envisages CCM missions deployed either jointly or in close cooperation and 
coordination with military operations throughout all phases of the operation (Khol, 2006: 137).   
148 See Khol (2006: 137). 
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7.2.4 Improving civilian capabilities and human resources 
 
The analysis of documents and reports produced within the CCM practice and 
knowledge communities (Ioannides, 2010; Blair and Gya, 2010; Chivvis, 2010; 
Bossong, 2012; Grevi et al., 2009) shows two major shortfalls arising from the 
early civilian missions deployed under the CSDP from 2003 onwards: the 
absence of adequate training and, as a consequence, severe shortfalls in 
recruitment. 
The Civilian Headline Goal (CHG), elaborated in December 2004, built on 
“what was achieved in civilian crisis management since 1999”149 and out of the 
awareness that EU’s ambitions in global security lay on enhanced civilian 
capacities. Official EU documents also underline that, in developing the CHG, 
“the Lessons Learned from EU-led operations and exercises should be taken 
into account”.150 Key aspects of the CHG included the development of 
integrated civilian crisis management packages; the ability to conduct 
concurrent civilian missions, to deploy at short notice and to work with 
military missions; as well as the issue of inter-pillar coherence between CSDP 
actions and long term EC programmes (Gross, 2008: 16). A new Civilian 
Headline Goal 2010 was approved by the Civilian Capability Improvement 
Conference on 2007, building on the results of the Headline Goal 2008 and on 
the growing body of CSDP crisis management experience.151 As highlighted by 
the Headline Goal process itself and by several reports from field missions, 
                                                
149 Council of the European Union (2004: 2). 
150 Ibid. p. 7.  
151 Council of the European Union (2007b: 2).  
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challenges to CCM capacity building pertained to the lack of personnel and 
expertise available for CCM missions: costs of recruitment, bureaucratic 
hurdles, training, replacement and domestic shortage.  
In 2005 the Civilian Response Team (CRT) concept was launched, tasked with 
creating a pool of civilian experts (pre-selected by member states) ready for 
deployment within five days and up to three months. The CRTs objectives 
include assessment and fact-finding missions, logistical support, early presence 
following the adoption of a Joint Action and assisting the EUSR function 
(Gross, 2008: 17).  
Availability of technical expertise and staff deployability largely depends on 
training. Lessons from CCM missions revealed considerable differences 
between Member States in training standards for civilian personnel, which 
jeopardises an effective and coordinated pre-deployment strategy (Bloching, 
2011; Korski and Gowan, 2009).   
To patch up this aspect of the crisis management machinery, a Commission’s 
funded pilot project, called the Training for Civilian Aspects of Crisis 
Management, was launched in October 2001. From November 2002, due to the 
positive assessment, it eventually evolved into a more structured initiative, the 
European Group on Training (EGT).152 This open and informal network of 
training experts and centres was given the responsibility to develop proposals 
for a common approach and harmonised training programmes across EU 
member states. Its activities expanded quite swiftly so as to become a reference 
                                                
152 EGT is the phase II of the project, launched in November 2002 after the enlargement of the 
core group (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and Sweden) to 
additional EU member states (Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland and the UK).  
Chapter 7 – Case study: the EU and Civilian Crisis Management   
                   271 
for the identification of joint standard and requirements for both civilian and 
civilian military training, including the implementation course for the Civilian 
Response Team (CRT), the EU civilian stand-by force also created as the 
operational solution to the staffing problems in individual crisis missions 
(Gross, 2008). All through its 9 years of activity, activated courses focused on 
the rule of law, civilian administration and civilian crisis management, with 
over 1,200 member states experts getting trained by the members of the 
network. Three centres had been more actively involved in the development of 
the network since its inception: the Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna (Italy), the 
Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR, Austria) and 
the Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze (ZIF, Germany). The Crisis 
Management Center (Finland) and the Folke Bernadotte Academy (Sweden) 
joined this core group shortly after the creation of the network.  
Despite a promising start, insufficient link between training, recruitment and 
deployment as well as the lack of institutionalisation of arrangements among 
the members constituted a heavy burden for the EGT’S mission (Bloching, 
2011). As a result of these flaws, a new network, the Europe’s New Training 
Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management (ENTRi), was created and 
coordinated by ZIF. As the successor of the EGT, ENTRi was explicitly 
designed to address previous gaps, namely by intensifying pre-deployment and 
specialisation courses for civilian experts and issuing standardized certificates 
for training courses to improve the quality of formation. In 2005, another 
attempt to deepen and increase the know-how and expertise for CCM missions 
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led to the establishment of the European Security and Defence College 
(ESDC). A Brussels-based virtual network college comprising civilian and 
military academies, universities and colleges, the ESDC was mandated with the 
task of fostering a European security culture within CSDP and disseminating a 
common understanding of CSDP activities, including the civilian aspect of 
crisis management. 
Notwithstanding these efforts and the intense network-building, however, 
staffing and training still constitute, even after the entry into force of the Treaty 
of Lisbon, the main obstacles to the delivery of effective civilian crisis 
management in the framework of CSDP operations. In light of the present 
dissertation on norm diffusion in civilian crisis management, the persistence of 
these problems can be accounted for as follows.  
To start with, it is worth reminding that a convergence in policy actions does 
not necessarily lead to a convergence or effectiveness in policy outcomes 
(McNamara, 1998). Consensus building and cohesiveness of the members of 
learning communities are unquestionably factors that stimulate the 
institutionalisation of new norms. However, policy change may take longer to 
occur and the lag between intentions and deeds can be substantial. 
Furthermore, policy evolution as learning is a much more expensive and time-
consuming step than previous ones steps of the norm/practice evolution 
models, especially in terms of resources for training and coordination to 
achieve the desired operational results and improve the efficiency of 
institutional structures and procedures. In fact, member states’ civilian cultures 
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vary greatly and, although CCM became institutionalised relatively easily, a 
proper culture of coordination involving civilian and military tools is much 
harder to instil as civilian and military structures are subject to centrifugal 
forces and tend to remain “separate worlds” (Drent, 2011). Finally, one should 
not forget that civilian crisis management structures, despite drawing from 
models through policy emulation and institutional isomorphism, have been 
built from scratch, as opposed to a much longer history of military cultures and 
organisation – including as regards international security cooperation (cf. 
NATO-EU relations). 
 
7.2.4 CCM’s robustness  
 
Let us conclude by assessing the institutionalisation of CCM according to the 
criteria of norm’s specificity, durability and concordance (Legro, 1997). The 
evidence is collected from the answers to the interviews as well as from an 
analysis of relevant secondary sources published since 1999 by European 
institutions and individuals.   
According to Legro, specificity refers to how well the guidelines for restraint 
and use are defined and understood: do countries argue about what the norm 
entails in terms of behaviour or implementation? Are guidelines simple and 
clear enough to be correctly understood by actors? 
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Although conflicts exist between the Council and the Commission on the 
division of tasks for civilian missions and inter-pillar coherence153 
(Hoffmeister, 2008), and member states maintain different strategic cultures154, 
organisational structures and procedures for deployment (Biava, Drent and 
Herd, 2011; Howorth, 2002; Meyer, 2005; Baun, 2005), civilian crisis 
management has found its own niche in the EU institutional structure, 
associated with the development of non-military crisis response capabilities. 
The EU specificity and specialisation as a civilian crisis manager is well known 
and acknowledged both inside and outside the EU institutional setting155. 
Furthermore, in comparative terms, one could go as far as to claim that the 
objectives and instruments of civilian CSDP are much better defined than those 
of military CSDP, given the enormous divergence among key member states as 
regards a common vision of European defence – for instance, the political 
barriers to the creation of a common defence market.156  
The second criterion is durability, which denotes how long the rules have been 
in effect and how long-standing is their legitimacy. In this regard, civilian crisis 
management has, since its inception, produced an ever-growing amount of 
                                                
153 In several instances, in fact, the EU deploys several civilian crisis management tools at the 
same time and under different frameworks: in general, it has been noted (Hoffmeister, 2008) 
that when CSDP civilian crisis management operations (defined as short term actions in 
response to acute crises) intrude on institution building and long-term conflict prevention, 
serious questions of delimitation of competences between the Community method and 
intergovernmentalism arise.  
154 According to Howorth (2002), as many as six types of divergences can be identified across 
EU member states national security cultures: allied/neutral, Atlanticists/Europeanists, 
professional power projection/conscript-based territorial defence, nuclear/non nuclear, 
military/civilian instruments, large/small states and weapons providers/consumers. Cf. also 
Biava, Drent and Herd (2011: 1231).  
155 Cf. Jacobs (2011).  
156 On such divergence, cf. Bono (2002), Faleg and Giovannini (2012).  
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missions and, over ten years, left a strong mark on the operational contours of 
the CSDP. Despite the shortcomings outlined in the previous section, the 
CSDP over the past ten years has unquestionably gone civilian, carving out an 
international reputation as a provider of non-military security services. It is 
worth repeating that one of the key characteristics of the institutionalisation of 
crisis management within CSDP has been the rapidity with which it has 
blossomed, boosted by previous (learning from others) and new (learning by 
doing) experiences as well as from the competence and know how provided by 
those practitioners who operated in national and international (NATO, OSCE, 
UN) contexts (Duke, 2008). At the same time, it seems evident that the civilian 
and civil-military aspect of the institutionalisation of EU security cooperation 
is not complete and remains, by and large, a story to be written, particularly 
taking into account the quest for a clear strategic vision for the future of CSDP 
(Biscop and Coelmont, 2010).  
Finally, concordance is the degree of intersubjective agreement, which denotes 
how widely accepted the rules are in diplomatic debates, treaties, formal and 
informal settings. My empirical findings show that a consensus has emerged on 
a common definition of what the EU’s involvement in civilian crisis 
management amounts to, based on the guidelines set up at Feira. This is partly 
the consequence of the fact that CCM has become part of the EU jargon, with 
no equivalent in the lexicon and practices of other IOs. During my fieldwork 
interviews in New York, Brussels, Vienna and Stockholm, I realised that a 
former Austrian-national OSCE official and a German-national UN official 
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strongly disagree over the basic definition of “civilian” crisis management. But 
also that a Swedish diplomat seconded to the EU, a former Finnish 
representative to the PSC and a Czech practitioner working in the EEAS had a 
much clearer idea of the EU’s involvement in this field, with no substantial 
dissimilarity between their views. Similarly, think-tankers working on EU 
matters seemed to have little problems locating the conceptual boundaries of 
EU CCM, whereas complexity would arise when experts were asked to 
comment on civilian crisis management outside the EU setting.157  
Legro’s expectation is that the clearer, more durable and widely endorsed a 
prescription is, the greater will be its impact. Consistently with this vision, we 
can therefore conclude that norm robustness and the progressive creation, 
driven by learning communities, of an EU specific way to civilian crisis 
management, account for the significant impact of CCM on the current shape 
of the CSDP. The policy and expert consensus underlying the robustness – and 
hence the impact – of CCM did not spring up overnight, but progressed as part 
of an evolutionary process through which knowledge and practices became 
shared, consensual and dominant, thus influential within the EU decision-
making.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
157 Interviews of the author with experts and practitioners, Spring 2012.  
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7.3 Conclusion 
 
In light of the evidence presented in this chapter, it can be concluded that 
learning communities operated in accordance with the criteria set out in the 
theoretical framework and decisively influenced the creation of a civilian crisis 
management capacity within the CSDP. EU decision-makers and member 
states’ governments sought the support of a body of experts and practitioners to 
develop a policy consensus in support of their security choices towards a non-
military understanding of the EU’s role as a security provider. 
Through an in-depth analysis of the learning communities of CCM, this chapter 
has answered some crucial questions about 1) the relationship between state 
interests and ideational factors in accounting for EU security cooperation; 2) 
the factors that influenced the overall impact and policy evolution of civilian 
crisis management in comparison with other new, post-Cold War security 
policies (such as SSR); 3) the conceptual and empirical link between 
knowledge and practice.  
With regards to the first question, the analysis suggests that cognitive and 
ideational forces conveyed by learning communities stand neither above nor 
below interstate bargaining and power struggles between nation-states.158 
Instead, they are to be located at the same level of policy-making, as they 
provide domestic political élites and decision-makers in Brussels with an 
essential normative underpinning, without which the creation of policy 
                                                
158 A similar point is made by Verdun (1999: 323).  
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convergence and hence cooperation could not occur. Learning communities 
intervene in the grey area between structural factors (i.e. the end of the Cold 
War) and domestic political processes (at the EU or member states levels) to 
influence decision-makers perceptions and value-based judgements about the 
necessity and/or the type of policy responses envisaged.  
This co-constitutive relation between state interests and ideational factors also 
accounts for the pivotal role of national constituencies – in particular, Nordic 
EU member states – in supporting the process of norm diffusion. As the 
chapter has shown, the degree of influence and persuasiveness of CCM 
learning communities heavily depended upon the resources and political 
backing provided by those constituencies. Indeed, ideas and knowledge do not 
float freely (Risse-Kappen, 1994). In the case of the EU CSDP, the demand for 
non-military instruments championed by some member states as well as the 
opening window of opportunity to provide the Union with an added value in 
the global security arena facilitated the progress towards CCM and the Feira 
decision to develop a specific range of civilian tools.  
The chapter has then shown the main institutional and bureaucratic factors 
hampering policy evolution as learning by doing. Accordingly, the role of 
learning communities appear of the utmost importance for the added value of 
CCM as a “know-how asset” aggregating knowledge, experience and lessons 
learned that are lacking in other international organisations (Chivvis, 2010: 46).    
Finally, a more nuanced delimitation of the action areas of epicoms and CoPs 
proved useful to emphasise the conditions under which ideas are persuasive. 
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The presence of a practice in the formative stages of knowledge, and its 
expansion through communities, positively influences norm diffusion. The 
narrower the disconnect between habitus and episteme, or between 
professionalism and expertise, the more likely the possibility that norms will be 
impactful on decision-making and generate a convergence in policy objectives. 
In other words, ideas have better chances to become dominant and consensual 
if they are rooted in overlapping practices and beliefs.  
 
 Chapter 8 
 
Learning between knowledge, practice and power 
 
Victoria Concordia Crescit 
(Arsenal Football Club’s Motto) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
By the mid-2000s, the EU successfully established the institutional and policy 
means to become a “modern” crisis manager. Multilateral security co-operation 
within the EU quickly adapted to a changed security demand of the post-Cold 
War international system, requiring the development of non-military and 
integrated crisis response capacities to better address complex security 
environments. Since the early 1990s, as pre-existing peacekeeping norms 
started to be challenged, new agendas and approaches to interventions aimed at 
achieving sustainable peace arose and diffused in global fora (e.g. the UN). 
This policy consensus, resulting in multiple processes of norm generation and 
diffusion (involving concepts such as democratisation, good governance, 
human rights, the security-development nexus etc.) is ultimately responsible 
for the current design of EU security institutions and policies.  
Claiming that actors’ responses to structural changes hugely impact on policy 
evolution, and that such responses are, in turn, the product of community-
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clustered, socially constructed (hence dynamic) epistemes and practices, the 
previous chapters 6 and 7 have tested the applicability of a learning community 
model to the EU SSR and CCM frameworks. The two cases are particularly 
relevant for the post-Cold War security agenda based on comprehensiveness, 
and substantially contributed to making the EU a “civilian and normative” 
power.  
SSR and CCM are big slices of the comprehensive approach the CSDP was 
designed on the basis of. As my comparative analysis has shown, CCM 
provided a significant drive for institutional reform, shaping the policies 
governing EU operations towards the four priority areas (police, rule of law, 
civilian administration and civil protection) and producing impact on the 
ground. The outcome of SSR institutionalisation has instead been far less 
notable. EU member states agreed on a new way to cooperate in security 
involving the diffusion of a set of norms; however, CCM was more impactful 
on the shape and the outcomes of CSDP than SSR. Why?  
By summarising the key findings of my empirical analysis, this chapter 
answers this question and engages the debate on what makes learning 
communities persuasive, and what factors make certain ideas more influential 
than others. A key implication of this claim is that a policy consensus 
(McNamara, 1998) is a necessary, but not sufficient condition to redefine 
cooperation between states. Consensus, driven by the emergence of new, 
shared beliefs emerging from innovation or failure, is certainly fundamental to 
redefine states and actors’ interest in new forms of cooperation. However, it 
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does not automatically result into successful policy outcomes or institution 
building. For that to occur, knowledge need to be solidly and coherently 
secured to a power system, and anchored in practice. These two characteristics 
define the dominance of a certain type of knowledge over others. As this 
chapter will show, CCM found a secure harbour in the EU power system as 
well as in the pre-existing shared practices of non-military crisis response 
developed by other international actors. SSR, instead, continued to suffer from 
a thorny attempt to bridge divergent interests, perspectives and organisational 
cultures.  
The first section of this chapter presents the summary of empirical findings for 
the two case studies. The second section engages the debate (Cross, 2011) on 
the persuasiveness, cohesiveness and impact of learning communities on policy 
structures. It also explains what the overall contribution of the present thesis is 
in that respect. Finally, the last section assesses the relative significance of this 
approach vis-à-vis the alternative explanations of EU security cooperation, 
which I referred to in chapter 2. Accordingly, this chapter paves the way for the 
conclusion of my thesis, where broader questions of the model’s general 
explanatory power, the normative/practical implications and lessons for future 
research trajectories will be presented.  
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8.1 Summary of findings 
 
This section presents the summary of empirical findings, which emerge from 
the comparative analysis of SSR and CCM institutionalisation. In line with the 
structure of the case study chapters, it is organised according to three criteria: 
(1) the type of learning communities; (2) the dynamics leading to the diffusion 
of ideas; (3) outcomes (policy change). 
 
8.1.1 Learning communities and formative interactions 
 
Despite some degree of overlap as regards the transnational actors involved (cf. 
tables 6.2 and 7.2), different types of learning communities can be identified in 
the cases of SSR and CCM. This is a first, important consideration, as it calls 
into question current approaches to learning. In fact, it paves the way for a new 
research agenda, inquiring into the relationship between the cognitive content 
and the structure of social relationship underlying its formation.   
In both the cases studied, knowledge generation and community formation ran 
almost in parallel, as transnational communities advocating paradigm 
innovation were missing. Formal communities such as the Delors Committee 
(Verdun, 1999) were absent in the early development of SSR and CCM. The 
role of the Delors Committee as the epistemic community behind the creation 
of the EMU relied on an explicit mandate by the European Council. The 
Committee was formally tasked with addressing monetary issues, in view of 
creating a consensus and achieving a targeted policy result. The constitution of 
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the EMU epistemic community preceded the policy action associated with it. 
Conversely, the two processes were informal in the cases of CCM and SSR, 
and could not be spotted by simply looking at the institutional bodies in place. 
For this reason, in my previous CCM chapter, I have pointed out the peculiar 
morphology of the “islands of knowledge and practices”. Those islands define 
social and cognitive ties loosely linked, but nonetheless interconnected to each 
other emerging at the earliest stages of CCM conceptualisation.  
A main point of differentiation has to do with the relationship between the 
notions of episteme and practice. My study on the genesis of CCM provides 
evidence of the existence of common practices, albeit informally diffused and 
not structured. Those practices, arising in member states’ involvement in field 
operations with other international organisations (e.g. UN missions) supported 
the formation of a new episteme and the work carried out by expert.  
On the contrary, the conceptualisation of SSR was not associated to a specific 
habitus or background knowledge provided by the actors involved. Knowledge 
sharing and socialisation were functional to the purpose of bridging different 
approaches into the new SSR vision. However, individuals who influenced the 
debate on SSR, although exposed to practitioners, were not part of the same 
community of practice. Development and security professionals did not share 
field experiences. They did not have a sense of common routine that would 
facilitate their interaction. EU SSR remains today an innovative crisis 
management tool that lacks a backup empirical basis. Furthermore, SSR is a 
“chapeau”, integrationist concept, which includes very different types of 
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activities and an intense coordination of efforts, in order to provide long-term 
systemic reform. This made it easier for persisting and competing 
organisational cultures/behaviour to resist the merger. The case of SSR 
displays, in this regard, a particularly strong divide between the 
security/defence community and the development community, which I defined 
as the bicephalous structure of SSR communities. Interviews with experts and 
practitioners belonging to both groups reveal substantial differences in the 
terminology used as well as over definitions and means to achieve policy ends. 
Experts working for the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed 
Forces (DCAF) do not share the same concept of SSR than colleagues from 
Development agencies such as the ODI or DFID. Their sense of belonging to 
an SSR community reflect different visions of what SSR should achieve, or 
how it should be operationalised in the field. Because SSR is the “bastard 
child” of the security-development nexus, its norm entrepreneurs have 
struggled a lot to set up expert consensus around the new norm, which explains 
much of the fuzziness resulting in vague policy objectives and lack of 
awareness between policy-makers.  
This assessment of the empirical findings does not mean that the SSR practice 
is doomed to remain in the shade. The relationship between SSR professionals 
(consultants, academics, practitioners) based on their CVs and work 
experiences after 2006 – that is, once SSR had been mainstreamed - shows that 
the hint of a community of practitioners is slowly emerging. Many of the 
individuals who have acquired experience in SSR now share similar working 
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experiences and acknowledge the need to overcome their cultural, 
organisational and epistemic divide. Several interviewees have pointed out that 
the SSR experts involved in consultations and collaborative projects, for 
instance the one leading to the publication of the OECD Handbook (OECD, 
2007: 4), regularly provide consultancy advice to the same organisations, or 
participate in professional networks facilitating contacts and career 
development.159 Generally, when asking interviewees “who the most influential 
individuals shaping the SSR agenda are” and “who do you interact more often 
with” for issues regarding SSR, the list of individuals and organisations was 
not subject to much variation – the usual suspects came up systematically.  
Research on civilian crisis management produced a different picture. 
Involvement in previous experiences shaped actors’ perceptions and reinforced 
the move towards a new episteme. For instance, actor socialised by meeting 
regularly during peacekeeping missions, or contributing to conceptual 
preparatory works, such as the Agenda for Peace or the Brahimi Report. While 
the presence of a structured community of practice strictu sensu can be hardly 
detected, shared practices of crisis management have led to traceable personal 
and informal relations. Back to their capitals after a mission in the field, 
national diplomats and civil servants maintained professional links with 
colleagues with whom they had shared a working routine or an occasional 
task.160 These experiences contributed to construct a background knowledge. 
As a result, CCM was not built from scratch, and could be framed also looking 
                                                
159 Interviews with SSR experts, various locations, Spring 2011.  
160 Interviews with CCM experts and practitioners, various locations, Spring 2011. 
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at the conceptual and operational work being done in other international fora, 
hence drawing from the UN’s integrated missions, from the OSCE’s civilian 
administration, or at the level of member states.  
The relationship between habitus and episteme, therefore, heavily influenced 
the diffusion of ideas at the national and transnational level in the latter case 
analysed here. The learning communities in Sweden and Finland, which have 
been presented in chapter 7, were composed of both practitioners with 
extensive field expertise on the civilian aspects of crisis management, and, 
experts sharing new principled beliefs relating to the multi-dimensional nature 
of interventions in response to crises.  
Conversely, conceptual work to create a policy framework on SSR, in the UK 
and The Netherlands, was less rooted in shared practices and more focused on 
the epistemic attempt to bridge distinct policy fields. 
 
8.1.2 Pathways of influence and the diffusion of ideas 
 
The present section compares the empirical findings vis-à-vis the process of 
learning, through the four pathways of influence (innovation, sponsorship, 
emulation, socialisation). Each one of these elements reveals an interesting 
degree of comparability between SSR and CCM.  
To start with, both generated in the recognition of policy failure emerging 
throughout the 1990s, which spurred innovation. In particular, the consensus 
on failure was facilitated by ineffectiveness in UN peacekeeping missions as 
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well as by growing instability in the EU’s South-eastern neighbourhood, which 
European member states had been unable to come to terms with. It soon 
became an international acquis that, in many fragile regions of the worlds, 
multilateral crisis management had failed.  
Both CCM and SSR hence stemmed from a process of paradigm innovation, 
whereby “start-up” communities initiated the conceptual work with a shared 
enterprise of updating the security discourse – and policies.  
Some empirical differences appear at this point though. SSR innovation was 
channelled through the growing debate on the future of governments’ military 
spending and, in parallel, through the one on the need to redesign aid policies 
to address interrelated problems of conflict and fragility more efficiently and 
avoid a waste or bad allocation of resources. Pioneers of SSR found fertile 
ground in traditional security providers (e.g. states having a significant military 
apparatus) and major donors. CCM entrepreneurs intersected the debate on 
European - and, in particular, Nordic countries’ post-Cold War strategic 
posture, and hitched their ideas to the future of major international 
organisations in a transformed international system: the UN, in quest of 
legitimacy as peacebuilder; and NATO, engaged in the overhaul of European 
security institutions – meaning, essentially, the need to avoid duplications with 
the newborn EU security policy. Furthermore, as the previous chapters have 
shown, while innovation came from expertise in both cases, overlapping 
practices were present in CCM only.  
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The way a constituency of interested state actors supported the diffusion of the 
two concepts through sponsorship is very much alike. The sponsorship factor 
was arguably a prominent booster of diffusion in both CCM and SSR. While 
the configuration of EU institutions (by the multi-level governance, providing 
norm entrepreneurs with multiple access points to influence decision-making) 
provided a comfortable arena for internalisation of ideas, support from national 
actors and governments proved crucial, with the UK in SSR and the Nordic 
countries in CCM acting as “godfathers” of the new approaches.  
In terms of contribution to the institutionalist debate, my research clearly 
shows that learning communities define the boundaries of the space in which 
states reconstitute behaviours and interests as EU norms, and not just national 
ones (Smith M.E., 2004a). What enables institutions to shape interests, and 
identities, is the formation of a set of consensual and dominant norms 
emanating from a shared background (practices) or episteme (value-based 
judgment) clustered in communities. Learning communities are therefore 
pivotal insofar as they are within the state (they are tightly connected with state 
interests) and, at the same time, they carry ideational content inside national, 
intergovernmental and supranational bureaucracies. For this reason, they can 
be considered as a “thermostat of power”, regulating the balance between 
actors’ material interests and cognitive/ideational inputs. As a matter of fact, 
both CCM and SSR were selected not just for the scientific value of their 
prescriptions, but also for their relevance vis-à-vis EU member states’ 
preferences.  
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At the constituency level, intense advocacy through workshops, conferences, 
studies, publications (white and non-papers, editorials) and other activities 
aimed at fostering socialisation and networking occurred and characterised the 
emergence of ideational relations between actors, in some cases leading to the 
creation of ad hoc institutional structures tasked with dealing with the 
emerging paradigms. The Swedish’ Council for Peace and Security Initiative 
(RFSI) for CCM and the UK’s Stabilisation Unit (FCO, MoD, DFID) for SSR 
are good examples.  
The policy selection process, which coincides with the “tipping point”, was 
influenced by intervening factors. Timing, national cultures and EU 
governance structure facilitated the emergence of new ideas, although with 
some differences between the two cases. As regards the cultural factor, it is 
interesting to note that both CCM and SSR diffused first in those countries 
(UK and Nordic states) where a culture of “openness” was present; where the 
political system was particularly conducive to letting ideas circulate; where 
consultation with non-governmental bodies (academia, think-tanks, agencies, 
NGOs) as well as across the institutional spectrum was part of the country’s 
political culture. Ideology and the presence of party-based “policy networks” 
played a role in both cases. Although security norms tend to produce a 
bipartisan consensus within the political spectrum, the presence of progressive, 
social democratic governments in both Sweden and the UK when the CCM and 
SSR agenda were presented gave a substantial impetus to the debate. In the 
first case, the Swedish and Finnish Social Democratic parties (and influential 
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individuals, such as Ministers of Foreign Affairs Anna Lindh and Tarja 
Halonen) were keen on showing their electorate that the newborn CSDP would 
not open a season of militarisation of security co-operation in the EU (hence 
duplicating NATO), but conflict prevention and non-military crisis 
management tools would be included in the “basket”. Similarly, in a way, the 
UK Labour Party had a stake in enhancing Britain’s outreach and a more 
efficient planning and conduct of overseas international development policies.  
Emulation, as intervening factor facilitating the institutionalisation of 
CCM/SSR through persistence and evolution, shows instead two different 
patterns. EU CCM was modelled on a reliable set of successful experiences 
and practices, providing a blueprint for the organisational conceptual and 
procedural aspects of the new policy realm. Cooperation with other actors 
(OSCE, UN), NGOs and institutional isomorphism – replication of EU military 
structures, procedures and capability generation for crisis management – 
enormously facilitated the implementation of the CCM agenda. In terms of 
operational experiences, although a strong and successful model was lacking, 
experiences of UN and OSCE with civilian administration in the Balkans are 
an example of references upon which EU CCM was moulded. Empirical 
findings also show the (not negligible) extent to which emulation of military 
lessons learned procedures contributed to create a conceptual framework for 
knowledge management and lessons learned gathering on the civilian side.  
For SSR, emulation acquires a different meaning. Mainstreaming and 
institutionalising SSR in the EU was not inspired by a model, as no other actor 
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was previously involved in comprehensive SSR activities and, most 
importantly, was labelling its efforts in the security-development-good 
governance nexus as “SSR”. Emulation came in terms of guidelines for 
adapting SSR to individual actors’ need, with the OECD DAC acting as “agent 
of standardisation”. SSR norm diffusion proceeded by emulation in the sense 
that almost all international actors involved in this field have adhered to the 
OECD guidelines on security system reform, although in reality policy 
documents display a degree of variation: jargon, objectives and means for SSR 
policies vary substantially across organisations and European policy-makers 
seldom agree on what SSR implies as they are asked to go into detail, beyond 
the OECD principles.   
Finally, SSR and CCM differ strikingly in terms of evolution as learning by 
doing. Despite some common challenges, such as the training-recruitment-
deployment gap and the “practical” inadequacies of financial, logistical and 
regulatory support for SSR and CCM missions, one can hardly argue that the 
two norms faced the same destiny when turning into real policies. The EU 
commitment to CCM is vast, whereas pure SSR missions can be counted on the 
fingers of one hand. Asked about what the EU CCM approach amounts to, 
practitioners in Brussels respond quickly and precisely, making explicit 
references to the Feira priorities or to the experience in the field.161 Instead, 
discussions on the notion (and application) of SSR generally end up in 
stammer. Similarly, the EU as a civilian power consolidated over the past ten 
                                                
161 Interviews with EU officials, Brussels, Spring 2011.  
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years, whereas SSR security provision is criticised as lacking impact on the 
ground and sufficient coordination or even attention in Brussels, in spite of the 
relevance of the norm for current crises in the southern neighbourhood (e.g. 
Libya). Lessons learned are abundant on the CCM side - although procedures 
to collect and elaborate lessons learned are far from being faultless; they are 
scattered and ineffective on the SSR side.  
 
8.1.3 Outcomes: explaining policy change and variation 
  
One of the most fascinating aspects of academic research is the possibility to 
explain variation in outcomes. When I started engaging the CSDP literature in 
search of a strong research design, I was mostly concerned with why – and 
how – the cooperation on security and defence within the European Union 
evolved the way it did. It was only much later, during my fieldwork research in 
Brussels, that I came across what appears as a more subtle, theoretically-
relevant and largely under-researched question: how come that certain norms, 
or ideas, become policies while others fade away? Current and previous studies 
on the CSDP take for granted the fact that the EU has gone civilian, and that 
some policies (e.g. police, rule of law) had a more successful and committed 
implementation record than others (e.g. SSR, DDR). They just don’t explain 
why this was the case. In providing an answer to this question, my empirical 
findings point at several directions, but identify the relationship between 
interests and ideas as crucial.  
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Let us start with the consideration that the clearer, more durable and widely 
endorsed a norm is, the greater will be its impact (Legro, 1997). My empirical 
research suggests that this expectation is correct, as CCM evolution 
corresponds to a relatively robust norm, as opposed to a relatively weak one in 
the SSR case. Therefore, a first account for variation is that the latter did not 
meet Legro’s criteria for robustness in terms of specificity, durability and 
concordance.  
Another explanation can be deduced from the comparison of the two processes 
of diffusion through the pathways of influence. If we cross-check the steps of 
the Adler and Haas (1992) model of policy evolution (diffusion, selection, 
persistence, evolution) with the elements of the pathways that define how 
learning occurs (innovation, socialisation, emulation, sponsorship), one can 
conclude that CCM and SSR share all but three (emulation, persistence, 
evolution). Since evolution is the outcome we want to explain, according to 
Mill’s method of difference (Hancke, 2010), it can be argued that the emulation 
and persistence factors account for the variation. The application of Mill’s 
method to my two case studies can be represented by the table 8.1.  
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Table 8.1: Mill's method of difference: comparison between CCM and SSR norm 
diffusion 
 
Process / Norm Evolution CCM SSR Pathways 
Failure V V Innovation 
Diffusion V V Socialisation  
Selection V V Sponsorship 
Emulation V X Emulation 
Persistence V X Experience 
Evolution V X 
 
Learning by 
doing 
 
 
 
Emulation and persistence are directly linked. As I already discussed in the 
previous section, the persuasive example of the potential merits of an idea 
gives a strong impetus to forge consensus and maintain it across time. 
Economic theory also suggests that once a policy is introduced, it is likely to 
persist and it proves hard to be removed (Coate and Morris, 1999). As a matter 
of fact, SSR has not entirely disappeared, hence a certain level of persistence 
can be acknowledged. It has not, however, produced enough persuasive power 
to influence the design of EU institutions or the nature of missions.  
Explanations can be manifold. According to Fullan, “terms travel easily…but 
the meaning of the underlying concepts do not” (Fullan, 2005: 67). An 
interviewed SSR expert stated “mainstreaming (SSR) does not necessarily 
mean understanding; and if there is understanding, it does not necessarily mean 
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being able to deliver. Perhaps SSR has been mainstreamed too early”.162 
Theoretical, conceptual and analytical embedding for SSR did not lead to the 
creation of appropriate means to implement SSR programmes. Timing has 
certainly played a role as a heavy intervening factor. As chapter 3, 6 and 7 have 
shown, crisis management practices were criticised as “not ideal” since the 
early 1990s, producing different solutions. In that respect, SSR and CCM were 
problematised (Rose and Miller, 1992) differently. Only CCM got political 
salience, thanks to states’ interest in avoiding the militarisation of CSDP and 
maintain NATO’s primacy as Europe’s defence organisation. Shortly before 
the development of the CCM framework, the St Malo process created a unique 
window of opportunity for some countries to mitigate the push towards a 
“common army” or “mutual defence agreement” vision of the CSDP, and to 
keep the United States involved in European defence by not duplicating or 
downgrading NATO.163 SSR was not subject to the same process of 
problematisation. It was less “attractive” than CCM, given the latter’s 
contribution to differentiating CSDP from other security organisations, such as 
NATO or the UN.  
Furthermore, conceptual work for the EU approach to CCM followed a 
pragmatic approach, which started from the inventory on resources already 
available within member states and subsequently aimed at addressing the issues 
of how to develop (cf. headline goal process), apply (cf. learning by doing 
                                                
162 Interview of the author with an expert, Brussels, March 2011.  
163 Interview of the author with a Swedish diplomat, March 2012.   
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2003-onward) and coordinate (cf. institutional build up and reform since 2001) 
them, on the template of parallel developments on the military side.  
SSR posed more serious conceptual challenges, and demanded profound 
institutional change at different levels. First, in the methodology of decision-
making, since SSR entailed unprecedented cooperation and exchange of 
information between institutions, up to the need to create a “collegial” 
collaboration between competing bureaucracies. Second, in the practices on the 
ground, for instance through the implementation of a systemic – as opposed to 
sectoral – approach, or by stressing the importance of local ownership. Third, 
in the troublesome partnership between technical, academic and policy/practice 
expertise.  
With regard to the last point, it is worth recalling that EU policy-makers knew 
little about SSR at the time it was introduced: SSR networks did not exist 
beforehand. On the contrary, CCM was supported by “shared stand-by 
practices”, and its conceptualisation came largely as a result of pre-existing 
informal networks between ministries and organisations “streamlining 
countries’ positions and preferences”, as a Swedish policy-maker observed.164  
It follows from this assessment that the structure and the persuasiveness of the 
learning communities are key to understanding the different trajectories of 
policy change between SSR and CCM, as they shaped the formation, as well as 
the success, of the two concepts.  
 
                                                
164 Interview of the author with a Swedish policy-maker, March 2012.  
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8.2 Persuasiveness and impact of learning communities: theoretical 
implications  
 
If learning communities are of any use to explain cooperation is because the 
concepts they advocate have an impact. Academic research has logically 
addressed the issue of persuasiveness and influence, in order to establish when 
and under what conditions epicoms, or CoPs are more likely to be persuasive. 
A number of alternative explanations have been offered: access to key 
decision-makers (Haas E.B., 1990; Drake and Nicolaidis, 1992), the 
compatibility of policy goals with institutional norms (Sabatier, 1998), policy-
makers’ dissatisfaction with past policies (Hall, 1993), political salience of the 
issue requiring expert advice (Radaelli, 1995), and, last but not least, the 
sharing of a high level of professional norms and status (Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith, 1993). Communities of practice expand when they cross the cognitive 
threshold known as the “tipping point” (Gladwell, 2002), which include the 
socially constructed definitions of novelty and the success of the practice, 
which in turn depend on individuals’ expectations vis-à-vis their collective 
background knowledge (Adler, 2008: 203). Cross looks at (1) the importance 
of professionalism at the heart of cohesiveness within epicoms and (2) the 
understanding that epistemic communities do not simply exist, but can be 
strong or weak and hence level of cohesion during socialisation processes and 
their ability to reach a consensus are crucial in explaining their success or 
failure in persuading policymakers (Cross, 2011).  
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I overall agree that cohesiveness is critical for a community to be persuasive, 
that communities can be of different types (nascent, fully fledged) and hence 
that internal cohesiveness explain external persuasiveness (Cross, 2011: 26). 
However, my research findings suggest that the factors affecting cohesiveness 
go beyond the internal variables identified by Cross (selection and training, 
frequency and quality of meetings, shared professional norms, common 
culture).  
What does this analysis of CSDP add then to the existing literature on learning 
communities, namely vis-à-vis cohesiveness? From the role of communities in 
shaping cooperation in CSDP it can be concluded that:  
 
a. A shared practice facilitates the emergence of a policy consensus, 
which constitutes the necessary basis to achieve progress towards a new 
policy orientation of security cooperation. New cognitive content is 
more easily learned if it comes as an expansion of a practice, as 
opposed to the attempt to bridge previously separated episteme. The 
capacity of institutions to learn “by doing” also depends on the 
presence of a fully-fledged CoP, since routines and a shared sense of 
belonging facilitates communication and understanding between actors 
on the benchmarks, the outcomes and the types of lessons to be learned 
– and how to learn them. Conversely, a policy framework not supported 
by an existing shared practice makes it difficult to overcome 
institutional and cultural barriers, hence jeopardising policy evolution. 
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As a result, this thesis demonstrates that the CSDP has learning by 
doing in areas where a common understanding on the “doing” was 
already present. Conversely, CSDP actors failed to improve their 
performance through experiential learning when trying to bridge 
previously compartmentalised sectors.   
A corollary of the previous argument is that the presence of consensus 
does not automatically lead to the existence of a single dominant vision 
of what should be achieved. Empirical chapters show that learning 
communities may also co-exist at different levels of analysis. They are, 
in other words, like “Matryoshka dolls”: consensus can be reached at a 
broader and abstract level (e.g. on human security as a new 
paradigmatic approach, or on the necessity to introduce elements of 
peace-building in security cooperation), but it does not become 
dominant unless sub-communities agree on common standards, 
definitions, measures to achieve policy change. In the case of SSR, the 
emerging consensus on failure, innovation and diffusion was 
counterbalanced by disagreement across bureaucracies (defence, 
development), institutions as well as divergent national interests and 
perspectives over the policy instruments needed to sustain the new 
policy framework. Therefore, consensus is necessary to persuade 
decision-makers, but impact on institutional change (involving goals, 
means and instruments) fundamentally depends on dominance. The 
relationship between consensual and dominant knowledge is what 
Chapter 8 – Learning between knowledge, practice and power 
                   301 
influences robustness of learning communities and, as a result, 
robustness of norms (Legro, 1997). In this respect, the empirical 
chapters show that practice-based communities lead to more effective 
policy and institutional evolution, whereas knowledge not supported by 
a shared practice may result in fragmented communities and, in turn, in 
dysfunctional policy outcomes. The comparison of SSR and CCM also 
demonstrates that the narrower and more technical policy consensus 
gets (e.g. how to operationalise CCM approaches and use scarce 
resources / develop new ones to this purpose), the higher the chances 
that a dominant vision emerges. Although it is difficult to set general 
rules to determine what conditions foster the emergence of dominance 
out of consensus, this study allows to draw some interesting 
conclusions concerning the following factors: the type and structure of 
learning communities at the moment paradigm or norm innovation 
kicks off; the domestic setting (meaning the political, cultural and 
leadership conditions creating the environment where consensus 
develops and potentially leads to dominance); finally, some exogenous 
conditions creating the window of opportunity for change – that is, 
salience. 
 
b. Sponsorship, and hence power matter. The case studies show that 
backing from a political constituency is critical, although it may not 
lead to policy evolution and learning. Besides providing communities 
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with financial and political backing, capitals can mobilise and steer 
them in order to match their interests. As Verdun observed, in her 
analysis of epicoms and the EMU, epistemic communities do not stand 
“above” the political struggle between nation states” (Verdun, 1999: 
323), but they are in a way part of it: they are given responsibility and 
power to shape decision because lack of cooperation in a technical field 
would go against states interests and members of the communities 
possess the exclusive access to information or knowledge needed to 
advance such cooperation.  
Intervening factors help explaining the relationship between ideas and 
policy outcomes, as well as evaluating the contribution of this work, 
vis-à-vis alternative theories. National cultures and a certain 
permeability of EU institutional structures facilitated policy diffusion, 
although they were not, as argued by other scholars (Cross, 2011: 28)165 
indispensable drivers. While it might be argued that Nordic countries 
communities do share a common culture, the overlapping 
constituencies supporting CCM (neutral, small and anti-federalist 
states, and donors) can be hardly included in the same cultural family, 
yet they forged a solid consensus on the need to conceptualise an EU 
approach to non-military crisis management. Furthermore, network ties 
                                                
165 According to Cross, “common culture is an encompassing concept that is typically a key 
part of the identity, heritage, symbolism and sense of purpose shared by a group of individuals. 
It includes esprit de corps – a sense of camaraderie, and devotion to the goals of the group – 
but is also more. Some transnational networks, bureaucratic committees or nascent epistemic 
communities rest only on esprit de corps, but a strong epistemic community is also 
characterized by a shared culture” (2011: 28-29).  
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between practitioners rooted in practices and experience with previous 
organisations in the field (e.g. UN policing) arose from a common 
sense of engagement and not from a similar cultural background. 
Finally, a “culture of openness” was instrumental to achieve policy 
selection. Tight relations between experts and practitioners existed in 
the key constituencies supporting CCM (Swede and Finland). In other 
contexts, the emergence of learning communities was facilitated by 
other elements, such as the reduced size of the countries (e.g. Ireland, or 
other small member states).  
Similarly, while the EU’s permissive decision-making structure 
facilitated learning, it cannot be considered a sufficient condition for 
ideas to become consensual, dominant leading to policy evolution. In 
this respect, the EU governance seemed to amplify the influence of 
communities on decision-makers with regards preferences that are not 
politically sensitive (both CCM and SSR can be considered as less 
sensitive from a political standpoint compared to, for instance, military 
crisis management) and which are hence easily crystallised. However, 
once they are mainstreamed or institutionalised, the destiny of ideas 
gets indeterminate: CCM and SSR are, as we have seen, two different 
stories in terms of practical impact.166  
 
                                                
166 I would like to thank Mark Rhinard for his precious comments on this point.  
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c. The “cognitive architecture” of the policy area under study influences 
the learning dynamics and, as a result, the outcomes of institutional 
change. What seems to matter the most in the creation of a consensual 
and dominant vision underlying norm diffusion is the cognitive 
architecture, defined as the type and structures of communities at the 
moment norm entrepreneurship starts. Explaining why and to what 
extent learning communities matter requires examination and 
thoroughly understanding not just their specific internal dynamics, but 
also and foremost their place in the broader EU social context or 
networked environment; the boundaries between knowledge and 
practice, defining where an epistemic community ends and a 
community of practice begins; in other words, better outlining what 
networks are we talking about before even investigating how they 
work.  
In this respect, I found a striking amount of conceptual confusion in the 
literature concerning the relationship between practice (habitus) and 
knowledge (episteme). To start with, many analyses proceed with the 
investigation of one community (e.g. a single Committee). However, 
multiple communities often co-exist and overlap, due to variation in 
expertise, cultures or professional norms. For this reason, I accounted 
for CSDP as an environment in which practices and expertise are 
arranged in multiplex social and cognitive ties, which I locate within 
the broader concept of learning communities. My empirical analysis 
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suggests that neither CCM, nor SSR diffusion have shown the presence 
of a “single” epicoms or CoP, but showed a heterogeneous morphology 
tightly connected though not perfectly amalgamated (CCM) or even 
competing (SSR) communities. A new research agenda on learning 
communities could elaborate more on the morphology of learning 
communities. This analytical target is in fact evolutionary and dynamic, 
and very rarely limited to a single committee because of the multiple 
flows of influence and socialisation across institutional borders.  
Finally, the argument that shared professional norms enable the 
development of shared causal beliefs and foster agreement on 
appropriate policy goals (Cross, 2011) fails to specify how knowledge 
interfaces with practice. The empirical findings of this thesis indicate 
that a consensual understanding about new, shared causal beliefs 
emerged both in CCM and SSR, even though the latter was not 
underpinned by shared practices. However, pre-existing shared 
practices determined the agreement over a dominant vision of 
appropriate policy goals. Dominance emerged in the CCM case only. 
Here, pre-existing networks of practitioners, having a common 
understanding of routines on the ground or in headquarters, reinforced 
the overall persuasiveness and impact of learning communities. When 
practice interfaces with knowledge, a dominating view or some kind of 
prioritisation within the means-ends relationship is more likely to 
emerge, thus reinforcing the long-term impact of the norm.  
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In the case of SSR, the creation of a policy framework at member states 
(the UK, The Netherlands) and EU levels occurred before the first 
attempt to introduce shared protocol, procedures and professional 
routines leading to an “SSR practice” that was absent beforehand. On 
the contrary, the CCM framework came both as a result of the 
validation of new knowledge benefiting from networks of practitioners’ 
endeavour to “practice change”. It come pretty straightforward that a 
common episteme, or information base on human interpretation of 
facts, is stronger and more dominant if it is supported by the practical 
routines and background knowledge arising from CoPs. 
To conclude, evidence on CSDP missions presented in the empirical 
chapters confirms that the cognitive architecture of knowledge 
influences learning “by doing”. The way knowledge and practice 
overlap impacts on the way knowledge is produced, stored, exchanged, 
transmitted and retrieved. The “walking is how you learn to walk” (de 
Vasconcelos, 2009) proved more effective as practitioners shared a 
sense of belonging, a common repertoire and a mutual engagement 
towards a clear set of CCM objectives and activities.  
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8.3 Conclusion 
 
To sum up, a main theoretical contribution of the present thesis is to draw from 
the current debate on the “practice turn” and communitarian international 
relations (Adler, 2005) to reappraise the conceptual and analytical relationship 
between episteme and practice. The two are mutually reinforcing, as the latter 
enables ideas to become dominant and expand to new practices.  
This thesis also leads to the conclusion that dominance is achieved when ideas 
are rooted in a net which includes practices and power sources. Dominance 
arises when paradigm innovation is embedded in a consensual understanding of 
the causal beliefs, when this embeddedness is complemented by a shared 
notion of the “field” resulting in formal or informal network ties between 
professionals, and  when a powerful champion of change provides interest-
based support for the new policy enterprise.  
I have argued and demonstrated empirically that knowledge, practices and 
power are interlinked and mutually reinforcing drivers of the diffusion of ideas, 
and that learning communities are more likely to be persuasive (towards 
decision-makers) and impactful (towards institutions) when epistemic 
communities and communities of practice overlap, or, to be more precise, the 
latter support the formation of the former as this positively affects the overall 
robustness of learning communities. For instance, institutional isomorphism 
(Reynolds, 2007), or emulation, is generally reinforced by the presence of a 
community of practice as demonstrated by NATO-CSDP relations (Lachmann, 
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2010). Similarly, experiential learning “by doing”, as the comparative 
evolution of CCM and SSR has shown, is facilitated by cognitive proximity, 
shared tacit knowledge, shared repertoire, sustained mutual engagement and 
working routines, in other words the features that form a community of 
practice (Cohendet et al., 2001: 14).  
 
 
 
 Chapter 9 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
So we beat on, boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into the past. 
(The Great Gatsby) 
 
 
Current theories on social and institutional learning, including the practice turn, 
do not fully account for what happened within CSDP. They failed to 
acknowledge the complex cognitive architecture from which learning stems. 
This is particularly relevant in a decade of intense evolution of the European 
security discourse, during which new crisis management tools have been 
introduced and tested in the field. Conceiving the CSDP as a field in which 
knowledge and practice-based learning communities operate and foster 
evolution brings forward a renewed understanding of how organisations 
change, driven by new cognitive and ideational stimuli.  
As I embarked upon this research enterprise, back in 2009, my ambition was to 
contribute to the academic debate on institutional change. Change has to do 
with the ways in which the interpretation or re-interpretation of past events 
designs the future, as the link between policy failure and policy innovation 
shows. The act of interpreting denotes the emergence of a consensual and 
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dominant view between actors of a changing social reality in which old 
responses are adapted to new needs.  
The linkage between epistemic knowledge formation and practices, and their 
overlap producing dominance, clarifies the relationship between two different, 
though mutually supportive types of ideational forces underpinning learning. 
First, the epistemic act of norm/paradigm innovation, whereby new shared 
causal and principled beliefs and notions of validity are fashioned and 
embedded into a common policy enterprise: this is what characterises epistemic 
communities. Second, the daily re-elaboration of the shared sense of the past 
across the changing morphology of the field in which the actors’ background 
knowledge has blossomed, leading to the reiteration and, where necessary, the 
renovation of practices: this is what communities of practice are founded on. 
Understanding – and further conceptualising – learning as a product of 
evolving knowledge and practices bears significant potential for social 
sciences, since, as Bourdieu observed, “the progress of knowledge presupposes 
progress in our knowledge of the conditions of knowledge” (Bourdieu, 1980: 
1).  
This thesis demonstrates that the sense of the past, understood as habits and not 
to be confused with historical path-dependency, has been fundamental in 
shaping CSDP. One could go as far as to argue that the 1975 Helsinki Final Act 
is perhaps even more influential on the current design and activities of the 
CSDP than the St Malo Declaration itself, as the latter does not contain any 
reference to comprehensiveness or the development of joint civilian-military 
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tools for crisis management and conflict prevention. In the same way a new 
episteme is generated out of a critical appraisal of previous knowledge, or 
following a technological upgrade, an evolving habitus draws from a set of 
elements that constitute a heritage in people’s mindset and organisations’ codes 
of conduct: the notions of national interest, strategic cultures (Giegerich, 2006) 
but also education and early work experiences shaping people professionalism 
are certainly some of these elements.  
The communities that are responsible for learning shall not be associated to 
geographical or political limitedness: the OECD’s International Network on 
Conflict and Fragility, where much of the thinking on SSR and on other issues 
relevant for CSDP was done, cannot be detected by researchers’ analytical 
radars if these are set on the “Brusselsisation” or “Franco-British-engine” 
modes.  
Against this backdrop, my work has critically tested the validity of IR learning 
theories, especially in light of the recent “practice turn”, in accounting for 
policy evolution in European security. My claim that the EU has learned to 
become a security actor implies that CSDP’s institutional format and activities 
come as the result of learning from policy failure, which produced policy 
innovation, as well as learning by doing, which generated evolution. In 
particular, I argued that, when epistemic policy innovation is rooted in the re-
elaboration of past practices, and hence when a community of practice sustains 
the learning process, the ideas diffused by transnational communities are likely 
to be more persuasive and impactful on decision-making. On the contrary, 
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nascent epistemic communities that are not bound to a common practice 
struggle to become dominant, although some degree of consensus can still be 
reached. The reason is that, when the first scenario occurs, new ideas feed back 
into pre-existing consensual knowledge and are reinforced by shared practices; 
when the second scenario occurs, instead, an emerging consensual knowledge 
hits bureaucratic or cultural barriers, which are hard to overcome if none or 
loose network-ties between actors, organisations or policy fields are present.   
On the basis of these preliminary considerations, my concluding remarks are 
structured as follows. The next section outlines the explanatory power of this 
thesis vis-à-vis the alternative explanations presented in chapter 2 and in light 
of the empirical findings. It summarises the contribution of a learning 
communities approach, based on the articulation of practice and episteme, to 
the academic debate. The third section presents the normative implications and 
their relevance for the future of EU security cooperation in times of deep 
changes caused by austerity cuts. Finally, the last section suggests future 
trajectories of research on EU and international security and the role of 
learning theories and sociological institutionalism.  
 
9.1 Explanatory power 
 
In his preface to The Order of Things (1970), Michel Foucault refers to the 
tension between the “exotic charm of another system of thought and “the 
limitation of our own”.  
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To the extent that they stem from systems of thought, epistemes – and, as a 
result, the communities that that ensue from them – are by definition prone to 
epistemic closure. Such fragmentation is due to cultural, ideological, political 
divide. The knowledge of things proceeds from a fundamental arrangements of 
knowledge, which lies at the crossroad between the encoded, culturally-rooted 
understanding of the empirical order and the scientific explanations of it. As 
Foucault put it, “between the already encoded eye and reflexive knowledge 
there is a middle region which liberates order itself” (Foucault, 1970: xxi).   
That “arrangement of knowledge” paves the way for the “authoritative claim” 
the learning enterprise is built upon. It stems from the recognition of the 
consensus surrounding knowledge and the dominance emanating from it. 
Against this backdrop, the explanatory power of the theoretical approach used 
in this study finds in this “middle region” its biggest strength and, at the same 
time, its main source of weakness.  
By addressing the blind spots between the epistemic notion of learning, 
theorised by Ernst Haas and Emanuel Adler, and its evolution down through 
the “practice turn” by Adler himself, my thesis has sought to elucidate the 
dynamics and overlap between expertise-based and practice communities, and 
the way the mutually supportive relationship between habitus and episteme 
reinforces the diffusion and impact of ideas and, as a result, the prospects for 
international (European) security cooperation. As a matter of fact, Bourdieu 
himself stated, the habitus “a product of history, produces individual and 
collective practices – more history – in accordance with the scheme generated 
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by history” (Bourdieu, 1980: 54). It is this system of dispositions that, 
according to Bourdieu, allows the continuity and regularity which objectivism 
sees in social practices without being able to account for it, and ensures the 
active presence of past experiences which guarantee the “correctness” of 
practices and their constancy over time (p. 55).  
In this respect, the “creative act” of producing new principled beliefs pertaining 
to epistemic communities is naturally reinforced if it is lodged into the set of 
dispositions, habits of mind and regularities that form a community of practice, 
by means of which the authoritative claim leading to a new arrangement of 
knowledge is more likely to overcome cultural and structural barriers.  
This theorisation, I believe, bears deep implications for IR Theory and the 
study of international cooperation – in particular, integration processes, which 
can be summarised in the following three points.   
 
9.1.1 Follow ideas, track practices 
 
A first, general theoretical lesson from my research concerns the object of 
sociological institutionalist analyses. Empirical investigations of European 
security over the past five years have overemphasised the role of bureaucratic 
structures as agents of socialisation. This approach presents some advantages 
in operational terms, particularly since bureaucracies tend to have clear 
boundaries and mandates, making them fit for research. However, as I have 
repeatedly pointed out in the previous chapters, learning communities are 
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seldom confined to a single entity. Decision-makers are not locked in their 
offices and do not talk exclusively with colleagues from their unit, like in the 
New Yorker’s 1969 Cartoon (cf. Annex 4). People have at least three good 
reasons not to do so: first one, they would probably go insane. Second, their 
career prospects would be severely undermined, especially in a job market 
where networking matters. Third, they most likely could not be locked inside 
their offices anyway because of the EU’s multi-level governance system, 
which essentially means that influent Council, member states and Commission 
officers know each other.  
The process leading to the institutionalisation of a norm, to the creation of a 
policy framework and, finally, to its implementation is a highly complex one. It 
entails intense consultation between bureaucratic units, institutions, states and 
other relevant international organisations. An analysis of the EUMC as an 
epistemic community (Cross, 2011), or the COREU network as a community 
of practice (Bicchi, 2011), provides interesting findings in terms of how these 
structures influence agenda-setting. However, they are incomplete: it would be 
like investigating the diffusion and impact of the “tiki-taka” style of play in 
football by looking at the Spanish national team only, hence failing to consider 
how this thinking emerged in the first place as an evolution of “Total Football” 
in Barcelona, The Netherlands and other European contexts.167 To understand 
how concepts develop, it is therefore necessary to follow ideas, from the 
moment they are generated down to the processes of diffusion and 
                                                
167 I thank Roberto Roccu for his comments on the limits of a bureaucratic approach to learning 
communities, as well as for his feedback on the evolution of “Total Football” as an example of 
norm diffusion.  
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institutionalisation, hence looking at how cognitive content flows and evolves 
across (not within) institutional structures.  
My thesis shows that the expansion of a pre-existing practice (CCM) has more 
power, in terms of persuasiveness and influence, than the epistemic attempt to 
bridge separated areas of security cooperation into a single framework (SSR). 
This work has hence explored the different social structures (communities) 
coexisting within a policy area (CSDP). Different communities resulted in 
different learning processes. In one case, the rationale behind the formulation 
of CCM rested on the enhancement of a “know-how asset”, shared by a 
community of practitioners, which was expected to provide CSDP with a niche 
role in international security. In the other case, instead, the SSR enterprise was 
linked to the generation of new avenues of knowledge, which openly called 
into question the existing practices of security. It can hence be concluded that, 
in order to follow the ideas that successfully influenced the construction of 
European security, the practices associated with it must be tracked down.   
 
9.1.2 Limitations and lex parsimoniae 
 
This work presents several limitations. First of all, the empirical study only 
deals with two cases. It thus makes it difficult to draw robust implications 
regarding the typology of learning communities, their interactions and the 
extent to which this learning approach can be replicated to other environments 
– for instance, security cooperation in other institutional or regional contexts. 
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There is clearly a need for further empirical research on a broader scale, and in 
particular in comparative perspective across different international 
organisations, as discussed in the last section of this chapter. Moreover, the 
analysis does not sufficiently explore the possibility that a form of community 
may evolve into another, for instance how an epistemic community may 
succeed in becoming a community of practice. Transformative interactions 
between communities are also a promising research avenue in this respect.  
Other limitations of this research relate to the mapping technique used and the 
snapshot of learning communities. The choice to apply a qualitative research 
design was motivated by the need to concentrate on the dynamic flow of 
knowledge. This choice, however, goes to the detriment of the quantitative 
assessment of network relationships, in other words the structures upon which 
social interactions occur. The use of a set of criteria drawn from social network 
analysis, in order to detect relations among actors, could only partially address 
the problem. Furthermore, some “filters” through which membership of the 
communities is selected could not be covered by the framework: for instance, 
my methodology did not bring into focus other pertinent indicators such as 
education and cultures, which concur in the definition of the predominant 
system of thought in a given sector of cooperation (think about the liberal 
notion of peacebuilding, or the Western vs “others” understanding of the 
Responsibility to Protect; cf. also a deeper investigation of the role of 
language); individual leadership and the way it affects the diffusion of some 
ideas over others was also missing: in some cases, individuals can play a 
Chapter 9 – Conclusion 
                   318 
decisive role in shaping policy change (for instance, the Ruggie’s agenda on 
business and human rights). The truth is: following the norm and singling out 
what drivers mattered, and amongst those which ones can be identified as 
critical, independent variables is already a complex process tracing enterprise. 
The path an idea follows from its inception to the applicability on the ground 
may in some cases stretch forth through centuries, disappear at some points and 
reappear to surface again at specific historical circumstances. Learning 
communities are also complex entities: their configuration is not linear, their 
shape and size irregular, their representation follows the “Matryoshka doll” 
illustration, whereby different degrees of consensus at a higher, abstract level 
include different “arrangements” at the lower, technical or contextual level.  
After four years of PhD research, I can claim with sufficient confidence that 
institutional learning tests a researcher’s ability to abide by the law of 
parsimony. At the same time, it helps reminding you that few, well-structured 
although not entirely exhaustive hypotheses are the best way to reduce, and 
hence explain complexity. In this work, I therefore singled out what I think are 
the most critical drivers of learning, and these essentially have to do with (1) 
the actors who carry the cognitive content producing learning; (2) the cognitive 
architecture within which they operate; (3) the power-based enablers (the 
constituencies) who elevate ideas from being a small boat in the great sea to the 
domain of political relevance. A second implication is that, no matter what the 
theoretical or methodological approach used is, that basic principle of 
simplicity known as the “Occam’s razor” shall never be forgotten.  
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9.1.3 The making of CSDP and its relevance for IR Theory 
 
The present study also addresses the agency-structure debate that has haunted 
IR Theory for decades. Following the “turn to ideas” (Schmidt, 2010) and the 
basic logics of constructivist sociological institutionalism outlined by Adler, I 
have argued that human actions and the world’s reality are mutually 
constitutive and depend on “dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations 
of the material world” (Adler, 1997: 322).  
My cases show pretty clearly the extent to which interactions, socialisation and 
learning influence and constitute the identity of actors as well as their interests, 
but has also stressed the role of power in terms of creating the conditions for 
ideas to become authoritative – or dominant. Learning communities 
complement sociological perspectives on CSDP and push forward the research 
agenda in the wider fields of international security and international relations in 
many respects.  
First, they mediate between the internalisation of norms through socialisation, 
understood as the shaper of agents’ preferences, and the presence of power 
within institutions, which sways socialisation processes. The latter become a 
mutualisation of influence: views are intrinsically linked to the interests of 
those who “view” and their desire to influence the mindset of their 
interlocutors.  
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Second, learning communities move the analytical focus into human agency, as 
they emphasise the capacity of actors to shape responses to changed structural 
circumstances. In this respect, my work avoids the return of structuralist 
institutional account (Menon, 2011), and rejects explanations based on 
predictability and path-dependency orienting decision-makers’ actions. But it 
also contrasts the growing literature on principal-agent rational-choice theories, 
which take all consequences as intended and pre-determined.  
Third, a learning communities approach shows that paramount to the making of 
international cooperation, in this case of the CSDP, is the agents’ interpretation 
or reinterpretation of consensual knowledge (episteme) and of the schemes of 
perceptions and actions that are derived from interaction within a social field 
over a long period (habitus) (Mérand, 2012). This act delivers a new know-
how, making what is to be done self-evident or commonsensical (Pouliot, 
2008). The making of the CSDP in its formative years is a creative, concerted, 
isomorphic, multi-layered and evolutionary act. Structural and agential 
elements are therein combined: actors build on their expertise and/or on 
practical background knowledge they accumulated which in the end result in 
institutional constructions. While Mérand (2012) conceives this process as 
bricolage, I prefer to compare it to the practice of building construction, which 
entails a collective effort between a real estate developer, who secures funds 
(the EU or other international organisations); investors, who provide the 
funding (states); construction managers, who coordinate the efforts of different 
groups of participants (formal networks such as INCAF or DCAF); the 
Chapter 9 – Conclusion 
                   321 
architects, who provide the building design (epistemic communities); and the 
engineers (communities of practice), who ensure the link between planning and 
implementation thanks to their know-how rooted in practical experience. This 
finally leads to the establishment of CSDP’s comprehensive and civilian 
structures for mission planning and implementation.   
 
9.2 Normative implications: a comprehensive CSDP? 
   
In light of the present conclusions, a broader, empirical overview of the most 
recent developments affecting CSDP is necessary to beef up my study with 
some normative, policy-relevant recommendations. The question arises as to 
how my contribution can provide some practical guidelines for a more coherent 
and integrated European cooperation in security and defence.   
In ten years of operational existence of the CSDP, the EU has become a global 
crisis manager and strengthened its role as a regional security actor, by serving 
as a partner of the United Nations and finding a relatively stable coexistence 
with NATO. Recently, however, since 2008 (launch of Operation Atalanta in 
the Horn of Africa) and up till the Summer 2012, the CSDP entered a period of 
stagnation, marked by an “existential crisis”. The core problems can be 
identified in the lack of political will and low commitment on the part of 
member states to provide EU institutions with coherent strategic guidelines. 
Operational requirements have meanwhile become more onerous as the 
demand for security provision increased, due to upheaval in the neighbourhood 
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(cf. the Arab Spring), transformations to global security in a multi-polar world 
and defence budget restrictions caused by austerity. In response to these 
changes, only one crisis management mission – the small-scale EUTM training 
mission in Somalia – was launched in more than four years, a crisis that was 
worsened by the EU lack of action on Libya.  
This trend has been broken, very recently, by two signs of revival. The first one 
has to do with the debate on pooling & sharing of military capabilities, boosted 
by the NATO smart defence agenda in the wake of the Chicago Summit in 
May 2012. Originating in the Ghent initiative (Autumn 2010) and strongly 
promoted by the European Defence Agency, pooling and sharing seeks to 
operationalise the EU and member states’ attempt to meet new security 
challenges while at the same time coping with scarce capabilities due to the 
budget cuts imposed by austerity measures (Faleg and Giovannini, 2012; 
Biscop and Coelmont, 2012). The second sign is a renewed engagement in 
crisis management, taking the form of the launch of new missions (cf. EUCAP 
Nestor and EUCAP Niger) specifically designed to “turn the comprehensive 
approach into comprehensive action” (Ashton, 2012) and let the EU assume its 
global responsibilities in high-risk theatres (Faleg and Blockmans, 2012). 
These initiatives constitute important and concrete steps to tackle insecurity in 
a comprehensive manner, following the strategic roadmap defined by the 
regional strategies for the Sahel (EEAS, 2012) and the Horn of Africa (Council 
of the European Union, 2011).168 Furthermore, the institutional structures, such 
                                                
168 Cf. also European Parliament (2012).   
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as the EEAS, and procedures, such as early warning capacity, created by the 
Lisbon Treaty badly need a new set of learning experiences to consolidate the 
integrated, comprehensive approach. The CSDP is still, in a sense, a young 
security institution compared to other organisations and the post-Lisbon 
institutional format has not been tested on several fronts, from the internal 
coordination to interoperability on the ground.  
This overview points directly to the great dilemma surrounding the future of 
EU security cooperation. Acknowledging ten years of progressive 
institutionalisation and development of shared practices, the Lisbon Treaty has 
formalised structures and procedures to reinforce the comprehensive approach, 
hence integrating military with civilian tools for long and short term crisis 
response capacity. However, this new arrangement is characterised by scarce 
resources (worsened in the wake of the Eurozone crisis), lukewarm political 
underpinning (due to differences in member states preferences resulting in 
political sensitivities and stumbling blocks, such as the issue of a permanent 
operational headquarter), and loose strategic direction. How could this 
stalemate be overcome?  
The answer to that is neither in the withdraw of the state to the benefit of right-
minded Brussels-based civil servants controlling policy-making due to their 
positional power (Dijkstra, 2012), nor in the directoire of a core group of 
member states (e.g. the Franco-British entente) providing the authority for 
legitimacy and ignition, while at the same time retaining the control over the 
red button.  
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The recipe lies somewhere in the middle. It resides in the formation and 
consolidation of an empowered community of like-minded agenda-setters 
belonging to different backgrounds (Commission officers, military officials, 
Brussels-based diplomats, seconded national experts), but sharing a common 
sense of practice reinforcing their conviction that a comprehensive approach to 
security represents the future of crisis management and conflict prevention. 
The normative vision and practical aspects of the EU’s crisis response should 
become mutually reinforcing and feed into the strategic discourse. In an 
integrated approach, existing esprits de corps must necessarily become 
integrative, breaking the walls between competing cultures and previously 
separated organisational routines. This process can work only if a series of 
conditions apply: the presence of constituencies agreeing on the need to 
provide a strong political and financial backing to this cause – for instance, the 
German-Swedish initiative to intensify military pooling and sharing in Europe 
through the implementation of the “Ghent Framework”;169 a rationale for 
action justifying the greater push towards deeper integration and greater 
comprehensiveness - e.g. the austerity measures imposing to “do more with 
less”; the search of complementarities between NATO’s and the EU’s pooling 
and sharing agendas; an empirical validation of the policy enterprise - e.g. 
emulation of successful operational models and best practices, such as the EU 
comprehensive efforts in the Horn of Africa, where multi-dimensional and 
                                                
169 Cf. “Pooling and sharing, German-Swedish initiative”, Food for Thought Document, Berlin 
and Stockholm, November 2010. Available from: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede260511deseinitiat
ive_/sede260511deseinitiative_en.pdf [Accessed 7 February 2014].   
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inter-operating missions co-existed; finally, the emergence of a 
consensual/dominant understanding of the strategic way forward, fostered by 
stronger and accountable leadership.  
The bottom line is that the learning communities approach to CSDP reinforces 
the claim that the power-based representation of technical knowledge and 
experiential know-how concur in explaining the design and activities of the 
CSDP as we see it today. As a consequence, these factors are crucial to 
estimate the trajectories of security cooperation as they will unfold tomorrow. 
Arguably, the construction of a comprehensive CSDP is based on a consensual 
and dominant vision of the changing nature of security affairs among European 
stakeholders. Such vision is imposed by exogenous factors, such as a changing 
security environment. It is also rooted in practice, through learning by doing, 
and supported by a sizeable group of member states, who perceive the 
integrated approach as a common denominator. If theory must serve the 
practical purpose of making predictions about future scenarios, I would 
therefore argue that while the first decade of the 2000s was marked by the 
“civilian” aspects of CSDP, reflected in the civilian deployments outnumbering 
military ones, the second decade will be focused to construct a 
“comprehensive” vision of CSDP out of the design sketched over the past ten 
years, possibly leading integrated structures, missions and capabilities. The 
CSDP has already started its transformation from a civilian to a comprehensive 
actor. As a UK diplomat pointed out, a generational shift is needed to produce 
a cultural shift, as individuals need to live through and experience new 
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policies.170 The underlying idea of the comprehensive approach (that things are 
done better if done together) was implausible ten years ago and still finds some 
resistance in certain environments. What makes the difference now is that 
integrated policies implemented in the Balkans or in the Horn of Africa, 
through learning by doing and the constitution of nascent professional 
networks, will plausibly create the practices that will, in turn, back up 
paradigm innovation.171      
 
9.3 Future trajectories of research 
 
Not all ideas can mold international cooperation. Influent ideas certainly do. As 
the very final act of my work I deem necessary to identify some concrete 
research avenues with respect to 1) the contribution of a learning community 
approach vis-à-vis institutional learning, sociological institutionalism and the 
research agenda on practice/knowledge-based communities; 2) security 
cooperation in Europe.  
 
9.3.1 Learning communities and IR Theory 
 
Let us start from the extremely broad area of IR Theory. Let us also 
acknowledge that whereas academic works on institutions and ideas have 
                                                
170 Interview of the author with a UK diplomat, London, December 2012.  
171 I thank Mary Martin for her input on the broader relation between theory development and 
empirical back-up.  
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multiplied in the past 20-30 years,172 works on learning and communities can 
be counted on one hand.173 My contribution has to do with the cognitive 
dimension of ideas - such as causal beliefs or knowledge, i.e. collectively 
shared validity claims with regard to cause- and effect-relationships and states 
of the world. Essentially, I conceive the diffusion of ideas as learning.  
A first, key “lesson” to be learned for future research is that institutional bodies 
and transnational bureaucracies cannot be investigated in isolation from one 
another. The circumstances under which socialisation takes place, and norms 
are internalised by actors should lead to a renewed, comprehensive research 
programme, devoted to explain which norms matter in international 
cooperation, why, what are the communities involved in their diffusion and the 
impact on institutional outcomes.  
The research agenda on norm diffusion could be refined so as to stress that (1) 
sources of change are both within and outside the institutional arena as norms 
transcend institutional borders, and (2) unexpected consequences are part of 
institutional development,174 and policies evolve through multiple, non-linear 
stages. This justifies a deeper understanding of the praxis and epistemological 
origins of social interactions determining the way actors mobilise ideas and use 
them to foster policy change. A future research agenda could therefore explain 
                                                
172 On the vast, incredibly vast literature on the diffusion of ideas as a central theme of IR 
literature, cf. the Grant Proposal “The Transformative Power of Europe: the European Union 
and the diffusion of ideas”, available from: http://www.polsoz.fu-
berlin.de/en/v/transformeurope/forschung/Trafo_Europ_short.pdf (Accessed 12 September 
2012).  
173 That being said, a revival has occurred as a result of the rise of communitarian IR and the 
practice turn. The Canadian scholarship has been in the avant-garde, overtaking research in 
Europe and the United States.  
174 Policy outcomes might be different from what is expected, as shown by the development of 
a civilian, as opposed to military, CSDP.  
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how changes in the international system impact on agencies and what accounts 
for policy-makers’ agreement over a certain type of cooperation pattern; and 
also what explains the emergence of policy consensus (or the lack thereof) at 
critical junctures, especially when experiences of policy failure are no longer 
considered as acceptable. In this regard, a recommendation coming out this 
work is that research should privilege the analysis of macro-structures (e.g. an 
international organisation, such as the EU or the IMF) and their interactions 
(e.g. EU-NATO or EU-UN relations), in addition to micro-bureaucratic units 
(e.g. EUMC, COREU). For instance, comparative research could look at how 
specific norms, such as state-building, develop across institutions (e.g. OECD 
and EU approaches to state-building) and explain possible variation in 
outcomes or patterns of inter-institutional co-operation. In the sample case 
above, interaction between EU, OECD and respective member states’ 
representatives through formal (INCAF) and informal networks would deserve 
exploration.    
Furthermore, research shall acknowledge that in the same way an episteme can 
be weak or strong, practices can be tight or loose: in this sense, it would be 
extremely beneficial to our understanding of international affairs if future 
research agendas clear up the conditions under which a practice becomes 
stronger or weaker, hence more or less influential, and whether specific types 
of institutional design (e.g. the EU multi-level governance) facilitate or hamper 
the emergence of practices. It shall also be explained what is the relative 
weight of cultural factors in explaining experts or practitioners’ consensus. 
Chapter 9 – Conclusion 
                   329 
This bears particular relevance as the international systems moves towards 
multi-polarity and emerging powers exert a political and cultural counterweight 
to the West. In a global order in which Western liberal values are increasingly 
called into questions, because of the relative decline in Western hegemony, the 
question arises as to how the framework of learning communities can be 
applied to explain multi-polar/multi-lateral patterns of cooperation. The 
dominance of the liberal peace agenda in the global discourse and practice of 
peace making depends, in fact, on the material (Waltz, 1979), ideational (Nye, 
2004) and discursive (Foucault, 1970) power of the “Global North” (Peterson 
et al., 2012). With the transition towards multi-polarity, these power balances 
worldwide are shifting as old and new powers are (re)emerging. These changes 
take different shapes across different policy and geographical areas. The 
influence of emerging powers on dominant peace norms has not been explored. 
Peacebuilding and the notion of the R2P (Kuperman, 2008; Bellamy, 2011; 
Weiss, 2011) are important cases in point. Research efforts should then be 
directed towards understanding how ideas become consensual and dominant in 
a multi-polar system. How can emerging epistemes or connecting habits be 
affected by multiple cultural gaps? In other words, what factors can be 
considered as more relevant to explain resistance to knowledge formation and 
practice expansion as the balance of power is reconfigured – and new security 
dynamics emerge?    
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9.3.2 Learning communities and EU security studies 
 
Updating the research agenda on security cooperation in Europe is perhaps a 
more challenging and, to a certain extent, ambitious task. CSDP is a very 
recent research field and scholars, likewise policy-makers, are “learning by 
writing”. Since Christopher Hill’s capability-expectations gap (1993), the 
intensification of studies having EU foreign and security as the object of 
analysis have reduced the “theoretical deficit” that was considered relatively 
high in the mid 2000s (Howorth, 2001; Bono, 2002; Tonra and Christiansen, 
2004). Theoretical applications of CFSP/CSDP may still be uncoordinated 
(Jorgensen, 2004), but competing mainstream explanations have emerged (e.g. 
rationalist approaches and institutionalist ones). An evolutionary pattern within 
each one of these explanations also unfolded, as shown by the evolution from a 
trans-governmental agenda to the focus on Brussels-based bureaucracies.  
I guess the most important implications of my research for future studies 
concerns the development of a social epistemology of the CSDP and, to a 
wider extent, for European integration. Over the past decade, research has 
mostly gone in the direction of ontological (what constitutes EU security 
identity) and normative (how does the EU CSDP relates to external challenges, 
actors, threats). More recently, as I already discussed in the literature review, 
sociological accounts were brought to the fore of academic debate. What has 
been neglected is, using Bourdieu’s formulation, the “knowledge of the 
knowledge”: a systematic and thorough focus on the types of knowledge 
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acquired by the EU security system and their effects. In a highly 
interdependent world characterised by technological and social change 
proceeding at unprecedented pace, academic research should be able to explain 
what type of knowledge makes headway into decision-making, what are the 
cognitive beliefs rooted in expertise and practices that shape discussions about 
security and defence, and what factors facilitate/hamper cooperative outcomes. 
If we start conceiving EU institutions as maximising the cognitive impact of 
knowledge and practice-driven learning, future research should then show how 
the construction of principled and causal beliefs is structured in the first place. 
Accordingly, it would be interesting to see how other security frameworks have 
evolved, and how the EU relates to other international organisations with 
which it shares the same or a contiguous practice field (e.g. NATO, the OECD, 
the UN). The emerging debate on military pooling and sharing provides a good 
case, because it raises highly relevant theoretical questions: what motivated 
states to move from previous forms of armaments cooperation (within NATO 
and outside, e.g. EDA or OCCAR), to forge new ones? How robust is the 
emerging consensus on pooling & sharing and what are its policy implications, 
namely the impact on security governance? Prior analyses of armaments 
cooperation across Europe and the US (Jones, 2007; Guay, 1998; De Vore, 
2013), overlook the formation of policy innovation and fail to specify how 
policy issues were re-framed and influenced decision-making (McNamara, 
1999; Adler, 2008; Batora, 2009), in response to structural changes in global 
security – namely, the transition towards a multi-polar world, transformations 
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in the defence industry, US pivot to East, austerity measures imposing 
substantial defence budget cuts.  
Moving on from the practice turn, a research agenda on learning communities 
could explore other empirical case studies (e.g. cyber security) in which 
different types of communities may co-exist and produce a complex cognitive 
architecture. This may eventually lead to a more robust analytical framework 
for addressing the major issues surrounding the future of security governance, 
possibly drawing from the education literature (Feger and Arruda, 2008).   
Security and defence cooperation in Europe is producing a highly technical, 
innovative and, from an institutional standpoint, increasingly sophisticated 
policy field. It is by understanding how ideas, in the form of technical 
knowledge and practical know-how, are interpreted and channelled into the 
decision-making that it will be possible to explain the identity and determine 
the causes of CSDP. The notion of learning communities, which I elaborated in 
this thesis, defines the multiple processes and overlapping episteme/practices 
by which actors come together to achieve learning goals in a specific field. By 
further exploring the explanatory potential of this concept in IR Theory, and by 
applying it to other policy areas, the gap between the generation of knowledge 
and the related praxis may finally be bridged.    
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Annex 2: Questionnaire SSR 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The aim of this questionnaire is to map the universe of the expertise-based networks 
that have shaped the debate on Security Sector Reform, with specific focus on the 
European Union’s approach. This mapping exercise constitutes a methodological tool 
for my Ph.D. thesis on the role of learning communities in fostering policy and 
institutional change in the EU Common Security and Defence Policy. Accordingly, 
the results of this study will be used for scientific purposes and information provided 
will be treated with the utmost confidentiality so as to guarantee the privacy of your 
data. 
Although I understand you have a very busy schedule, I kindly ask you to be as 
precise as possible in your answers: the questionnaire has a total of 20 questions and it 
is designed in a way to require less than 25 minutes to fill out.  
Comments, questions or attachments in support of your answers (i.e. working papers, 
resumes, official documents) are of course welcome and can be addressed via email 
to: g.faleg@lse.ac.uk .  
 
Thank you very much for your time. 
 
 
 
1. Personal information 
 
 
Name:  
 
Nationality:  
 
Age:  
 
Gender:   
 
Native language:  
 
 
 
 
 
2. Background information [4 questions] 
 
 
(2.1) Which organization or institution you currently work for or are affiliated to? 
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INSTITUTION WEBSITE 
  
 
 
 
(2.2) What type of organization is it? (underline the correct answer)  
 ‐  governmental ‐ international organization ‐ NGO ‐ business ‐ academia ‐ interest group ‐ lobby ‐ think-tank ‐ military ‐ other__________________________________________________ 
 
 
(2.3) Which of the following sectors do you focus on?  (underline the correct answers)  
 ‐ development ‐ security/defence ‐ human rights ‐ good governance ‐ democracy promotion ‐ post-conflict reconstruction ‐ peace-building ‐ migration ‐ civilian crisis management ‐ humanitarian aid ‐ SSR/DDR ‐ mediation ‐ gender ‐ civil society ‐ training ‐ other__________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
(2.4) If different from the present one, what organization(s) or institution(s) were you 
working for / affiliated to between 1999 and 2006?  
 
 
 
YEAR FUNCTION ORGANIZATION 
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3. Your views on SSR [2 questions] 
 
 
(3.1) How would you define SSR? (please include references unless this is your 
original definition or viewpoint) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(3.2) What do you think are, in general, the main problems related to SSR 
conceptualization and implementation? 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
4. Your engagement with SSR [11 questions] 
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(4.1) What type of professional output best characterizes your work in relation to 
SSR?    
 ‐ direct involvement in policy-making ‐ providing expertise  ‐ opinion-making  ‐ lobbying ‐ legislative activity  ‐ diplomacy ‐ military/defence matters  ‐ advocacy  ‐ other:__________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
(4.2) What are or have been your main sources of funding for SSR-related projects?  
 ‐ government budget (please specify below which ministries or agencies): ‐ _______________________________________________________  ‐ corporate funding  ‐ political funding ‐ parliamentary funding ‐ donations  ‐ NGOs  ‐ research schemes  ‐ EU budget  ‐ UN budget  ‐ World Bank budget  ‐ OECD budget ‐ other IOs 
budget:________________________________________________
_ 
 
 
 
(4.3) In your field of expertise, do you perceive yourself as influential vis-à-vis policy 
and decision-making? If yes, please specify why/ provide evidence. 
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(4.4) Do you rely on external or expert advice or make use of sources produced by 
other individual or organizations? Please provide one or two examples of interaction 
with experts that have significantly shaped your ideas or knowledge about SSR.  
 
 
 
 
(4.5) How often do you seek or have you sought expert advice for SSR matters 
(underline the correct answer)?  
 ‐ often ‐ regularly ‐ seldom ‐ never 
 
 
 
 
(4.6) When looking for expertise to carry out a work assignment on SSR, you tend to 
consult (underline the correct answers, multiple choice possible):  
 ‐ advisors or colleagues within my organizational unit or institution  ‐ people of my same ethnicity or nationality who I can speak to in my native 
language  ‐ people recommended by mutual friends or acquaintances  ‐ individuals met at thematic conferences, workshops etc.  ‐ random google search  ‐ my organization/institution takes care of providing the useful contacts at 
the right time ‐ experts or professionals working in influential organizations/institutions, 
especially those that are linked to my employer ‐ I seldom need expert advice: I know almost everything one needs to know 
and I use to provide, rather than seek expertise ‐ policy-makers who have direct experience with the subject-matter ‐ people with field experience  ‐ other 
_______________________________________________________ 
  
  
  
(4.7) How many individuals you can reasonably define “experts” in the field of SSR 
are you regularly in touch with? Please provide up to 10 names and function. 
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NAME FUNCTION EMAIL  
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(4.8) Please list five individuals and organizations you consider as being most 
influential in shaping the SSR agenda, regardless of your interaction with them.  
 
 
a) Individuals  
  
NAME FUNCTION EMAIL 
   
   
   
   
   
 
 
b) Organizations  
 
NAME COUNTRY (if applicable) 
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
(4.9) Please list the main SSR-related conferences, workshops and meetings you have 
attended since 2000 (if possible indicate a minimum of three) 
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CONF. TITLE ORGANIZER LOCATION YEAR 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 
 
(4.10) Would you consider these conferences useful? If yes, why? (underline the right 
answer)  
 ‐ No ‐ Yes, because of:  
 
o networking opportunities 
o knowing more about SSR 
o exchange views with other colleagues 
o eat a lot, get to see new places  
o other:____________________________________________ 
 
 
 
(3.11) Has fieldwork experience been instrumental to shape your views on SSR? If 
yes, please provide one or two examples.  
 
 
 
 
 
5. A few more questions on SSR and the EU [3 questions] 
 
 
(5.1) Which EU member states were, in your opinion, more actively and effectively 
involved in pushing forward the SSR agenda?  
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(5.2) What is your position vis-à-vis the EU approach to SSR?  
 ‐ what approach?  ‐ favorable: The EU is becoming a major player in SSR  ‐ against: the EU’s approach to SSR stops at the declaratory level: 
implementation lags behind  ‐ there is no “EU approach”, only the Council and the Commission’s 
engagement  ‐ other:__________________________________________________ 
 
 
(5.3) What do you think is the main obstacle to the implementation of the EU 
approach to SSR?   
 
 
 
END OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
THANKS FOR YOUR COOPERATION!  
 
-- 
 
Feedback is welcome: g.faleg@lse.ac.uk  
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Annex 3: Questionnaire CCM 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The aim of this questionnaire is to map the universe of the expertise and practice-
based networks that have shaped the debate on Civilian Crisis Management (CCM), 
with specific focus on the European Union’s approach. This mapping exercise 
constitutes a methodological tool for my Ph.D. thesis on the role of learning 
communities in fostering policy and institutional change in the EU Common Security 
and Defence Policy. Accordingly, the results of this study will be used for scientific 
purposes and information provided will be treated with the utmost confidentiality so as 
to guarantee the privacy of your data. 
Although I understand you have a very busy schedule, I kindly ask you to be as 
precise as possible in your answers: the questionnaire has a total of 19 questions and it 
is designed in a way to require less than 20 minutes to fill out.  
Comments, questions or attachments in support of your answers (i.e. working papers, 
resumes, official documents) are of course welcome and can be addressed via email 
to: giovanni.faleg@ceps.eu   
 
Thank you very much for your time. 
 
 
 
6. Personal information 
 
 
Name:  
 
Nationality:  
 
Age:  
 
Gender:   
 
Native language:  
 
 
 
 
 
7. Background information [4 questions] 
 
 
(2.1) Which organization or institution you currently work for or are affiliated to? 
 
 
INSTITUTION WEBSITE 
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(2.2) What type of organization is it? (underline the correct answer)  
 ‐ governmental ‐ international organization ‐ NGO ‐ business ‐ academia ‐ interest group ‐ lobby ‐ think-tank ‐ military ‐ other__________________________________________________ 
 
 
(2.3) Which of the following areas do you focus on?  (underline the correct answers)  
 ‐ development ‐ security/defence ‐ human rights ‐ good governance ‐ democracy promotion ‐ post-conflict reconstruction ‐ peace-building ‐ migration ‐ police ‐ rule of law ‐ civilian administration ‐ civil protection ‐ monitoring ‐ humanitarian aid ‐ SSR/DDR ‐ mediation ‐ gender ‐ civil society ‐ training ‐ other__________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
(2.4) If different from the present one, what organization(s) or institution(s) were you 
working for / affiliated to between 1999 and 2006?  
 
 
 
YEAR FUNCTION ORGANIZATION 
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8. Your views on CCM [2 questions] 
 
 
(3.1) How would you define CCM?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
(3.2) What do you think are, in general, the main problems related to CCM 
implementation? 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
9. Your engagement with CCM [10 questions] 
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(4.1) What type of professional output best characterizes your work in relation to 
CCM? (underline the correct answer) 
 ‐ direct involvement in policy-making ‐ operational (missions) ‐ consultancy ‐ research ‐ lobbying ‐ legislative activity  ‐ diplomacy ‐ advocacy  ‐ other:__________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
(4.2) What are or have been your main sources of funding for CCM-related projects? 
(underline the right answers. If not applicable, skip to question 4.3)  
 ‐ government budget (please specify below which ministries or agencies): ‐ _______________________________________________________  ‐ corporate funding  ‐ political funding ‐ parliamentary funding ‐ donations  ‐ NGOs  ‐ research schemes  ‐ EU budget  ‐ UN budget  ‐ World Bank budget  ‐ OECD budget ‐ other IOs 
budget:________________________________________________
_ 
 
 
 
(4.3) How would you describe your role and influence in policy and decision-making 
in the field of CCM? Please feel free to provide examples and evidence of this. 
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(4.4) Please provide one or two examples of interaction with experts or practitioners 
that have significantly shaped your ideas or knowledge about CCM.  
 
 
 
 
 
(4.5) When looking for expertise to carry out a work assignment on CCM, you tend to 
consult (underline the correct answers):  
 ‐ advisors or colleagues within my organizational unit or institution  ‐ people of my same ethnicity or nationality who I can speak to in my native 
language  ‐ people recommended by mutual friends or acquaintances  ‐ individuals met at thematic conferences, workshops etc.  ‐ random google search  ‐ my organization/institution takes care of providing the useful contacts at 
the right time ‐ experts or professionals working in influential organizations/institutions, 
especially those that are linked to my employer ‐ I seldom need expert advice: I know almost everything one needs to know 
and I use to provide, rather than seek expertise ‐ policy-makers who have direct experience with the subject-matter ‐ people with field experience  ‐ other 
_______________________________________________________ 
  
  
  
(4.6) How many individuals you can reasonably define “experts” in the field of CCM 
are you regularly in touch with? Please provide up to 10 names and function. 
  
 
NAME FUNCTION EMAIL  
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(4.7) Please list five individuals and organizations you consider as being most 
influential in shaping the CCM agenda, regardless of your interaction with them.  
 
 
c) Individuals  
  
NAME FUNCTION EMAIL 
   
   
   
   
   
 
 
d) Organizations  
 
NAME COUNTRY (if applicable) 
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
(4.8) Please list the main CCM-related conferences, workshops and meetings you have 
attended since 2000 (if possible indicate a minimum of three) 
 
 
CONF. TITLE ORGANIZER LOCATION YEAR 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 
 
(4.9) Would you consider these conferences useful? If yes, why? (underline the right 
answer)  
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‐ No ‐ Yes, because of:  
 
o networking opportunities 
o knowing more about CCM 
o exchange views with other colleagues 
o eat a lot, get to see new places  
o other:____________________________________________ 
 
 
 
(4.10) Has fieldwork experience been instrumental to shape your views on CCM? If 
yes, please provide one or two examples.  
 
 
 
 
10. A few more questions on CCM and the EU [3 questions] 
 
 
(5.1) Which EU member states were, in your opinion, more actively and effectively 
involved in pushing forward the CCM agenda?  
 
 
(5.2) What is your position vis-à-vis the EU approach to CCM? (underline the right 
answer)  
 ‐ what approach?  ‐ favorable: the EU is a major player in CCM ‐ against: the EU’s approach to CCM stops at the declaratory level: 
implementation lags behind and fail to have a real impact on the ground  ‐ other:__________________________________________________ 
 
 
(5.3) What do you think is the main obstacle to the effective implementation of the EU 
approach to CCM?   
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END OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
THANKS FOR YOUR COOPERATION!  
 
-- 
 
Feedback is welcome: g.faleg@lse.ac.uk  
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Annex 4: Cartoon 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cartoon from The New Yorker, Published April 19, 1969, "Poor things!" 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
